EXPERIENCES IN ARAB AFFAIRS

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IRAQ AND THE FERTILE CRESCENT

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Lebanon
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IRAQ AND LEBANON

The relations between Iraq and Lebanon have been educational, economic and political at the same time. Lebanon is a great centre of modern learning which provides a meeting place for Western and Arab cultures.

Over fifty years ego, in 1921, when the Kingdom of Iraq was established and King Faisal the First was enthroned, I was among six students chosen by the Iraqi Ministry of Education to study at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon. We want by the sea route which took us via Basrah, Karachi, Bombay, Aden and Suez to Haifa. From there we took the train to Damascus and Beirut. The other members of the group were, Mohammed Deshti, Khalil Feddoo, Hasan Jwad, Muhyiddin Yusuf and Yusuf Zainal. The trip took us 39 days. Two years later the desert route was opened, and people began to cross the desert by automobile And bus, a journey which took some 24 hours. Today the trip by jet plane takes less than one hour.

In 1924 we suddenly and unexpectedly found that we had become Lebanese citizens. This happened when Turkey and the Allies signed the Lausanne Treaty, for it stated that all subjects of the old Ottoman territories would become citizens of the territory in which they were at the time of signing. This provision of the Treaty made us Lebanese citizens. We had to go through the process of re-establishing our Iraqi citizenship based on the fact that we were in Lebanon on an Iraqi government educational mission.

At the American University I majored in Education and minored in Natural Sciences. In addition to my academic education, I practised and lived inter-Arab unity. In the student society of 'Urwat al-Wuthqa, Arab students met together -- Iraqis, Syriens, Lebanese, Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, Sudanese -- and we all worked together for our national aims, namely, the liberation and union of the Arab nation. Besides, in the Brotherhood society, we learnt to practice tolerance in inter-religious relationships. Muslims, Christians, Jews and Druzes used to meet to learn to understand and respect each other. Beirut was a great centre for education in Arab nationalism And religious tolerance.

After the arrival of our group in Beirut the flow of students from Iraq increased, from year to year. Hundreds of students from Iraq, men and women, went to the American University of Beirut for their university education or for a year or two as a preparation for going to other universities-in the United States. Very soon Iraqi graduates of the A. U. B. began to occupy responsible positions in the various Ministries of the Iraqi government.

After my graduation in 1927 I returned to Iraq and started teaching at the Teacher Training College of Baghdad. In those days Iraq needed teachers for its educational development, and Beirut was an important center for recruiting teachers. Since I often spent my summer vacations in Lebanon, I was Asked by the Ministry of Education to take pert with the American University in the selection and recruitment of teachers for Iraq. The teachers were usually graduates of the A.U.B. and included Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanians and Palestinians.

When crossing the desert became easy due to better mean of transportation, Iraqis began to spend the summer months in Lebanon where they could escape the heat of Baghdad and enjoy the beautiful weather and scenery of the mountains of Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea. Thus Iraqi-Lebanese educational and economic relations become well established over the years, and those of us who had been educated in Beirut felt quite at home in Lebanon. In 1929 I went to the United States for my post-graduate studies in Education. On my return in 1932 up until the end of l942, I occupied administrative posts in the Ministry of Education, progressing from Supervisor General to Director General of Education. One of my functions in Education was the recruitment of Lebanese teacher and the sending of Iraqi students to the American University of Beirut. The numbers continued to increase with the development of Iraq up till the Second World War. Beirut continues to be an important educational centre attracting students from all over the Middle East.

During World War II, I was transferred from the Ministry of Education to take up the post of Director General of Foreign Affairs. It was at this time that the Lebanese national leaders, side by side with the Syrian national leaders, began to struggle for the termination of the French Mandate and for the independence of Lebanon. In Beirut Iraq had an accomplished Consul General, Tahseen Qadri, of Syrian descent. He later became the Minister at the head of the Iraqi diplomatic mission to Syria and Lebanon. He was well known to the early Arab nationalist for he had been aide-de- camp to King Faisal I. He had the friendship of the Lebanese political leaders and he reported their views and problems faithfully. At the same time he had the cooperation and confidence of both General Edward Spears, the British representative, and Mr George Wadsworth, the American government's representative in Beirut. It was Iraqis role to plead for the termination of the French Mandate and for the recognition of Lebanon as an independent state.

When the Lebanese leaders, including Bishara al-Khuri, Riyadh as-Sulh, Camille Sham’un, Saleem Taqla, 'Abdul Hameed Karami, 'Adil 'Usayran and others, were arrested by the French I wrote a few strong article for the Iraqi press defending the cause of Lebanon. Being Director General of Foreign Affairs at the time I could not sign my own name to what I wrote and so I used a pen name. Fortunately the United Kingdom and the United States both stood by Lebanon and defence the cause of its independence. Iraq, then did its best to see to it that Lebanon and Syria were both invited to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco 1954.

At San Francisco the Iraqi delegation worked hand in hand with the four other Arab delegations, namely, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. I established Friendly relations with Lebanese delegates, Wadi’ Na'im, Josef Salem and ‘Abdullah al-Yafi. Dr Charles Malik, another member of the delegation was already an old friend and classmate of mine. We thus had fine team work in San Francisco.

I was on the Trusteeship Committee that drafted Article 78 of the United Nation Charter which put a legal end to the French Mandate over Syria and Lebanon and assured them of achieving political independence. The Article stated that "The Trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality."

Before the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, Lebanon had already taken part in the establishment of the League of the Arab States and from then on Iraq's cooperation with Lebanon on a new political dimension. The Iraqi delegation which I used to lead to the United Nations cooperated fully and harmoniously with the delegation of Lebanon. Our policies in the world body were very close although Iraq usually was more forward, sharp and direct in stating them.

In the autumn of 1946 the British government called for an Arab Conference in London. As Foreign Minister I led the Iraqi delegation to that Conference. It was there that I came to know Camille Sham’un for the first-time. He was the Lebanese Minister to Great Britain and he headed the Lebanese delegation to the Conference. I came to appreciate his fine qualities and his zeal in defending the Arab cause. Later on we worked together in the United Nations fighting against the partition of Palestine And the establishment of Israel. Camille Sham’un was brilliant speaker and a charming states man. Our friendship and cooperation continued when he became President of the Lebanese Republic.

Riyadh as-Sulh, a well-known Arab nationalist, who became the first Prime Minister of Lebanon, was a loyal friend to Iraq, and we could cooperate with him in all matters and situations arising in the Arab League. The Arab League was often divided about the way to handle the Palestine problem and about matters arising from differences in points or view where Iraq was on one side, and Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the other. Riyadh as-Sulh acted as an intermediary and harmonizer. Before going to the Arab League, we often had a preparatory meeting in Beirut which included representatives or Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Unfortunately my Syrian and Lebanese colleagues sometimes came to one decision in Beirut and then had to reverse it in the meeting in Cairo when they found Egypt or Saudi Arabia in determined opposition. Syria and Lebanon felt that the Arab League structure was not yet strong and homogeneous and that it was important to hold all the members together.

Riyadh's zeal and work for Syrio-Iraqi unity and inter-Arab harmony was genuine and memorable. I shall never forget his efforts in the last days of his life to bring me together with Nazim a1-Qudsi of Syria in Shtawra

(See Syria,129 ).

Side by side with Riyadh as-Sulh I should like to remember with appreciation the wise and respected Foreign Minister of Lebanon, Hameed Franjia, who played a constructive role in handling Lebanese relations with sister Arab states. Lebanon was deprived of a highly qualified man when he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and fell ill. In succeeding years at the United Nations I continued to cooperate with leaders of the Lebanese delegation –- Philip Taqla, Charles Helou, Fuad Ammun, and most of all, Dr Charles Malik. We usually consulted on all matters affecting our policies. We were united in defending the Arab cause, standing by the liberation movements in Asia and Africa, and following an anti-Communist line. This same policy was followed by Iraq and Lebanon in the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955, where Dr Charles Malik was the embodiment of Lebanese policies and the Lebanese delegation was the closest one to the delegation of Iraq.

Lebanon, although a small Arab state, had a great advantage in international affairs because of its Christian-Muslim character and because it represented a meeting place for the occident and orient, culturally and politically. In 1952 the government of Pakistan proposed a summit meeting for the heads of Muslim states. Teheran was suggested as the place of meeting. I went to Karachi to discuss the matter with the Governor-General, my friend Ghulam Mohammed. From Karachi I flew straight to Beirut where I had a meeting with President Bishara al-Khouri, a Maronite Christian and a broadminded, wise statesman. I put before him the idea of the Islamic summit conference and suggested that Lebanon should certainly take part, for the presence of Lebanon would serve the cause of Christian-Islamic brotherhood and mutual understanding. Furthermore, the presence of Lebanon would ally any suspicious or misunderstanding in the West towards the Islamic conference. I emphasized the importance of Lebanon’s role as a connecting link and a symbol of brotherhood between Islam and Christianity. Sheikh Bishara listened very carefully and responded very generously. Unfortunately the summit conference was never realized -- not because of Lebanon, but mainly because Egypt and Turkey for the moment showed no interest in the project.

At the time of my Premiership, 1953-54, Beirut was the meeting place of Syrian Arab nationalists who had sought refuge there from the dictatorship of Shishakli. Since Shishakli's policy was anti-Iraq in those days, we contacted the Syrian leaders and helped them in their efforts to rid Syria of Shishakli. My friend, ex-Premier Saleh Jabr, was requested to go to Lebanon to achieve two purposes. The overt one was to study with the Lebanese government the possibility of diverting the oil pipeline which used to run from Kirkuk to Haifa to make it run from Mafraq in Jordan to a port in Lebanon. At the same time he was authorized to contact the Syrians and render them all the help they needed.

I myself made occasional trips to Beirut and contacted personalities there like Sheikh Ma’aruf Dawalibi, 'Adnan al-Atasi, Salahuddin al-Bitar and Michel 'Aflaq, and others. Besides, the Lebanese press, and especially Al-Hayat, owned by my friend Kamil Muruwa, volunteered to serve the cause of Syrio-Iraqi federation. President Sham’un was aware of Iraq's intentions and policies with which he was quite sympathetic. He often gave valuable advice.

One of the big obstacles to Syrio-Iraqi unity was the Lebanese Christian fear of Muslim domination. That fear had some historical roots from the Ottoman days and it was nurtured by old French colonial policies. France used to consider herself as the protector of the Christians of Lebanon. Christian-Muslim feelings have been largely harmonized in modern times and a sense of national unity and brotherhood prevails today in Syria and Lebanon and religious tolerance has become the order of the day, but there will always be some residue of the past in the subconscious.

Fortunately, on account of Iraq's record of amity and understanding of the Lebanese situation, the Christians of Lebanon harboured confidence in her good intentions towards Lebanon in the case of federation between Iraq and Syria. To emphasize this fact and to assure my Christian brethren in Lebanon that Iraq would always stand by them and appreciate their point of view, I had a lengthy session at the headquarters of Al-Kataib, the Maronite Christian Party and Organization, with the leaders of the movement headed by Sheikh Pierre al-Jumayyil. Accompanied by my friend, Muhsin Saleem, a well-known lawyer, I also had an excellent session with His Eminence the Maronite Patriarch Maoushi with whom I had a very friendly and frank talk about Muslim-Christian brotherhood and the need for checking the tide of materialism and moral disintegration in modern times. Patriarch Maoushi is a man of high standing in statesmanship and religious affairs. He is one of those who see the value of Lebanese-Arab unity and harmony. The important thing to the Christians of Lebanon is to preserve the unity and identity of Lebanon and to see to it that Lebanon is not swallowed by or amalgamated with its Arab neighbours. This wish I was ready to support.

     Lebanon is the home of another movement which was started by a Christian but which has adopted a laic philosophy and a concept of nationalism much more restricted than Arabism. It is the Syrian Nationalist Party founded by Antun Sa'ada in the 30's of this century. This party holds that the people of the Fertile Crescent, which includes Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine, form one nation. The star or the Crescent will be Cyprus. This militant party had its own cult and rigid discipline .

    I had rather contradictory with the leaders of this party. Knowing my genuine desire for Syrio-Iraqi federation and my faith in unity, they approached me through the dynamic Iraqi military attach6, Colonel Salih Mehdi Samarra'i, who himself was devoted to the cause or Syrio-Iraq federation. They offered their help for the cause of unity and asked Iraq for material support. For my part I was appreciative or their zeal and readiness for sacrifice, but I continued to preach a broader Arab nationalism to them. I did, to some extent, accept cooperation with them on the understanding that any federation in the Fertile Crescent would be a station on the way to greater Arab unity. I had meetings with Georges 'Abdul Massih, one of their leaders who was later dropped by the Party. Asad al-Ashqar, Ghassan al-Jedid, Adeeb Qaddure and Sa’id Taqiyiddin. The latter a great Lebanese literary figure was my friend and classmate in U.A.B. I had great faith in his sincerity and devotion. He sacrificed all his possessions in serving the cause in which he believed.

    Realizing the important role which France could play in Lebanese politics, I accepted an invitation to tea from the French Ambassador to Lebanon, H.E. Mr Balayc whom I knew personally since he had previously been stationed in Baghdad. On this occasion I explained to him exactly my idea or the Syrio-Iraqi federation which I hoped would be realized through free democratic processes and would serve both countries. I assured the Ambassador that such a federation would in no way be harmful or inimical to any Arab state and this would be especially true for Lebanon whose independence and special character Iraq appreciated and respected. Moreover such a federation would surely promote Syrio-Iraqi friendship and cooperation with France. Mr Balayc showed complete understanding and expressed sympathy and approval of the effort.   My purpose was mainly to allay French and Lebanese Christian fears of such a federation.     My friend Kamil Muruwa, appreciating the role of France and the French language in Lebanese politics, often advised that Iraq should purchase a French language newspaper in Beirut. This idea, however, could not be swallowed by Iraqi politicians. Nuri as-Sa’id once told me, "Syrio-Iraqi federation requires the agreement of France." But he did not, at the time, put much faith in the use of mass media and propaganda machinery for achieving political ends.

    Beirut, besides being a center for cooking Syrio-Iraqi federation, also became a battle ground on which the cold war over the Baghdad Pact was waged by the press. Egypt and Saudi Arabia both had press and propaganda media in Lebanon. Iraq and its pro-Western friends defended the cause of the Baghdad Pact. Lebanese foreign policy had much in common with Iraqi foreign policy as far as relations with the West was concerned.

    President Camille Sham’un was kept fully informed on Iraq's moves in the Baghdad Pact affair and his counsel and point of view were well appreciated by Iraq. The pact in its early stages, was called the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between turkey and Iraq. After Great Britain, Iran and Pakistan had joined, it became known as the Baghdad Pact. When President Gamal 'Abdul Nasir called for a meeting of the Arab Prime Ministers in Cairo in order to unite them against Iraq's entry into the Pact of Mutual Cooperation, I was in Lebanon. I had a lengthy meeting with President Sham'un in which he advised that Iraq should be represented at the meeting in order to present and defend its point of view. He thought that, if Prime Minister Nuri did not wish to be present himself, he might nominate me to represent Iraq. That is what actually happened for I led the Iraqi delegation to the meeting of the Arab Prime Ministers.

    But while Lebanese foreign policy, as represented by the President, was on the side of Iraq, the Lebanese Prime Minister, the popular Sami as-Sulh, held views similar to those of Egypt and took Egypt's side although he tried to maintain a show of complete neutrality. When I suggested at the Prime Ministers' meeting that a delegation should be sent to Baghdad to talk over the question of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation, Sami as-Sulh was nominated to head the delegation. While he was in Baghdad his Iraqi chauffeur report to Nuri as-Sa'id a conversation between Sami as-Sulh and Salah Salem. Sami stated that he was against Iraq's policy and in full accord with Egypt.

    When the tension between Iraq and Egypt began to increase, President Sham'un suggested to President Nasir that a meeting of heads of Arab stats should be held in Beirut to bring about understanding and harmony among the sister Arab states, but there were no positive results and the cold war continued between Iraq and Egypt.

    After Iraq’s entry into the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, later called the Baghdad Pact and Egypt’s negative stand, hops of having Lebanon join the Pact began to diminish. The same was true in the case of Jordan and Syria. The masses were aroused against the Pact by propaganda in the mass media. In spite of Lebanon's friendship and affinity with Iraq and Turkey, it was not practical for her to join. President Sham’un was a sincere friend of Iraq, so, when the cold war between Egypt and Iraq became intense, the anti-Iraq propaganda machinery in Beirut mobilized a section of the Lebanese community to be anti-Sham’un. In 1958 an attempt was being made to amend the Lebanese Constitution so that President Sham’un could be reelected. The anti Sham’unites, helped by Egypt and the Syrian Deuxieme Bureau, started politically inspired strikes which led to sanguine incidents inside Lebanon. Syrian elements, said to be directed by President 'Abdul Nasir's regime in Syria, began to infiltrate into Lebanon and add fuel to the fire. Lebanon considered this to be an interference in its internal affairs and took the case to the Council of the League of Arab States and then to the Security Council of the United Nations, accusing Egypt of interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon and jeopardizing its safety and security. Iraq sympathized wi:h President Sham-un. I was asked-by H.M. King Faisal II to defend the cause of Lebanon at the security council of which Iraq was a member at the time. Accordingly I went to New York and delivered a speech in defence of Lebanon. My speech contained a definition or Nasirism and explained that it meant the domination by President Nasir or the Arab world and the opening of doors for Communism to penetrate the Arab world. That speech cost me a sentence or 20 years imprisonment passed on me in December, 1958, by the Special High Military Tribunal or Iraq. A special Article had been inserted in the Criminal Law prepared by the Iraqi revolutionaries against the old regime. The article stipulated that who ever delivered a speech in an international body against the head or an Arab state should be sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. All such revolutionary laws were applied retroactively. I was the only person accused under that Article.

    While attending the Security Council in the spring of 1958, my efforts were not limited to work in the United Nations. I cooperated with Dr Charles Malik, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, to think or ways and means by which peace and harmony could be restored to Lebanon. I thought at the time that Iraq could playa significant role to that effect, and that Lebanon should and could rely on Iraq for help in getting out or her predicament. I conveyed a message to President Sham'un through Dr Charles Malik suggesting that Lebanon might consider possible ways of associating herself with Iraq and or getting Iraqi support in restoring peace and resisting external infiltration and aggression. Lebanon might: join the Arab Union which federated Jordan and Iraq, or, enter a treaty relationship with Iraq like the one which I had signed on behalf or Iraq with Jordan in 1947, according to which either state could call on the other for help in case of internal mutiny or disorder, or, sign a military pact with Iraq.

    When informed by Lebanon about the various proposals, Nuri as-Sa'id, Prime Minister of the Ar9b Union, approved of them. At first President Shamoun thought that the second possibility might be considered, but, in the end, he did not act on any of the proposals because he questioned the reliability of the Iraqi army. I myself had no knowledge or information about the political and cross currents inside the Iraqi military establishment.

    In Washington, Lebanese Foreign Minister Charles Malik and I had tea with Under Secretary of State Christian Herter. Mr Rockwell, a State Department official, was present also .During the course of the conversation we discussed ways and means of restoring peace to Lebanon and ways in which America could help. I made a proposal, namely, that America should provide Ir9q with twenty army transport planes to carry Iraqi troops via Turkey to the Mediterranean and land them in Beirut. The Iraqi military force would stand between the two sides in the fighting as a bulwark of peace and prevent a continuation of the fighting while law and order was restored. Mr Rockwell asked me in passing, "Are you sure of your army” No decision was reached at this meeting.

    Soon after that I returned to Iraq and conveyed Mr Rockwell's remark about the Iraqi army to Foreign Minister of the Arab Union Tawfiq as-Suwaidi who passed it on to the Prime Minister of the Arab Union, Nuri as-Sa'id. Tawfiq as-Suwaidi told me later that Nuri pasha called American Ambassador Gallman and furiously protested the imputation concerning the Iraqi army. A few days later, July 14, 19se, the downfall of the royal regime was effected by the Iraqi army. The situation in Lebanon became more complicated as a result, and America landed troops in the country. In Iraq many members of the royal regime, including myself, were arrested and put in prison to stand trial on various accusations.

    My cultural and ideological relations with Lebanon will always remain as long as I live. I love Lebanon and its mountains. I have walked on foot from village to village from north to south and I have climbed all the highest mountain peaks. Besides, I have often gone to Lebanon to take part in cultural activities, giving lectures on Iraq, Middle Eastern politics and Education. From time to time some of my writings have appeared in the Lebanese press, especially in AI-Hayat daily newspaper, and several of my books in Arabic have been published in Beirut. I continue to cherish the friendship of many Lebanese nationalists and intellectuals, just as I value highly the spirit of brotherhood and harmony between races and sects on which Lebanon is founded. I think that the Lebanese ideals of freedom and tolerance are much needed in the Arab world today.

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IRAQ AND JORDAN

Towards the end of the First World War, when Emir Faisal, the third son of King Husain of Hejaz, entered Syria at the head of. the Arab army and was enthroned as the King of Syria. Iraq nationalists called for Emir Abdullah the second son of King Husain, to become king of Iraq. Very soon, however. the French evicted King Faisal from Syria and a campaign started for him to become King of Iraq. Emir Abdullah always felt that he was the legitimate King of Iraq, and he never forgot that his brother replaced him on the throne which was to have been his. After losing the chance of becoming the King of Iraq, he became the Emir of the barren land of Transjordan lying east of the Jordan River, a country which was mainly tribal and not economically viable. Transjordan, like Iraq and Palestine, was put under British Mandate by the League of Nations.

Emir Abdullah's relations with Iraq. a country which was also poor at the time, rested mainly on family ties which made the younger brother, Faisal. act as generously as possible towards his elder brother. But Transjordan depended mainly on British subsidies for maintaining its army and administration. Transjordant’s importance to Iraq was partly due to the oil pipeline which ran from Kirkuk in Iraq and across Trans-Jordan before reaching the port of Haifa in Palestine. The much-spoken-of Baghdad-Haifa railway which was to have given Iraq access to the Mediterranean, would also have had to pass through Transjordan. The idea of the railway was not pursued after the desert route to Beirut was opened to motor transport. The use of the pipeline was stopped after the 1948 occupation of Haifa by Israel.

Emir 'Abdullah paid occasional visits to Iraq, and it was during one of those visits in the 30' s that I first went to pay my respects to His Royal Highness Emir ‘Abdullah an impressive Arab personality, well cultivated in Arab tradition and literature. He was more conservative than his younger brother Faisal. I also had the pleasure or meeting Emir 'Abdullah's eldest son, Emir Talal, who paid occasional visits to Baghdad. He was a very polite and subdued Arab nationalist.

In the 30's, After having achieved independence, Iraq had a succession or internal troubles -- the Assyrian problem, the death or King Faisal the First, tribal upheavals, the Bekr Sidqi coup d'etat, the killing of the Minister of Defence, Ja’afar al-Askeri, the killing of the Minister of Finance, Rustam Haidar, the death of young King Ghazi in a car accident in 1939. During these years there was not much give and take between Iraq and Transjordan, but the family ties among the members of the ruling house were always alive.

King Ghazi was succeeded by his son, King Faisal the Second, who was a baby at the time. His uncle, Prince 'Abdul Ilah son of King ‘Ali, the eldest son of King Husain of Hejaz, acted on his behalf as Regent. Prince 'Abdul Ilah was the brother of Queen 'Alia, who was the mother of King Faisal the Second. The prince was very considerate and respectful towards his uncle, Emir 'Abdullah, whom he considered as the head of the royal Hashemite family.

When Prince 'Abdul Ilah had to flee Iraq at the time of the clash between the Rasheed 'Ali Gailani government and the British in 1941, Prince 'Abdul Ilah and a small team of Iraqi statesmen sought refuge in Transjordan. They returned to Iraq at the head of the Transjordanian army and entered Baghdad as seviours. From then on, Iraq's ties with Transjordan became more vital. Emir 'Abdullah's visits to Baghdad and Prince 'Abdul Ilah's visits to Amman became more frequent during the Second World War. In 1945 the Arab League was formed with both Iraq and Transjordan among the founding members. The year 1946 saw the termination of the British Mandate over Transjordan and the declaration of its independence, at which time Emir 'Abdullah became King 'Abdullah and Transjordsn 'became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Immediately after independence King ‘Abdullah sought complete cooperation with Iraq in political, economic, military and cultural. fields. In Februery 1946 Prince 'Abdul Ilah led a delegation consisting of the Minister of Finance, Saleh Jabr, the Minister of Justice, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, and the Minister of Defence, Isma'il Namuq, to a meeting in Shuna, Jordan. Topics discussed included ways and means for Iraqi- Jordanian cooperation in achieving the aims of the Arab national revolution and in fulfilling the objectives of the Pact of the League of Arab States. A joint declaration was issued regarding what was called the Shuna Conference. While returning from Jordan there was a car accident in which my friend, Saleh Jabr suffered severe injuries to his right arm. He was taken to England for treatment.

In 1946 the Syrian government complained to the Arab League Council about King 'Abdullah's interference in the affairs of Syria by propagating printed material inviting Syrians to unite with Jordan. I was instrumental in preventing the League Council from condemning King 'Abdullah for his activities. (See Syria, PP.) On the 14th of April, 1947, as Foreign Minister in the Cabinet of my friend Saleh Jabr, I signed a Treaty of Alliance and Brotherhood between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Preamble of the Treaty expressed the fraternal ties and national unity which exists between Iraq and Jordan and the desire of the two parties for complete mutual understanding and cooperation in fulfilling national objectives as expressed in Article 9 of the Covenant of the Arab League.

Article 4 provided agreement for common defence in the face of a third-party aggressor.

Article 6 provided for cooperation in dealing with internal troubles or conspiracy.

Article 7 provided for the unification of the military system and exchange of military mission.

Article 8 provided for one country to represent the other when one party did not have a diplomatic mission in a certain country.

Article 9 provided for setting up permanent committees representing the two parties to deal with matters enumerated in Article 2 of the Covenant of the Arab League and those included economic and financial matters, communication, culture, questions of nationality, passports, visas and extradition of criminals, social affairs and health.

A big debate took place in the Iraqi parliament and specific objections were raised concerning Article 6 which provided for cooperation in dealing with internal troubles, for that might mean that the Jordanian army. which was British led, could interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq. In the end, the Treaty was ratified by the Iraqi parliament.

Although the Treaty was never fully implemented, its spirit prevailed and influenced events during the lifetime of King 'Abdullah. Jordan was not a member of the United Nations, but, acting in accordance with Article 8 of the Treaty, Iraq presented Jordan's point of view in the United Nations in particular cases. I recall that one time, while debating with Aba Eban of Israel, I got up from the Iraqi chair where I had presented Iraq's point of view, and went to Jordan's choir to answer Eben after he had attacked the representative of Iraq.

In 1948 the first War of Palestine was going on, and the Egyptian army was beseiged in Falouga. I was then a minister plenipotentiary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prime Minister Muzahim al-Pachachi asked me to go to Cairo to talk over the situation with my friend, Naqrashi Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister. (See Egypt pp.) I was accompanied on this mission by General Isma’il Safwat Pasha. On the way we stopped at Amman and I had an audience with H. M. King 'Abdullah. He opened his heart to me and told me that, while he had been appointed by. the Arab League as Commander-in-Chief of all Arab armies in Palestine, he had no knowledge of what was going on along the Egyptian front. The Egyptians had not arranged for him to visit their front nor did they answer his inquiries about their needs and difficulties. He told me th3t Egypt had already confiscated a shipload of arms intended for the Jordanian army. He told me that his army, which was British led and subsidized, was not his own. It was a British army in Jordan, but those who criticized Jordan and its military achievements should rather pay for the army and make it an Arab army. Actually no other army saved as much of Palestinian territory as did the Jordanian army, although it has been established that Glubb Pasha, who commanded the Arab Legion, never occupied Palestinian territory which had been allotted to Israel according to the United Nations plan of partition.

In 1949 Husni az-Za'im carried out his coup in Damascus and dismissed President Shukri al-Quwatli. Iraq responed to overtures by az-Za'im and there was an exchange of delegations between Damascus and Baghdad. This worried three Arab countries, namely, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. King 'Abdullah of Jordan thought that Iraq's rapprochement with Syria might cause him to lose the opportunity of becoming King of Greater Syria. Egypt and Saudi Arabia did not wish to see a power made up of a federated Syria and Iraq.

One day Jordanian Prime minister Tawfiq Pash Abdul Huda was sent to Baghdad by H. M. King 'Abdullah to convey a very frank message to me as Foreign Minister of Iraq. He told me that His Majesty was enraged by the Iraqi activities concerning Syria and that he was even threatening to invade Iraq. I laughed and said that Iraq would certainly welcome His Majesty and the Jordanian army. I asked Tawfiq Pasha to pay my respects to His Majesty and tell him that Iraq was ready to keep hands off Syria and to let His Majesty take it over. If, however, that should not be possible, what would His Majesty command? Would it be better for the Arab nation that Iraq and Syria remain apart, or would it be better for Arab states should eventually join them? I, as Foreign Minister would be delighted to get some high national guidance from His Majesty.

Tewfiq-pasha returned to Jordan, and, after presenting my point of view to King 'Abdullah, the Pasha telephoned me from Amman to tell me, "His Majesty kisses your cheeks and says that he was full confidence in your policy towards Syria." In the United Nations I continued to work on behalf of Jordan. I defended the Arab character of Jerusalem and opposed the United Nations plan for internationalization. That was King 'Abdullah's policy. But, when I found that all the other Arab states were backing the internationalization or Jerusalem, and that Israel was the main opponent or the scheme, I could not continue opposing internationalization. I joined the ranks of the other Arab states and the overwhelming majority or the members of the UN who stood for internationalization. Again this enraged King 'Abdullah who made a special trip to Baghdad to quarrel with Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id over the stand I had taken on the question of Jerusalem.

The Trusteeship Council of the UN met in Geneva to draft a constitution for an internationalized Jerusalem. Iraq was a member of the Council at the time, and I was the representative of Iraq at that session. Jordan sent its Consul General in Paris, Hafiz 'Abdul Hadi to be an observer at the Council's meetings. Through him I received a message from His Majesty to the effect that the internationalization of Jerusalem meant its destruction as a holy city, and that the Arabs would never rise unless all Syria was united and federated with Iraq. I assured His Majesty through Hafiz 'Abdul Hadi that, in spite of our best efforts to draft a good constitution for an internationalized Jerusalem, such internationalization would never be implemented so long as Israel and Jordan both resisted it.(see Palestine, pp.)

At the United Nations I worked for Jordan to be admitted as a member. Jordan was one of several states whose admission to the UN was blocked at the time by the Soviet veto in the Security Council. In Florence at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization conference in 1950, I worked for the admission of Jordan as a member of that body. To my regret the Egyptian delegation, led by Dr Taha Husain, voted against the admission of Jordan, the reason being that relations between King Farouq and King 'Abdullah were strained during that period. I tried to convince Dr Taha Husain to change his mind and give a positive vote, but without success. Jordan was admitted to UNESCO, but Egypt and Israel were conspicuous by voting against it.

I had a few opportunities of visiting Amman and talking tête-â-tête with H. M. King ‘Abdullah. As head of the Hashemite family he had to tackle some family problems in which his views differed from those of Prince 'Abdul Ilah. King 'Abdullah had' a much more liberal outlook on family problems than did Prince 'Abdul Ilah, and His Majesty asked me to do my best to influence Prince 'Abdul Ilah to be more tolerant and merciful.

King ‘Abdullah was also determined to see that the Iraqi and Jordanian thrones were united. He confided to me that neither of his sons was qualified to carry the burden.

Twice I was honoured by receiving Jordanian decorations. The First Order of al Istiqlal (Independence), and the First Order of an-Nahdha (Renaissance) were bestowed on me. Actually I felt the complete unity of interest and policy of both Jordan and Iraq. I never thought of Jordan as another state, but felt that it was a part of a Greater Syria which was a part of a greater Arab homeland. At the beginning of July 1951, a meeting was held in the mountain village of Sarsang in the north of Iraq where there was a royal summer residence. Present were several Iraqi statesmen including myself as President of the Chamber of Deputies and Tawfiq as-Suwaidi as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prince 'Abdul Ilah presided at the meeting which discussed a draft agreement for the unity of the throne of Jordan and Iraq which had been prepared by King 'Abdullah in his own handwriting.

Article 1 of the document stated, "The two kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan shall be united (federated) in accordance with conditions agreed upon." A Council of the Union was to be formed which would meet annually and alternately in one capital or the other, and which would be presided over by the King of the country in which the Council met.

Article 10 stated, "The two united (federated) kingdoms shall have one foreign policy and shall be represented by the sister state in any foreign country in case of one of them does not have a representative in that foreign country.

Article 12 stated that “The ruling family in the two kingdoms is considered to have the same right in the two countries in such a way that, if the King dies without en heir, the heir to the throne shall be a suitable personality from the off spring of the Greet Saviour, Al-Husain Ibn 'Ali." (King Husain of Hejes, father of King 'Abdullah of Jordan and King Faisal I of Iraq)

The meeting approved the principle of union and asked Foreign Minister Tawfiq -suwaidi to go to Amman to negotiate the draft agreement with H. M. King 'Abdullah. The handwritten draft prepared by King 'Abdullah remained in the pocket of the Foreign Minister who, on returning to Baghdad, resigned his post over a disagreement with the cabinet concerning the appointment of his brother as President of the High Court of Appeal. While ministerial squabbles were taking place in Baghdad, King 'Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem on July 20, 1951.

Prince Abdul Ilah accompanied by Nuri as-Said and Saleh Jabr, took King 'Abdullah's handwritten document and went to Amman to attend the funeral and to present the document to the Jordanian government. Some young Iraqi nationalists also went to Jordan to help build up public opinion in favour of Iraqi-Jordanian unity. The Jordanian Prime Minister, Tawfiq Pasha Abul Huda, prompted by the Saudi Arabians and the British in Jordan, especially Glubb Pasha and Sir Alec Kirkbride, British Ambassador to Jordan, worked together to install King 'Abdullah's eldest son. Talal, as King of Jordan.

The Iraqis returned disappointed, but wishing Jordan and its new King all the best. Cooperation between Iraq and Jordan continued as before, although, from that time on, Saudi machinations along with those of Egypt began to, influence Jordan's policy vis-a-vis Iraq. The attitude of the British officials in Jordan rather puzzled me, for I had more than once discussed the eventual federation of Iraq, Syria and Jordan with the Foreign Office in London and I had had no negative response. This shows that, either there was no unified policy between London and Amman, or that my friends in London had not been frank about their real intentions.

King Talal could not carry the burden of the kingdom for long. He had to retire and R.M. King Husain Ibn Talal ascended the throne of Jordan. King Husain is a brave Arab nationalist who is, at the same time, a political realist. His relations with the Royal House of Iraq was cordial and correct, but he tried to be friendly with conflicting Arab sides, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. He tried to keep a balance between Iraq where his heart would be inclined, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt where other forces were involved. Jordan's politicians were also divided. Some, like Sulaiman Tuqan and Hezza’a al-Majali were known to be inclined to Iraq, and others, like Tawfiq Pasha Abul Ruda and Waleed Salah, were on the Saudi and Egyptian side.

I became Prime Minister of Iraq in September of 1953. At that time there was a Jordanian delegation headed by Hikmet al-Misri negotiating 3 million dinar loan for Jordan and other financial and economic help. The negotiations were concluded, and, on the 1st of October the following communiqué was issued:

Negotiations between the Jordanian delegation and the representatives of the Iraqi government took place in Baghdad .from the 21st till the 30th of September with a genuine brotherly spirit. The Iraqi side .fully realized the situation in our sister state and the heavy burden it carries after the tragedy of Palestine -- a situation which requires every Arab state to take part in protecting Jordan from the dangers that threaten it. The negotiations led to a trade agreement between the two states, and the Iraqi government offered financial help amounting to 150 thousand dinars to the front villages. This amount will include the 80 thousand dinars which is Iraq's share of help designated by the League of the Arab states. The Iraqi government also decided to take measures to open branches in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for both the Iraqi Industrial and Agricultural Banks. In order to complete the studies the two parties agreed to leave the door open for further negotiations regarding the loan and other economic projects.

Soon after, Israeli forces invaded Jordan and attacked the village of Qibiya killing men, women and children. On hearing the news I immediately flew to Amman to attend the meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League which was called to study the situation. I went to Qibiya where I saw the extent of the destruction. I was deeply touched by seeing the village school which had been bombarded and destroyed. I had a meeting with the Jordanian authorities and discussed measures to be taken to defend Jordan and to present the case of Qibiya and its innocent victims to the world. On behalf of the Iraqi government I announced the donation of 10,000 Iraqi

diners for rebuilding the Qibiya school and asked that it be named the Faisal-Husain school.

In January 1954 I went to Cairo to attend the Council of the Arab League and presented the Council with a project for Arab unity. (See Egypt pp. ) It seems that by presenting that project without previous consultation with Jordan I had unintentionally been negligent concerning our brotherly ties, and H. M. King Husain was displeased.

After returning to Baghdad it was reported to me that King Husain had been told that Jamali had dedicated 100,000 Iraqi dinars for a plot against His Majesty and that Iraqi troops were ready to move into and take over Jordan when the time came. I was stunned by that fabrication. I went to King Faisal II, informed him of the malicious story and told him that I thought I must go to Amman personally to talk over the matter with H. M. King Husain. On the 11th of February I took a small military plane to Amman from where I went Straight to the King’s palace. After embracing his Majesty I set down and discussed the false rumours. I told His Majesty, "There are no 100,000 dinars in the Iraqi budget for your assassination and there are no Iraqi forces on the border with Jordan." I told him I have always cherished loyalty to the Hashemite House and I make no distinction between the Hashemite House in Jordan and the Hashemite House in Iraq, for in my view it is one House. I believe in the unity of the Hashemite House and Your Majesty has a home in Baghdad just as you have a home in Amman. For my part I am always ready to receive your direct commands by telephone. Mischief-makers should not be given a chance to intervene between Iraq and Jordan, or between Your Majesty and myself."

King Husain was deeply impressed by my coming personally to see him to dispel the false rumours and to demonstrate the spirit of unity and loyalty which I cherished. He expressed his regret for the time that had, elapsed with no contact with Iraq. He had been expecting a word from H.M. King Faisal since a letter from him had indicated that he intended to visit Amman and Jordan. At one time King Husain had almost reached the border of Iraq and had wished to continue on to Baghdad, but he had held back on account of having had no word from Faisal.

His Majesty wished to know something about our aims concerning Arab federation. He was frank to tell me that my going to the Council of the Arab League with the project of Arab unity had aroused his suspicions. He did not know what our plans were, and he asked why we had not come to an understanding with him before going to the League of Arab States.

My answer was, "Any work towards unity is only a fulfillment of the message of your great grandfather, King Husain of Hejaz, and we all carry that message with equal zeal." I continued with a history of the concept of Arab unity and the stand of his grandfather on the unity of Syria and the negative attitude taken by the Arab League on the subject. I said, "Iraq has no specific plan to offer to a specific country, but Iraq has approached the Arab states with new thinking -- thinking which realizes the difficulty of implementing complete Arab unity now. At the same time it is not satisfied with what the Arab League is achieving for the Arabs. The history of the Arab League shows that it has been very slow in moving, for it moves at the pace of the weakest and slowest of its members. Besides, the League is being hampered by the political blocs among its members. Syria's attitude toward federation is being vitiated by Saudi gold and foreign influences. Saudi fears of federation have no justification. Our attitude towards the Saudis is brotherly and correct. We do not know what the Saudis are worried about." I touched on Nuri Pasha's project for Syria and Iraq and how it was turned down by Sa’adallah al-Jabiri who thought that the Arab League should provide all the measures for unifying the Arab states.

Then I spoke about the role of the Hashemite House in promoting the Arab cause and the need for cooperation between Amman and Baghdad. There was a mutual Faisal Husain responsibility for achieving the mission of the Hashemite House and its unity. I said, "There should be no barriers and no formalities between Baghdad and Amman. Mutual visits and consultations between the two capitals should continue informally in the manner set by H.M. King 'Abdullah. We must combat foreign intrigues between us. “The welfare of Jordan is the welfare of Iraq, but the welfare of some other countries may not be the welfare of Jordan." I touched on the readiness of the Iraqi government to offer any help she could to the Jordanian government.

Then I touched on the attacks which Colonel Shishakli was addressing to Iraq. I described his policy and intentions. His Majesty said that he wished we could be in constant communication so that Jordan would not remain silent vis-a-vis the Shishakli campaign.

We touched on Egypt and the questions or defence, neutrality and pacts. We agreed on the necessity for a continued exchange or visits and readiness for continued cooperation and consultation. I said that the Arab states are more bound together than the states of the Benelux. We live in a world or blocs and groupings. I emphasized our respect for the independence or Jordan and the throne of Jordan. The cooperation and unity which we sought did not mean the eradication or political entities as envisaged by the Syrian Constitution. Rather we would start with the integration or economic, military, educational and foreign policy while retaining our political entity.

I expressed my view on the role or the Hashemite family in cementing the unity or the people, something I thought a republican regime could not guarantee. This required, however, that the monarchical regimes should provide honest constitutional governments.

His Majesty sent greetings and deep thanks to King Faisal and his thanks and affection to Crown Prince 'Abdul Ilah and expressed the wish to visit Iraq before going to Egypt.

Having achieved the purpose or my visit I intended to return to Baghdad in the afternoon of the same day. His Majesty objected to my quick return and insisted that I should pass the night in Amman and spend the next day also in Jordan. He kindly offered his personal plane to take me to visit Petra where I had a most delightful experience. Sa'id Pasha al-Mufti, President of the Senate, accompanied me on the visit.

I returned to Amman and spent a second night there. His Majesty would not permit me to leave Jordan the next morning for he had arranged an official luncheon in my honour at the royal palace. It was only in the afternoon of that day that I could return to Baghdad with our relations with Jordan most cordial and clear.

Two weeks after my return H.M. King Husain arrived in Baghdad to visit King Faisal. He also visited Basrah which was having an industrial fair. On the 2nd of March I had an audience with him in the presence of H.M. King Faisal on the royal yacht, Queen 'Alia. We discussed the project of federation which I had presented to the Arab League. King Husain stated that the way in which the project had been presented to the Arab League had embarrassed Jordan for there had been no previous consultation with them. I answered that Iraq had not presented a concrete project but a general invitation for a federation which should be followed by consultations and preparations on the part of those who accepted the principle of federation. I said that Iraq was always ready to initiate discussion on the subject with Jordan however the Jordanian government was ready for such a move. King Husain expressed the existence of a desire on the part of the Jordanian government to enter such negotiations for a federation with Iraq. I mentioned that Iraq's invitation for a federation with Jordan could imply three basic principles:

1) The unity of the army. I expressed Iraq's wish to achieve unity on condition that there should be no foreign command at the head of the Jordanian army.

2) Integration of financial matters. In this respect Iraq would be ready to offer the financial help and economic cooperation required for the interest of the two countries.

3) Unity of foreign policy. I said that Iraq would be ready to represent Jordan in any country where Jordan had no representation, but the important thing was not representation but complete understanding on the objectives and lines of foreign policy. Iraq's foreign policy, for example, was inclined to the west. Iraq's relations with Syria were vital, for the Euphrates united the two states. Iraq's oil and commerce had to pass through Syria, and Iraq provided a big market for Syrian products. Jordan, like Syria, had to turn to Iraq for economic development. Saudi Arabia should be convinced that such cooperation, which should lead to a federation, would in no way be contrary to her interests. It was on matters like these that our foreign policy should be clear and unified.

After King Husain's return to Jordan Israel attacked Jordan again in the village of Nahaleen, another act of destruction and loss of Arab life. I was Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister of Iraq. We sent asking what we could do and I received the following message from the Jordanian Legation in Baghdad.

In response to your telegram of the 24th of March. Present H. E. Jamali with the thanks of the Jordanian government for what was contained in your telegram. Inform him the details of the incident at the Nahaleen village and ask His Excellency to order the sending of one military expert or more to discuss with the Jordanian military authorities the readiness of the Iraqi army and air force to help Jordan to fill the vacuum in the necessary means of defending the country. Inform us about results immediately.

I received a telegram dated the 30th of March to the same effect from our Legation in Amman. It stated that H. M. King Husain had called the Iraqi representative and the Military Attache and expressed to them his fear that the Israelis might undertake an attack greater than that at Nahaleen and on a large scale. His Majesty wished to know what military help Iraq could render. I immediately answered:

“Iraqia, Amman.

Iraq is ready to send all that is within its military capacity. An officer of the General staff is coming to you to study the situation and estimate the quantity and quality of help in accordance with our potentiality.

Foreign Affairs.

These telegrams coincided with an unusually severe flood that threatened to wipe out the city of Baghdad. The 29th of March was the worst night. On the 19th of April I resigned as Prime Minister for reasons that had nothing to do with Jordan or the flood. (See Syria pp.)

The next Iraqi Cabinet was formed by Arshad al-Omari and I accepted the post of Foreign Minister. We had an amount of 150,000 dinars in the budget which was intended to be spent for promoting the cause of Syrio-Iraqi federation. This amount was diverted to Jordan by the Prime Minister as a financial aid.

In 1955 apolitical tug-of-war took place in Jordan between Iraq on the one hand and Egypt-Saudi Arabia on the other. The rift between Iraq and Egypt over the Baghdad Pact and over cooperation with the West had its effect on Jordan's politics. This was shown during the meeting of the Prime Ministers in Cairo when President Nasir called on the Arab states to pass a resolution against Iraq's joining the Baghdad Pact. Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id did not attend that meeting and I was asked to represent Iraq on his behalf as Head of the Iraqi delegation. I joined the meeting on the 27th January 1955. (See Egypt and Baghdad)

At that meeting the Jordanian delegation consisting of Prime Minister Tawfiq Pasha Abul Huda and Foreign Minister Waleed Salah, did not support the Iraqi stand. As a matter of feet, Waleed Salah openly took the Egyptian side. He joined the committee sent by the meeting to Baghdad. The committee, headed by Prime Minister Sami as-Sulh of Lebanon, included Faidhi al-Atasi, Foreign Minister of Syria and colonel Salah Salem, Minister of National Guidance of Egypt. Waleed Salah acted in unison with Colonel Salah Salem and supported his point of view.

The same Jordanian personalities had shown no cooperation with the Iraqi delegation at Bandung, but thanks to Hezza'a al-Majali, a member of the Jordanian delegation, there had been no conflict between the two delegations at that conference. Hezza’a al-Majali, a noble Arab character, believed in the unity of the destiny and interests of Iraq and Jordan. He was a devout Muslim who had no tolerance for Communist infiltration and domination. At Bandung I discovered him to be a sincere friend and companion. Hezza'a al-Majali later became Prime Minister of Jordan and his government tried to have Jordan join Iraq in the Baghdad Pact. Egyptian propaganda and machinations, however, were strong enough in Jordan to prevent its joining the Baghdad pact, some time later al-Majali was killed by a bomb explosion in his office.

The incidents at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung and those concerning the Baghdad Pact proved that Arab disunity, especially between Iraq and Egypt, had its effects on Jordan’s politics, for the Jordanians were sometimes the victims of the tug-of-war. Another Jordanian who demonstrated the will for cooperation and unity was Wasfi at-Tell. In 1958 I had a letter from Wasfi at-Tell, who was Jordanian Charge d’Affaires at Teheran at the time, commenting on the Algerian war and regretting the great losses of life which the Algerians were suffering. Wasfi, who had been trained as an officer, thought that the Algerians needed special training in guerilla warfare, an art of war which had special methods and techniques with which he was familiar. He suggested that Iraq and Jordan together should provide up to 1000 volunteers whom he would train and lead in Algeria. (See Algeria pp. 54)

Relationships between President Nasir and King Husain fluctuated. There were times of friendship and cooperation and times of propaganda war in which President Nasir himself and the Egyptian radio station, Sawt ul-Arab. Voice of the Arab, would direct abusive language to King Husain and the Hashemite family. At such times Jordan would be closer to Iraq, for Iraq was already getting its share of the abusive propaganda. It was in such an atmosphere that the Egyptian-Syrian unity took place in the form of Egyptian annexation and domination of Syria. When that happened, I rushed to the royal palace in Baghdad and said, "Unless Iraqi-Jordanian federation is announced at once, we are headed for trouble in the Arab world." King Faisal and Prince 'Abdul Ilah both shared my point of view and they called on Prime Minister 'Abdul Wahab Mirjan to send a delegation to Amman to discuss the federation of the two countries. ‘Abdul Wahab's Cabinet initiated the process in 1958 but had to resign. Nuri as-Sa'id formed his last Iraqi cabinet. I had the post of Foreign Minister. We negotiated the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan and revised the Iraqi Constitution to facilitate the implementation of the Arab Union.

Nuri as-Sa'id was not enthusiastic for that union. He did not wish to make Iraq carry the financial burdens of Jordan which was receiving financial aid from both Britain and America. I had a different outlook. To me Jordan was a part of my nation. It was an Arab state which should be supported by its sister Arab states. Its army was an Arab army which should be supported by Arab money. No needy Arab state should depend on foreign support while sister Arab states could come to its aid. To alleviate Nuri's worries about the financial burden I suggested that efforts should be exerted to invite Kuwait to join the Arab Union in which case Kuwait and Iraq together would shoulder the Jordanian financial burden.

From then on Nuri worked hard to have Kuwait join the Union, but Kuwait was still under British protection at the time, and Britain did not seem ready to make a move to grant Kuwait independence and have it join the Arab Union. I even suggested to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, who passed through Baghdad coming back from a SEATO meeting on his way to London, that the Sheikh of Kuwait should be recognized as the King of Kuwait and that an independent Kuwait might join the Arab Union. If that had happened and the money of Kuwait and Iraq had come to Jordan's support, Jordan would have become strong and fortified to face the Zionist danger. I always felt as much concern for Jordan as for Iraq. I never believed in the political frontiers. I believed that we were one people, one nation with one royal family and one destiny. When going from Baghdad to Jordan I rarely carried my passport with me.

When the Arab Union between Iraq and Jordan was formed in March 1958, I was appointed as one of the five to seven members to be nominated by the King of Iraq to the Arab Union Council. From then on there were two Cabinets - the Iraqi Cabinet and t he Cabinet of the Union. King Faisal of Iraq was the head of the Arab Union and King Husain was Vice-President. Nuri as-Sa'id was the first Prime Minister 'of the Arab Union. In May 1958, King Faisal, the Crown Prince, Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id and the Arab Union Cabinet Ministers and Members of the Council all went to Amman for the opening session of the Arab Union Council. We attended an official dinner given by H.M. King Husain that night. The next morning I had to leave urgently for New York at the insistence of H.M. King Faisal. I had to go to the Security Council where Iraq was a member and defend Lebanon which had lodged a complaint against President Nasir's interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. This caused me to miss the opening session of the Arab union council. The Union between Iraq and Jordan ceased to exist after the downfall of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq in July 1958.

When I came out from prison in 1961 H. M. King Husain was gracious enough to delegate Wasfi at-Tell, Jordanian Ambassador to Iraq, to inquire about me and to convey His Majesty's good wishes. When I left Iraq in 1962 on account of poor health, the Jordanian government invited me to go to Amman to help establish the new University of Jordan. Unfortunately my health did not permit me to accept the kind invitation.

IRAQ AND PALESTINE

'Ibn il-Iraq’

No one problem has ever occupied time, energy and thought in my life equal to the Palestine problem. As a student, as a teacher, as a member or national and social organizations, I have always sympathized with my brethren, the Arabs of Palestine, in their suffering due to the grafting onto the Arab world of a foreign body which has so far been most poisoning to the health and vitality or the Arab nation. In 1944 I was appointed as Director General in the Ministry or Foreign Affairs or Iraq. In that post I had access to Zionist material coming to us from the United States. I could watch the increasing Zionist activity and machinations aimed at achieving the goal or creating a Jewish state in Palestine. I began to publish articles in the Iraqi daily press telling the public of the potential Zionist danger to the Arab world. I could not sign my name in my official capacity, so I chose a pen-name, 'Ibn il-Iraq', Son of Iraq. Immediately after the Second World War those articles were published in Arabic in a booklet in Cairo, Egypt, entitled, The Zionist Danger, by 'Ibn il-Iraq'.

Second World War

At the beginning of the Second World War there were only four more or less independent Arab states, namely, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The Arab states, notably Iraq, joined the Second World War on the side of the Allies, just as they had done under King Husain of Hejaz in the First World War, to achieve the liberation and independence of their Arab brethren everywhere, including those of Palestine. During the Second World War the Zionists expressed their determination to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. The Biltmore Resolution passed in New York City in 1942 was the first open official declaration by the Zionists of their intention to establish a state in Palestine. The Zionists began to exert their political influence in American elections. They worked on the two major American parties in such a way that the parties began to compete with each other in pouring out promises for the Zionists. The bidding between the Republican Party, headed by Thomas Dewey, and the Democratic Party, headed by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in support of Zionist ambitions is well known. When the Arabs saw the enthusiasm of American politicians to win Zionist favour, the Arab states, especially Iraq and Saudi Arabia, made one protest after another, warning the American government of the international consequences.

In 1944, during the War, I became Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq. Arshad al-‘Omari, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was firm and forceful in his defence of Arab rights in Palestine. Hamdi al-Pachachi, the Prime Minister, and Saleh Jabr, The Minister of Finance, were both enthusiastic in support of the Palestine cause. The American Minister to Iraq, Mr Loy Henderson, faithfully transmitted to his own government the honest and frank views and sentiments of the Iraqi government.

Probably the most outstanding diplomatic acts in defence of Palestine during the War were personal letters written by King 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince 'Abdul Ilah (in the name of the King of Iraq) to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States. The texts of the two letters were alike as far as I can recall. I was responsible for rendering the Iraqi letter into English. The letter reminded President Roosevelt of Arab friendship and referred to the Covenant of the Calipha Omar Ibn al-Khattab (Allah be pleased with him!) to the Arab army which undertook the conquest of Palestine in early Islamic history. That great Calipha commanded the conquering army to treat the Christians in a just and humanitarian manner. The letter further reminded the President that Palestine having passed through so many historical developments belongs to its legal inhabitants, the Arabs. President Roosevelt was asked to uphold the principles of the Atlantic Charter of which he was the co-author. President Roosevelt's answer, dated April 12, 1944, included the following statement:

"...In the view of the Government of the United States no decision affecting the basic situation in Palestine should be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Franklin Roosevelt"

The answer certainly contained an injustice to the Arabs who formed the majority in Palestine. Still, it gave the Arab rights equal weight with the Zionist claims, a fact which was completely ignored by Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, who yielded to Zionist pressure in whatever concerned Palestine.

Arab Publicity for the Palestine Cause

Propaganda plays a very important role in modern times. Its role is not less than that of the army or the diplomatic service in the cold war and the struggle amongst nations. Since the Arabs are the rightful possessors or Palestine it was their duty to undertake a vast publicity campaign for the Palestine cause in order to enlighten world public opinion. The Arabs were slow in this matter and trailed dismally in making their case known to the Western world. I thought that one or the important things that should be done for the Arab cause in Palestine was to in form public opinion in the West and especially in the United States, where the Arab point or view on Palestine, although based on history, justice and human rights, was never widely known. The United States, while playing a major role in influencing the destiny or Palestine, was saturated with Zionist propaganda which was not equaled by a knowledge or the Arab side of the question.

In December 1944, as Director General of Foreign Affairs, I submitted the following memorandum to the Minister or Foreign Affairs, Arshad al-‘Omari:

Subject: Project or Publicity in the United States. His Excellency the Minister,

Having seen the great importance which Your Excellency gives to the question or Palestine, I am encouraged to present to Your Excellency some observations regarding the organization or public information based on my personal knowledge or the United States, its special conditions, and the power of Zionism there. I am hoping that you will please look into these suggestions, and, if they meet with your approval in full or in part, that they may be implemented as soon as Your Excellency gets to Egypt and is able to convince the representatives of other Arab states to cooperate. It will appear to Your Excellency that the question is not one of sending two or three persons to the United States. The situation demands a campaign on a large scale, the establishment of an adequate structure and the allotment of large sums for this purpose.

My observations can be summarized as follows:

1. To counteract Zionist propaganda in the United States we must inform and influence American public opinion. It is not enough to work with personalities in the American government and members of the Congress in Washington. We must reach men of politics, leaders of big business, men of the church, the universities, scientific institutions, societies, clubs and the press. We must struggle hard and fight Zionist propaganda in every corner of the United States.

2. America is a great continent and working in Washington alone is not enough. Organization should not be restricted to Washington. There must be central headquarters in Washington, but there must be at least four auxiliary centres outside Washington, namely, a Centre in New York City which will feed the eastern states as far as Canada, a Centre in the city of Chicago which will feed the mid-western states, a Centre in San Francisco that will feed the western states, and a Centre in Dallas, Texas, which will feed the southern states. This is the smallest number of Centres which might have some effect. Without them the efforts of the body in Washington alone will prove ineffective.

3. The main Centre in Washington must be manned by at least five qualified persons besides the secretarial personnel. As for the other Centres, they should each be staffed by at least three persons with secretarial help as required. The Centre may find it necessary to employ some American newspaper correspondents or specialists in publicity with regular salaries.

4. We propose that these Centres should be independent of the Arab Legations and Embassies in their work and administration and that they should be headed by a prominent personality with rank not less than that of a Minister.

5. Activities (given in detail)

6. Budget (given in detail)

7. We can imagine that the Centre in Washington would be equivalent to an Embassy and that each of the other Centres would be equivalent to a Consulate General. It is not too much for the Arab states to support these establishments if they intend to achieve serious, fruitful work. We support the point of view of Musa al-‘Alami of the necessity for an extensive structure, but we go farther than he does. As for the point of view of 'Abdur Rahman 'Azzam that only three persons should be sent, that looks like a drop compared with the Zionist sea in the United states.

8. The success of the whole project depends mainly on the ability of the persons, the harmony amongst them, the degree of their zeal for the Arab cause and their adaptability to the American mentality and environment. I was pleased to read in the local press that Sayid Musa al-'Alami had a meeting in Beirut with Dr Constantine Zuraiq to discuss this project with him, for Dr Zuraiq (I have already introduced him to Your Excellency) should be considered as an active supporter of this project. Besides him there are other young Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians who could be depended upon. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia could delegate Sayid 'Ezzeddin Ash-Shawwa, a graduate of Cambridge University. He is one of the distinguished young men qualified for the purpose. In Iraq we could choose three or up to five persons if required. Egypt is rich in qualified journalists and publicists. Dr Philip Hitti will undoubtedly offer his valuable advice for this project of information if it is not possible to convince him to become an adviser.

9. After appointing the person to head the organization, a statute should be drafted which will include principles and instructions to be followed by the Centres and to detail duties and functions. Much freedom will be left for each Centre to adapt its activities to local needs.

10. Besides establishing these Centres of Information, we propose that responsible personalities from the Arab world should visit America every now and then .Political and scientific delegations should be organized to contact responsible personalities who carry political and moral weight and to arrange dialogues with them. That is what the Zionists are doing. Great Zionist personalities frequently travel between Palestine and London, and Palestine and America. Such activities have increased in these days. We have just heard that Weizmann will visit America shortly. As for Shertok, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Zionist organization, he is on the move constantly and the same holds true of several other well-known Zionist personalities.

These are a few points which may be useful to Your Excellency when looking into the question of publicity in the United States.

With my respects,

Mohammed Fadhel Jamali

Director General of Foreign Affairs

After hearing an Iraqi proposal, the Arab League resolved to establish Arab Offices for Palestine propaganda in both the United States and Greet Britain. Musa al 'Alami, a prominent Palestinian leader, was asked to organize these offices. But the Arab states, with the exception of Iraq and Syria, did not take part in financing them. As for Syria, she paid her share for the first year only. Iraq was then left alone to support the offices up till the time of the tragedy of Palestine, when the offices were closed. Unfortunately they were closed at a time when they were most badly needed.

As for the Zionists, we find that they did not leave any sensitive spot in the world untouched by their propaganda. The Arabs on the other hand, rarely cared for the affairs of propaganda in those days, and never paid enough attention to them. It may be interesting to note that, when the Arab Office in New York was started, the Zionists agitated against it, and the police authorities were instigated to go to inspect it. When this happened I invited the American Ambassador in Baghdad to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and protested against the act which I considered unfriendly and harmful to Arab-American good relations I said that, if such acts were repeated, the Iraqi government might consider taking similar measure in connection with American institutions located in Iraq.

Five years after the partition of Palestine, when I was Prime Minister of Iraq, 1953-54, Dr’Izzet Tannus, a devout and loyal Palestinian, visited Baghdad. He discussed with me the importance of enlightening American public opinion regarding Arab rights in Palestine. He suggested opening an information office in New York City. I concurred and stated that Iraq was reedy to offer ten thousand diners annually (a dinar equaled one pound sterling) for the purpose from its very tight budget. I suggested that he should also contact Saudi Arabia for support. I learnt later that Saudi Arabia offered to match Iraq's contribution. Thus Dr Tennus was enabled to start the office. He did a very good job of publicity and education for the Palestine cause. The office worked well until the Iraqi Royal regime was overthrown in 1958.

The San Francisco conference

President Truman's policy of partiality towards the Zionists began to show itself openly in the Conference in San Francisco where the United Nations Charter was laid down in 1945. The Arabs were represented by five delegations from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, although Syria and Lebanon were not yet fully independent. The Arab delegations exerted their efforts so that texts would be included in the United Nations Charter guaranteeing the independence of both Syria and Lebanon, guaranteeing the rights of non-independent Arab states to self determination and independence, and protecting Palestine from Zionist invasion. The Arab delegations achieved relative success in all their objectives except in that concerning Palestine.

A special Article, Article 78, was put in the United Notions Charter to ensure the independence of Syria and Lebanon although these countries were not mentioned by name. The Article stated that "The Trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality." Iraq fought hard, side by side with Egypt, the Soviet Union, China and the Philippines to put a text into the United Nations Charter in the chapter on Trusteeship which would guarantee the right to self-determination and independence to all countries under trusteeship or colonial rule. After a struggle with the colonial powers that lasted almost a month we succeeded in putting into the Charter texts which, no matter how weak they were, could be considered as a big initial victory for the people of Asia and Africa. Many of these people have already profited from the provisions of the Charter. And others will profit from them in the future.

I represented Iraq on the Committee of Trusteeship, Dr Mohammed 'Owadh Mohammed represented Egypt, Mr Andrei Gromyko represented the Soviet Union, General Carlos P. Romulo represented the Philippines, and Dr Wellington Koo represented China. We five fought hardest in order to insert in the United Nations Charter the right of self-determination and/or independence for all peoples who were being ruled under mandatory or colonial systems.

But an impasse was reached in the Trusteeship Committee when the Arab states asked for a text which might protect the Arabs of Palestine from immigration and guarantee their independence. The struggle in the Trusteeship Committee between the American delegation, behind whom the Zionist delegation was sitting, and the Arab delegations lasted more than a month. It concerned the drafting of Article 80 of the United Nation Charter. The Arab delegations wanted the Article to include a guarantee for the rights of the majority in any country under mandate, and for their right to self-determination The American delegation, headed by Commander Harold Stassen, stubbornly resisted and fought the Arab proposal, thus serving the Zionist aim. That is why Article 80 was left devoid of a guarantee of the rights of the Arabs of Palestine, and the path remained open for Truman to muck up Arab rights to Palestine and to involve the U.S.A. in support of the ugliest imperialistic operation enacted in modern history.

After the failure of the Arab delegations to guarantee Arab rights in Palestine, the Head of the Iraqi delegation, Arshad el-'Omari, Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs, left San Francisco in protest. I was entrusted with the affairs of the Iraqi delegation, and I signed the United Nations Charter on behalf of the government of Iraq.

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry

No sooner did the San Francisco Conference end, then President Truman began to ask that the provision of the British White Paper of 1939 be no longer enforced. That white paper limited Jewish immigration into Palestine to 15,000 a year for a period of five years, after which immigration would stop and Palestine would be independent. Truman asked for 100,000 Jewish immigration to admitted into Palestine immediately.

The Zionists had already started to defy the British government. The terrorist gangs of Irgun and Stern threatened British officials in Palestine and kidnapped chosen ones, killing some, and using others as hostages. The Jewish Agency began to use various means for illegal immigration into Palestine. King David hotel in Jerusalem was bombed. British ships were boycotted in New York harbour. When Truman insisted on the entry of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, opposed the idea openly in the British Parliament. After negotiations between the two governments, it was agreed that an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry should be sent to Europe and the Arab lands to study the conditions and to submit a report on what it deemed appropriate with regard to Jewish immigration and the future of Palestine. The Committee included amongst its member some who were very enthusiastic for Zionism and who defended the cause like the British Labour Member of Parliament, Richard Crossman. The committee came to Cairo and began to listen to the Arab point of view in Mena House Hotel.

The Iraqi government delegated me to go to Cairo to submit to the Committee the Iraqi point of view on the Palestine question. I did my best to make the statement strong in argument and clear in thought regarding natural Arab rights to their land in Palestine. Zionist claims were refuted with forceful logic. I requested the Committee to apply one moral principle to Arabs and non-Arabs alike, using the dictum: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you." Just as an Englishman, an American or a Frenchman will not accept the detachment of any part of his homeland for any cause whatsoever, but will defend it with his life, so will the Arabs of Palestine and the Arabs of other parts of the Arab world defend their homeland. In the name of the government of Iraq I invited the Committee to come to Iraq to listen to the views of a number of Iraqi political leaders including Iraqi Jews. The Committee accepted the invitation and came to Baghdad after finishing its sessions in Cairo and Jerusalem. In spite of the peaceful defence undertaken by the Arabs, the Committee Report came out, as we had expected, in agreement with the wishes of President Truman, for the Committee recommended the entry of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine.

The Bludan Meeting of the League of Arab States

The Arab states were outraged by the contents of the Anglo-American Committee Report, so prejudicial to Arab rights. The Arab League held a meeting in Bludan, Syria, to study the situation. It was decided at that meeting that the Arab states should each send a note of protest to Great Britain and the United States of America. It was also decided that the Arab states should attend the London Conference called by the British government to discuss the Palestine problem.

The Iraqi delegation proposed that the Arab states should contribute two million dinars (pounds sterling) a year for the Palestine cause, one million to be spent on an information service, and another million for buying up Arab lands which might pass into the hands of the Zionists, and for organizing Palestine Arab affairs. This proposal was not accepted.

As for the famous Confidential Resolutions of Bludan, they were no more than ink on paper. They resembled a big drum which echoes after but which is entirely empty. When I stood in Bludan as a member of the Iraqi delegation to belittle the Resolutions and to criticize the weakness of the stand of the Arab states with regard to the Palestine problem, brother members of the Conference shouted at me and addressed me with harsh protests, a fact which made the Head of the Iraqi delegation, Hamdi Pachachi, ex-Prime Minister of Iraq, stand up and ask that my speech be deleted from the minutes. By so doing he calmed the temper of the brethren.

The Confidential Resolutions passed by The Council of the League of Arab States in its 4th Session, Extraordinary, in Bludan in June 1946.

After discussion the Council of the League recommends the following:

1. The condition in Palestine moves towards violent confrontation due to Zionist military organization and terrorist societies. The Zionists are acquiring the habit of using force to dictate their will. This may lead to the Arabs of Palestine taking measures to protect themselves by similar arrangements. This will lead to friction between the two forces in which case the stand of the Arab governments will become extremely critical for they will not be able to prevent the Arab peoples from volunteering by all means to support the Arabs of Palestine with money, arms and volunteers.

2. If the recommendations of the Anglo-American Political Committee of Inquiry are adopted and a start is made to implement them, conditions between these two governments and the Arab states will worsen to a great degree so that it will become incumbent on the Arab states to defend themselves by taking some necessary measures and among these measures the following:

a. Acting not to permit the two states or either one of them or their nationals any new economic or other concessions.

b. Not to support their special interests in any world body.

c. Moral boycott.

d. Looking into the abrogation of what concessions they may have in the Arab states.

e. Complaint to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

On reading these resolutions one can see the weakness and lack of seriousness with which the Arab states began handling the Palestine problem. On my return from Bludan to Baghdad, the Iraqi government asked me to prepare a memorandum of strong protest to be presented to both the British and American governments regarding their unfair stand on the problem of Palestine which had led to the inimical proposals made by the Anglo-American Committee and the illegal flood of immigration into Palestine, and charging the governments of Britain and the United States with responsibility for the terrible consequences of their policy which WAS partial to the Zionists. The British Ambassador, Sir John Stonehewer-Bird, refused to receive the memorandum, and requested very earnestly that we should convey the message to the British government orally and put nothing so harsh as that on paper.

Crisis in the Leadership of the Palestine Arabs

One of the basic factors which led to the Palestine tragedy was the problem of leadership and the lack of democratic organization on the part of the Palestinians. The Leadership of the people was attained by arousing popular sentiment. Personalities might rise to leadership by personal charm, family background and a does of nationalism. Once a leader was in the saddle, he was usually not removable or changeable by democratic procedure. Authoritarianism on the part of a leader might lead to dissensions and conflict of personalities, which might weaken the whole national body. This was true of most of the Arab world and the Palestinians were no exception.

In the '30's the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haji Ameen al-Husaini, rightfully achieved leadership or the Arabs of Palestine and won the respect and affection of the Arab messes. Before the Second World War he came to Iraq where he enjoyed great respect and prestige among the nationalists. He also exerted some influence among the army officers who led the Rasheed 'Aali al-Gailani movement or 1941. That movement was anti-British and it led to the flight to Amman or the Regent or Iraq and a number or Iraqi statesmen. When the movement was crushed by the Jordanian army led by Glubb Pasha, Rasheed 'Aali and his regime fled the country. So did the Grand Mufti, Haji Ameen al-Husaini and his followers. Both Rasheed 'Aali al-GailaniaHaji Ameen al-Husaini landed in Berlin and were honoured guests of the Axis during the War

In the absence of the Grand Mufti the Palestinias had no single leader to replace him and this in itself hurt the Palestinian Arab cause. The charisma, popularity and control of Haji Ameen left no room for another person. When Haji Ameen returned after the War he was not popular either in Iraq or with the victorious Allies. This perpetuated the crisis of leadership. In 1947 Prime Minister Saleh Jabr attended a meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League in Beirut which dealtwith the Palestine problem. He sent a telegram containing the following statement:

The Mufti since coming to Beirut has shown great activity with the intention of forming a Palestine Arab government which for the present would reside somewhere outside Palestine. It is understood that he wants to preside over this government which will be made up of his followers and supporters. The head of one of the Arab delegations in a sub-committee opened the subject. He asked the sub-committee which was made up of Riyadh (as-Sulh, Lebanon), Jamil (Merdam, Syria), Sameer (ar-Rifa'i, Jordan), Naqrashi (Pasha, Egypt), Sheikh Yusuf al-Yaseen (Saudi Arabia), and Sayid Mu'een al-Madhi for Palestine, to discuss the matter.

I mentioned that the time has not come yet for such an act and that it would lead to many difficulties, disagreements and problems on the part of the Palestinians on the one hand, and the Arab states and the Mufti on the other. I told them very frankly that Iraq, which is fully reedy to work for the Palestine cause and to help the Arabs of Palestine, could in no circumstances cooperate with the Mufti in view of its conviction that the Mufti had failed terribly in dealing with Palestine question and that he had taken it from bad to worse. In fact his person was the cause of the tragedy. On the other hand, forming a government of this kind by a resolution of the League of Arab States would provide an opportunity for the Zionists to ask for the same thing and this would be a strong weapon in the hands of their supporters in the United States. This would complicate our difficulties. Moreover, no benefit is to be reaped from a government that carries the name but resides outside Palestine, for it can do nothing in the present situation. The idea was abandoned...

Iraq's enthusiasm for the cause of Palestine was at its height from 1944 to the beginning of 1948. Iraq allotted from its budget, which was small at the time, hundreds of thousands of dinars for the Arab Offices of Information and for saving Palestinian Arab lands from passing into Zionist hands and making Arab peasants homeless. In this the Iraqi government depended on one of the most loyal and best educated and realistic sons of Palestine, Muse al-'Alami. He was entrusted with both the projects until the downfall of the Saleh Jabr Cabinet in January 1948. In the meantime Haji Ameen al-Husaini felt that his leadership was being defied and weakened by the work that Musa al-'Alami was doing outside the Mufti’s realm of influence. It was to overcome this situation that Haji Ameen came to see me in Cairo.

This is the last part of a telegram which I sent from Cairo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq on the 25th of March 1947.

The Mufti asked to meet me. I met him tonight at the (Iraqi) Legation and the discussion lasted more than two hours. He began by thanking Iraq for its stand on behalf of Palestine and he said that the things that Palestine needed most were unity inside and solidarity outside amongst the Arab states. He hopes that the atmosphere will be clarified between the Higher Arab Committee and Iraq. He says that it is not reasonable or possible that there should be any alienation between them while Iraq is motivated so vigourously for the cause of Palestine.

Then he spoke of his old friendship with H.E. the Prime Minister and how he believed in his broad mindedness as well as his sacrifices for national goals.

Then he spoke at length about his life in Iraq and declared his innocence concerning what had happened (the Rasheed ‘Aali al-Gailani movement). He said that he is writing some brief memoirs and that he will offer a copy for the information of H.R.H. the Regent and H.E. Sayid Nuri Sa’id, and it will appear from it that he was an agent only of goodness, and that he did not take part in the unfortunate movement. He brings as witness the report which George Antonius made about him to the British government. He is searching for all the means that will improve his relations with Iraq.

Then he discussed at length the project of the Arab Offices (of Information) and Musa al-‘Alami. He expressed the necessity for Musa’s joining the higher committee if only morally. He had proposed to Musa to become a member of the Higher Committee and undertake the Offices and the Development Project. He refused. Then he (the Mufti) had proposed to him that his work should be under his (the Mufti's) auspices in his capacity as President of the Higher Committee. He refused. When Musa decided to leave (the Arab Offices of Information) he (the Mufti) asked him to hand over the Offices to persons on whom he (the Mufti) could rely like Raja'i al-Husaini or Ahmad Shuqairi. He refused. He (the Mufti) had proposed to him that he should become Director of Political Affairs. He refused. He (the Mufti) blamed Musa for Iraqis stand concerning the Offices. I told him that Musa was not responsible for Iraq's stand, but that Iraq found in the person of Musa a capable, loyal and reliable character. They (the government of Iraq) have entrusted him with the affairs of the Offices and the Development Project and I explained to him that it would be better for the public good if he supported Musa without interfering in his affairs. He promised to exert his efforts to come to an understanding with Musa on the basis of respecting Muse's dignity and the dignity of the Arab Higher Committee, but he wants to come to an understanding with Iraq by any means possible. He is thinking of sending a delegation to Iraq.

I asked him about his relations with the British. He said that the atmosphere was beginning to clarify between them and that if the British had been wise they would have depended on him in Palestine and their burden would have been much lighter. He said that world-wide Jewish propaganda against him has been unequalled by any propaganda, and it was that propaganda which made the British see him not as he truly is.

After a long discussion he requested me to exert my efforts to do away with whatever alienation there might be between Iraq and the Arab Higher Committee which represents Palestine. He charged me with his respects and greetings for H.R.H. the Regent and H.E. Sayid Nuri Sa’id.

The London Conference on Palestine

The British government invited the Arab states to Round-Table Conference to discuss the Palestine problem. It also issued a separate invitation to the Zionists in order to be able to negotiate with them simultaneously The London Conference was held in two sessions; the first towards the end of 1946, and the second early in 1947. The British side was represented by Mr Ernest Bevin, Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs, and Mr Creech-Jones, Minister for the Colonies. The Arab states were headed by Prince Faisal Al Sa'ud, for Saudi Arabia; Prince Saif-ul-Islam 'Abdullah, for Yemen; Faris al-Khouri, for Syria; ‘Abdur Razzaq Sanhouri Pasha and later Isma’il Haqqi Pasha, the Egyptian Ambassador to England, for Egypt; Sameer Pasha ar-Rifa'i, for Jordan; Camille Sham'un, for Lebanon; and Mohammed Fadhel Jamali, for Iraq. 'Abdur Rahman 'Azzam Pasha (Egypt) Attended as Secretary-General for the Arab League. The Arabs of Palestine were represented by Jamal al-Husaini, Sami Taha and others.

The Arab delegations worked together in presenting the Arab point of view. They defended the Arab character of Palestine with full strength and clarity. They also took part in proposing a solution, based on a democratic constitution for an independent Palestine, which would be ruled by the legitimate inhabitants of the land irrespective of their race or creed. After the Arabs had completed the text of their project, the British side notified us that the Zionists flatly rejected the Arab project for the solution of the Palestine problem. This was to be expected.

Mr Bevin, on his part, suggested a solution for Palestine, the Morrison Provincial Plan, analogous to the Swiss cantonal system, whereby Palestine would be divided into Arab cantons where the Arabs formed the majority, and Jewish cantons where the Jews formed the majority. The Arab delegations rejected this solution. It was also rejected by the Zionists, as we learned.

The following statements represent Iraqi reasoning at that Conference:

Extracts from Notes of the Third-Meeting Speech made by H.E. Dr Jamali.

I should like first of all to thank Mr Bevin for turning his cards face-upwards on the table. I think that is the best way to reach complete mutual understanding. I also wish to register here that we in Iraq received with great pleasure Mr Bevin's statement that friendship with the Arab world is much more important for Great Britain than armies stationed in the Middle East. We certainly think that the mutual friendship of our two peoples is vitally important to us both, but I am afraid that the Palestine problem may overtax that friendship.

I should like to state here that we in Iraq are deeply concerned with the problem of Palestine. For us, it is a matter of internal affairs, besides its national and international significance, for our peace and stability are directly affected by events in Palestine. We have about 120,000 Jews in Iraq. For centuries Jews have lived with the Muslims and Christians in complete peace and harmony in Iraq. There was nothing in the political atmosphere to disturb peace and harmony until Zionism came to Baghdad. Then the Jews in Iraq began to find themselves, through no fault of their own, greatly embarrassed by Zionism, and the government is doing its utmost to prevent any intolerance which might lead to trouble between members of the various faiths.

Before dealing with the Morrison Provincial Plan, I should like to raise a few points which, to my mind, have direct bearing on any feature settlement of Palestine.

1. The first is that the Arabs desire peace and security but peace and security have been disturbed by political Zionism. The Arabs have always expressed their grievances and raised their voice asking for their rights. What they ere after is to reach a final settlement of their just cause. They are in despair. They have lost faith in Commissions and official statements, for, so far, they have seen shelved any decision which has been cognizant of their rights, while those decisions which favour the intruders have been carried out. I earnestly plead, in the name of Peace and justice, that peace and justice be granted to the Arabs in Palestine.

2. A very important point which needs to be settled once and for all is that Palestine has no magic about it. It is a small piece of country which has its natural physical capacity. There is nothing mystic about its capacity, nothing supernatural about it. Like any other country, it is inhabited by a people. The fact that it contains the Holy Places for the three great religions does not add to its natural capacity, nor should it create political complications. The mystic urge which the Zionists claim for Palestine is a myth, and should be exploded In the first place, Zionism is not a religious movement but e temporal political idea. In the second place, if we were to accept the precedence of mystic attachment for other peoples' lands we might very wall start a new cause for conflict allover the world, for any aggressive nation could develop a mystic attachment to someone else's land. Thus, it seems to that the Palestine problem should be dealt with naturally and humanly, without any mythology.

3. It seems to me that the basis of all trouble in Palestine lies in the nature of political Zionism, for political Zionism is an aggressive movement. We know of no limits to its aims and ambitions. Its ideology, combining race, religion Bnd nationhood has much in common with Nazi ideology. The very idea of a Chosen People and a Promised Land is nothing very different from Nazi ideology. Chosen People? Maybe. Promised Land? What is it that is promised? Is it part of Palestine? All of Palestine? Palestine and Transjordan? Palestine, TransJordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq? These are questions to which various answers have been given, according to expediency. We know very wall that the Zionists are not such fools as to spend millions, hundreds of millions of pounds, for a small arid country. They have come with much wider ambitions, ambitions to dominate at least economically all the Arab world, nay, all the Middle East. The Arabs certainly cannot stand indifferent to such aggressive intentions.

In their tactics, the Zionists have proved to be much deadlier than the Nazis, for they use methods of infiltration and squeezing-out of people from land and commerce which the Nazis never knew how to apply. In their deadly methods, and their terrorism, they are as efficient, if not more efficient, than the Nazis. The situation which I would like to lay before the British Government is that the Arabs are facing a big danger. They are faced with an invasion, for the Zionists are doing nothing less than invading Palestine. This aggressive invasion, coupled with aggressive ideology and tactics must be exposed to all the world. We hope that the British Government, which has the Arabs' friend ship so much at heart, will sympathize with the Arabs and decide to put a final stop to this danger.

I should like to ask Mr Bevin how he would welcome 500,000 Nazis imported into England to build a Nazi national home? I am sure he would oppose it and fight against it. But something similar to that is happening to the Arabs in the Middle East, and the danger is still growing.

4. With regard to the interference of the United States in the question of Palestine, I have two remarks to make. First of all, I am sure that the great American people, whose sincere stand for democracy and justice I never doubt, have been exploited by influential propaganda. I am sure that, once they are shown the truth and justice of the Arab Cause on the one hand. and the peril to their friendly relations with the Arab world on the other, they will cease to champion Zionism. In the second place, if we accept the premise of American interference, we should have to grant the same right to other nations. That is why we feel that the settlement of the Palestine affair should be the concern of the Arabs and the British Government alone. As for the Zionists, they have no basic rights in Palestine. They were given a favour by Britain which they misinterpreted and misused.
One of the fundamental facts that should be recognized is that the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine are never on an equal footing. The Arabs are the legal owners of the country, while the Zionists are aggressors and invaders. It is not a question of right versus right, but of right versus wrong.

5. We have to separate, completely and finally, the World Jewish Problem from that of Palestine. The Jewish Problem should be dealt with in Europe, for Europe needs builders who can repair the destruction wrought by the Nazis. We cannot claim to have won the war if the roots of Naziism continue in Europe, and continue to preclude the people of the Jewish faith in Europe from enjoyment of full civil and religious right. The truth is that malicious Zionist designs have been applied to de-nationalize European Jewry and make them believe that they do not belong where they are and that they should go to Palestine. The Arabs cannot be responsible for such inhuman designs.

6. Are the democratic principles implied in the United Nations Charter, the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms to be applied to the people of Palestine? Or are the people of Palestine to be victimized by designs and problems for which they are not responsible? Why are the Arabs of Palestine, through no fault of their own, to be penalized by deprivation of self-government and self-determination, simply because ambitious dreamers intend to establish a foreign state on an Arab land?

7. On more than one occasion, the British government has solemnly declared that they do not meet the Jewish national home to be a Jewish state, and that the Balfour Declaration was not intended to prejudice the rights and privileges of the Arabs to their own land. I should like to know whether the British Government still maintains the same position. If so, we hope that they will put en immediate and final stop to Zionist aims and ambitions, end see to it that no plan which is proposed for Palestine will lead to a Jewish state.

8. I am sure that, if Mr Balfour were alive, he would regret his own Declaration. That greet philosopher seems to have been misled and to have been told that Palestine was a land with relatively no inhabitants, or at least inhabited only by primitive peoples with no ideals or aims of their own. Now that that experiment has been tried for a quarter of a century, it is only great and noble to recognize that such a policy was not right and that it cannot lead to right. It is high time to make big decisions and to correct or at least to stop the wrongs of the past. The world needs to be established on principles and not on expediency. We should recognize the right of peoples and nations to live their own life in their own homes, and to enjoy self-determination. It is time that this should be recognized for the Arabs of Palestine.

9. No matter what view we hold about the use and value of history, the Arabs cannot give up their historical and legal rights to Palestine. No promises, declarations or statements acknowledging these rights can be ignored or forgotten. The McMahon correspondence and other First World War pledges; Paragraph 4, Article 22, of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 73 of the United Nations Charter; the various statements of policy made by His Majesty's Government; the Churchill White Paper of 1922; the Passfield Paper of 1930; the White Paper of 1939, are all British pledges which we continue to regard H1s Majesty's Government in honour bound to fulfill insofar as Arab rights and complaints are recognized in these documents.

Bearing the above points in mind, the Iraqi government cannot but reject the Morrison Plan of Federation, or, as it is now called, the Provincial Plan. This Plan certainly contradicts the following points:

(1) The Plan will most probably lead to partition. The Arabs will never acquiesce to partition, for, to recall the story of the two women before King Solomon, they are the true mother of the child.

(2) Partition will mean a Jewish state, and the Arabs will never acquiesce in any plan that might lead to that. A Jewish state would not only be a misfit in the Middle East, but a danger to all concerned. It would certainly be more than anything that the British government has never intended to grant to the Jews.

(3) The Plan would reduce a big portion of the Arab population to the status of a minority in a Jewish state. That we strongly oppose.

(4) The Plan might lead to further immigration, end, by artificially overcrowding a Jewish province, the Zionists might use every means to overflow and exploit neighbouring Arab lends.

(5) The Plan has all the defects which were clearly demonstrated by the Woodhead Report. In the long run, it will not work.

(6) The Plan deprives the Arabs of the best part of their country and makes them unable to support themselves financially. In this connection, I should like to refer to a point raised by Mr Bevin in his statement yesterday, that he cannot see how the Palestine budget could be met without Jewish money. I wish to state that the greater part of the Palestine budget is spent on the maintenance of a police force for the sake of security disturbed by the presence and actions of Zionism.

(7) We strongly object to the Plan for supporting the Anglo-American Enquiry Commission's view that Palestine should be neither Arab nor Jewish. That is a violation of the most elementary principles.

(8) We also object seriously to the reference made in the Plan to money to be spent on the Arabs in Palestine, and to a loan to be made to the Arab states. This may be due to a lack of understanding of Arab nature and character. The Arabs will never agree to give up their rights to their own homeland in exchange for bribes or material gain, from whatever source. An Arab would rather die of hunger than have his honour and dignity violated. National honour and dignity make us flatly reject such proposals.

(9) Iraq will never acquiesce in the establishment of a Zionist bridgehead in Palestine. We feel that there cannot be peace in the Middle East until the poisonous fangs of political Zionism have been pulled out.

These, in brief, are the views of my country. I have presented them very frankly, and, I am afraid, bluntly, but I Can assure you, honestly and sincerely. I also have laid my cards face-upwards on the table. I hope that the views which I have expressed will be taken in a spirit of friendship and sympathy, because it is only thus that we can lay the foundations of a just solution of the Palestine problem. Since the British government could not find the possibility of an agreement between the Arabs and the Zionists on any particular solution, and, since Mr Truman, the President of the United States of America, was steadily increasing pressure on the British to open the gates of Palestine to Zionist immigration, the British government decided to relieve itself of the question of Palestine by referring it to the United Nations Organization for a decision on what was to be done.

The United Nations Special Session

In response to a request by the British government, the General Assembly of the United Nations held a Special Session in the spring of 1947 to look into the Palestine problem. I led the Iraqi delegation to the Special Session which met at Flushing Meadows and Lake Success. My efforts were directed to defending the right of the Palestinian Arabs to self-determination and independence, to proving that Palestine could not provide a solution of the Jewish problem which is universal in character, and to showing that any denial of the application of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations to the Arabs of Palestine would lead to bloodshed and racial and religious conflicts.

The Arab delegations to the Special Session met together regularly to coordinate their efforts. Besides we approached the Asiatic and African states like Iran, Turkey and India (before its division into India and Pakistan) to take a united stand to defend the inalienable rights of the Arabs of Palestine.

It was at Flushing Meadows and for the sake of Palestine that the Asian-African states first began to work together as group. I approached the leader of the Indian delegation, the Indian Ambassador to United States, Mr Assif 'Ali, to bring the Arab and other Asian and African delegations together to discuss cooperation in handling the Palestine problem. Mr Assif 'Ali invited heads of delegations to a luncheon at a restaurant near Flushing Meadows and it was there that the Asian-African cooperation movement was initiated.

The General Assembly in the Special Session decided to establish a United Nations Committee of Inquiry to study the question of Palestine in all its aspects and to submit its recommendations to the General Assembly. I emphasized that the membership of the 6ommittee should not include those who were already known to be biased in favour of Zionism. In fact the Committee did include some members who were very enthusiastic for the Zionist cause such as the delegates of Uruguay and Guatemala.

After the Special Session I gave a press conference to the United Press in Washington, May 22, 1947, which reported:

Jamali sharply scorned what he called the Zionists ideals of conquest, declaring they were a hang-over from the ill-advised Balfour Declaration which was based on the 19th century imperialist outlook, when the Western world imposed its thoughts and desires on the East forgetting that the East has a culture and has potentialities to grow, develop , rise and build anew civilization.

Fadhel Jamali emphasized that the Arab states would not be bound by any united nation committee of Inquiry decision which recommended partition of Palestine or the imposition of a Jewish state.

Fadhel Jamali expressed the opinion that all that was needed to settle the Palestine situation was to leave the people of Palestine alone and let them lead a democratic life without distinction as to race or religion.

This, he emphasized, was the only solution in conformity with the United Nations Charter.

The Committee of Inquiry came to Sofar, Lebanon, in the beginning of the summer of 1947 to listen to the Arab point of view. I was in London at the time but I flew to Lebanon to appear before the Committee and present the point of view of the Iraqi government on the Palestine problem. (See Appendix )

In August the Committee of Inquiry submitted its report to the Secretary General of the United Nations. The members of the Committee were not unanimous in their recomendations. The majority recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish, state and an internationalized Jerusalem (Corpus Separatum). The minority, which included members from Iran, India and Yugoslavia, recommended the establishment of Arab end Jewish regional zones which would be confederated in something like the Swiss cantonal pattern.

The Secretary General circulated the Report of the Committee of Inquiry to the member states.

The Political Committee of the Arab League met and decided that the Arab states should address communiqués to both the United Kingdom and the United States warning them against the implementation of the Majority report of the Committee of Inquiry and holding them responsible for the consequences in case the partition plan was implemented.

The notes addressed to the United Kingdom and the United States were very similar in their content. Because of their historical importance it may be useful to give a translation of the note addressed to the United Kingdom by Iraq.

22 September, 1947

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its greetings to His Britannic Majesty’s Embassy in Baghdad, and it has the honour of informing the Embassy of the unanimous Resolution of the Political Committee of the Council of the League of Arab States passed on the 19th of September, 1947, and wishes to call the attention of the honourable Embassy to the following points and requests it to convey them as quickly as possible to His Britannic Majesty’s Government.

1. When the British Government's Mandate over Palestine was decided, although it was basically invalid because of the people's opposition to it, it was intended, in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, that it should prepare the original inhabitants of this land to be an independent nation, and to achieve their political maturity in the shortest possible time so that, when the basic requirements for independence were completed, the Mandate would be terminated and independence declared. On the 18th of April, 1946, the League of Nations was dissolved and the Mandate emanating from the League supposing it was valid, ceased. But the British Government wished to continue its supervision of this land in order to achieve the prosperity of its original inhabitants. It was a wish offered by the British side and opposed by the Arabs of Palestine and rejected by all means by which they had been accustomed to express themselves from the time the Mandate was established. In February, 1947, the Foreign Secretary of the British Government declared in the British Parliament that the people of Palestine had achieved a cultural and political maturity which qualified them to practise the independence of their land. Their case would be like that of other Arab lands which were severed from the Ottoman Empire in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne and who now in fact enjoyed independence. In spite of this and in spite of successive promises made to the Arabs by the British Government. It has not followed the natural course by declaring the independence of Palestine.

2. Since the Committee of Inquiry formed by the United Nations has submitted proposals which, in total and in part, demolish the independence of Palestine as an Arab State, the Arabs of Palestine and all inhabitants of the Arab lands deplore these proposals and refuse them and their foundations and declare to His Britannic Majesty’s Government from now that there is no legal authority anywhere which has the right to cut a piece from Arab Palestine and offer it to the Zionists to erect a Jewish state thereon. They also declare that there is no legal authority which is capable of permitting the invasion of Palestine by Jews who have no relation with it and who are not entitled to enter it.

3. The invasion of Palestine by Zionist elements has been associated with acts of violence and terrorism in order to enable them to establish their feet in the land so as to be able later on to achieve their ambitions in neighbouring Arab states.

4. For this reason the Governments of the Arab states have already warned the afore-mentioned Committee of Inquiry of the consequences of recommending the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine end revealed to them that this would certainly lead to troubles which would engulf the whole Middle East, the reason being that the Arabs of Palestine will not yield to any measure which will do away with the unity end independence of their lend. They will surely wage a war which knows no relaxation in order to repel that aggression from their land, especially since they know that all Arab lands will stand behind them to support them and provide them with men, money and ammunition for self-defence. The Arab Governments themselves will not be able to suppress the rebellious feelings of their peoples aroused by the injustice imposed on them. Nor will the Arab Governments stand with folded hands vis-a-vis a danger which threatens all Arab lands. They will be obliged to undertake some decisive action in order to repel aggression and restore right to its position.

A stand of this kind on the part of the Arab peoples or their Governments is not an exceptional matter since it has been proved on various occasions that the Zionists depend for their armament, terrorist movement and war activities, by which they inflict harm on the Arabs of Palestine, on political and material help offered to them by some foreign governments and by some bodies and organizations which encourage those governments. Besides, the problem of disarming the Jews to stop their terrorist activities has been the subject of repeated requests and protests made by the Arab Governments to the British Government without those efforts leading to any decisive success.

5. For these reasons it is the view of the Iraqi Government, which is still tied to His Britannic Majesty’s Government with the strongest of ties, that it is her duty to make clear to them the danger which is actually engulfing security and peace in the Middle East and to charge them with the responsibility for all the events that may follow in case a resolution is taken which infringes the right of Palestine to become an independent Arab state.

The Ministry takes this opportunity to express its highest esteem and respects.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the British Embassy, Iraq

I am sure that the British and American governments did not give much weight to such memoranda presented by Arab governments who were not strong enough to defend Arab rights or threaten Western interests. But certainly both the United States and Britain underestimated the potential danger to peace and relations with the West which would be engendered by the frustration of the Arabs of Palestine and the Arabs in all other lends.

The General Assembly of the United Nations, 1947

Organization and meetings of the Arab delegations

Before going to the Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly I went to the Ministry of Defence in Baghdad and had a meeting with the Minister, Shakir al-Wadi. I put before him the possibility of the United Nations passing a resolution which might prejudice Arab rights in Palestine. That might lead to trouble and blood shed that would endanger Arab lives and security. I inquired about the policy of the Ministry vis-a-vis such a situation And whether the Iraqi Ministry of Defence could come to the help end defence of our Palestinian brethren, because that would have a great effect on the stand Iraq would take in the United Nations. He assured me that the Ministry of Defence would take all measures to defend the rights of our Palestinian brethren and that I could speak with full assurance that the Ministry of Defence supported my words.

The major work done by the Arabs together in a united way for the sake of Palestine was their struggle in the United Nations Session, in the autumn of 1947, to try to prevent the partition of Palestine.

The Arab delegations included some strong and experienced persons. From the Egyptian delegation I remember Mohammed Husain Heikal Pasha, Dr Mahmoud Fawzi and Memduh Riyadh. The Lebanese delegation included Camille Sham’un Dr Charles Malik and Dr Victor Khouri. The Syrian delegation included Faris al-Khouri, Ameer 'Adil Arsalan and Dr Farid Zainuddin. The Saudi Arabian delegation included H. R. H. Prince Faisal and Dr 'Awni Dajjani. The Iraqi delegation included Nuri as-Sa’id and Dr Mohammed Fadhel Jamal. The Palestine delegation was headed by Jamal al-Husaini. I wish to put on record here the name off Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, then the foreign Minister of Pakistan, who took an active and whole-hearted part in the defence of Palestine.

The Arab delegations met frequently to integrate their activities. They held some general meetings for all the members of the delegation. They also formed a higher political committee attended by the heads of delegations and one other member from each delegation. They formed a liaison committee to contact the various delegations and another to draft memoranda and statements for publicity and the press.

We all worked with zeal and passion to defend the cause of justice and humanity for the Arabs of Palestine. We worked day and night under constant strain. The pressure of power politics was great and we sometimes had to speak as fighters and not as diplomats.

The Opening the Session of the General Assembly

At the opening of each session of the General Assembly, heads of delegations make speeches setting out the general lines of their policy. General Marshall, Secretary of state for the United States, said that his government "gave much weigh" to the report of the majority of the Committee of Inquiry which recommended the partition of Palestine. Heads of several Arab delegations, including Iraq, expressed in their statements of policy their dismay at the attitude taken by the United States and advised the United States government not to be rash in taking a stand under the influence of Zionist propaganda and pressure. General Marshall met the heads of the Arab delegations at a luncheon party and assured them that America was still open minded and had reached no final decision yet, and that "giving weight" to the majority report did not mean final acceptance of it.

Next came the allocation of the items of the agenda of the Session to the various Committees. The Palestine problem, being major political question, should have been sent to the Political Committee for debate. Instead an Ad Hoc Political Committee was formed to deal with it. This was done over the objections of the Arab delegations who wanted the First Committee, namely, the Political Committee, to deal with Palestine, since the heads of delegations usually sat in the First Committee.

The Ad Hoc Political Committee

When the Ad Hoc Political Committee was formed, Dr Evatt, the Foreign Minister of Australia, was elected as its Chairman. The representative of Australia on the Committee of Inquiry had been quite neutral and he had not voted for partition. Thus the Arabs were deceived by thinking that Dr Evatt would be an impartial Chairman. Actually he proved to be a master of tactics in steering the Ad Hoc Political Committee toward achieving Zionist ends.

When the Ad Hoc Political Committee first met it decided that the representatives of both the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency should be invited to take part in the discussions and to answer questions. The Arab Higher Committee was led by Jamal al-Husaini. The representatives of the Jewish Agency were led by Moshe Shertok (Sharett).

When the general debate was opened, various delegations began to express their views on the report of the Committee of Inquiry. Some states criticized the majority report and some agreed with it. Others celled for conciliation and understanding between the Arabs and the Jews. Others dealt with the legal aspects of the subject. From the Iraqi delegation Nuri Sa'id end I made statements. The former dealt with the betrayal of the Arabs and the injustice of the Balfour declaration imposing Zionism on Palestine, and showed how all of that was contrary to the letters of Sir Henry McMahon to King Husain in the First World War and e violation of Arab natural rights. In my speech I dealt with the fundamental principles in the light of which the Palestinian problem should be examined. I showed that the recommendation of the majority of the Committee of Inquiry as well as the Zionist claims were all contrary to democratic principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter. I refuted the claim of Jewish right to a national home as well as their need for such a home. The Jews, citizen in any country, must consider that country as their home. I criticized the United States which contradicted itself when it called for the application of some principles in Greece and denied the application of the same principles to the Arabs of Palestine.

One of the most important speeches defending the Arab cause was made by Sir Muhammad Mafrullah Khan, leader of the Pakistan delegation. He reviewed the Palestine question and proved the legality of Arab rights therein, refuted all Zionist claims of the partition, proposal. His speech made a deep impression on the Committee.

Many people were waiting to hear what the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union had to say. Mr Creech-Jones, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, made an important statement. He spoke in the name of the British government explaining that the Mandate is unworkable and stating that his government would not undertake any solution which did not please both Arabs and Jews. The statement made some members doubt the possibility of imposing partition so long as the Arabs opposed it and so long as Britain was not willing to use force to implement it.

A speech by Jamal al-Husaini followed in which he explained that the rights of the Palestinian Arabs to their own country, Palestine, was a natural, unquestionable right and that they would not yield a span of Palestine before shedding the last drop of their blood and that the Palestine Arab delegation was not ready to take part in any discussion regarding the partition plan for it was absolutely rejected from its very foundations.

He was followed by Rabbi Silver on behalf of the Jewish Agency who claimed that the Jews had historical connections with Palestinian support by the Balfour declaration and that the Mandate gave them rights in all of Palestine. But they were ready now to sacrifice and let TransJordan be excluded and they also would accept the part left to them. In other words, he accepted the partition scheme.

Everybody was anxious to hear the statement of the delegate of the United States. Mr Hershel Johnson made the statement which endorsed the partition scheme and called for an international militia of volunteers to implement it. He stated that he took it for granted that United Nations member states surrounding Palestine would not undertake any aggressive (sic) move. This was a reference to the Arab states.

The American statement came as a great disappointment to the hopes of the Arab delegations who had seen the statement 24 hours before it was delivered and who had asked Faris al-Khouri to make a reply immediately after its delivery. He did make a very forceful reply. He was followed by a number of speakers, some of them from the Arab delegations.

Later I prepared a speech refuting the statements of all those who supported the partition scheme like Uruguay, Poland and Guatemala. I then turned to the United States and explained American relation to the Zionist and how Zionist propaganda in the United States and the Zionist role in American electioneering and elections had led to this harmful plan for partition, harmful to American interest, the interests of the United Nations itself and the interests of world peace. Then I dealt with the Committee of Inquiry and exposed the partisanship to Zionism of some of its members. Next I refuted the proposed plan for partition in the light of the principles of justice, politics, economics, peace and stability, and emphasized that partition was not practical and could not succeed.

Of those who spoke in the Ad Hoc Committee 16 states were in favour of the partition and 12 including the Arab states were against partition. The Iraqi delegation, supported by the Syrian delegation, questioned the legality of the United Nations passing a resolution of partition against the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of a country. The Charter does not authorize the United Nations to take such measures. If the UN should pass such a resolution they would be acting illegally and openly violating the Charter. I suggested, then, that the matter should be referred to the International Court of Justice at the Hague for consultation to avoid the passing of a mistaken resolution.

The proposal was a reasonable one, and we had enough votes to carry it in the morning when it should have come to the vote in the Ad Hoc Political Committee. However, voting was postponed until the evening session. A dinner party had been arranged by the opposition to which some of those who supported the Resolution were invited so that they would be absent at the time of voting. The Resolution came to the vote in the evening and the number of votes for and against were equal. The deciding vote against going to the International Court was cast by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Political Committee. Some years later I came across a book called, The Law of the United Nations, by a well-known professor of International Law, Dr Hans Kelsen, who himself is a Jew. He comments in one of the footnotes of his book that the objection raised by the delegate of Iraq, as well as by others, to the legality of the partition Resolution was valid. (Footnote: Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, Stevens & Sons Ltd., London, 1951, p. 197 )

The United Nations, from a strictly legal point of view, was not entitled to take a decision to partition a country against the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants. Dr Hans Kelsen is an important witness and he comes from the Jewish side. When the general debate was over, three sub-committees were formed. The first was to study the project of partition and to put it in its final shape. The second was to study the project of the unitary state and to prepare a final draft proposal. The third was to study the question of conciliation and of reconciling the Arab and Zionist views. The formation of these committees was entrusted to the Chairman. He formed the first and the second sub-committees from delegations who favoured the purpose of the committee. The sub-committee on partition was made up of USA, USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Guatemala, Uruguay, the Union of South Africa end Venezuela. The sub-committee on the unitary state was made up of the six Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen), Afganistan, Pakistan and Columbia. As for the sub-committee for conciliation, it was made up of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, Prince Wan of Thailand and the rapporteur from Iceland. Britain was requested to send representatives to both the first and second sub-committees. The Jewish Agency was to send a representative to the first sub-committee and the Higher Arab Committee to send a representative to the Second sub-committee. In the second sub-committee I nominated the representative of Columbia to become Chairman and the representative of Pakistan to become rapporteur. The representative of Columbia asked Mr Evatt to include some impartial members in the committees. When he declined to do so the representative of Columbia withdrew from the sub-committee. The representative of Pakistan acted as both Chairman and rapporteur of the sub-committee.

The sub-committee on the unitary state made the following proposal:

We hereby submit the following proposal as being the only just, practical and democratic way to achieve the independence of Palestine and its future constitutional organization:

1. That an Arab state in the whole of Palestine be established on democratic lines.

2. That the said Arab state of Palestine will respect human rights, fundamental freedoms and equality of all persons before the law.

3. That the said Arab State of Palestine will protect the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities.

4. That freedom of worship and Access to the Holy Place will be guaranteed to all

The following steps will have to be taken to give effect to the aforesaid principles:

(a) A Constituent Assembly shall be elected at the earliest possible time. All genuine and law-abiding nationals of Palestine will be entitled to participate in the elections for the Constituent Assembly.

(b) The said Constituent Assembly shall, within a fixed time, formulate and enact a Constitution for the Arab State of Palestine, which shall be of a democratic nature and shall embody the above-mentioned four principles.

(c) A government shall be formed within a fixed time, in accordance with the terms of the Constitution to take over the administration of Palestine from the Mandatory Power.

The third sub-committee did nothing but send a letter to Prince Faisal, the representative of Saudi Arabia, and to General Marsahll, Secretary of State of the United States, asking them to meet and reach a settlement. Prince Faisal expressed his willingness to meet with General Marshall, but the letter did not respond to the sub-committee's request. The first sub-committee took some time to do the work entrusted to it. It met some legal and practical difficulties which it could not overcome, especially in the question of implementing partition, for Britain would accept no responsibility in this connection. The Zionists took part in the sub-committee with vehement zeal, and Moshe Shertok sat with the butchers who were cutting up Palestine bit by bit. He chose and asked for the pieces of meat which suited Israeli interests. While this dissection was going on, a conflict started between Shertok and the United States delegate Ambassador Hershel Johnson, about the allotment of the Negev. The Special Committee of Inquiry had recommended the Negev, at least most of it, should be included in the Arab state of Palestine. As for Shertok, he insisted that it should go to the Zionists. After some give And take in the sub-committee, Johnson was celled to the telephone. Truman in person was on the line ordering him to give Negev to the Zionists, contrary to the recommendations of the Special Committee of Inquiry. Johnson returned from the telephone to the sub-committee, changed his stand, and yielded to the wishes of Shertok. Thus the sub-committee, and later the General Assembly, gave the Zionists more than had been proposed by the special committee which had recommended partition. It gave them practically all that Shertok asked for, and that was due to the intervention of Truman who had succumbed to Dr Weizmann's influence.

After a week or so the Ad Hoc Committee met to consider the reports of the three sub-committees. They started with the report of t he sub-committee on partition. Questions were addressed by the representatives of Pakistan and Syria regarding the legal foundations of the Palestine question and the partition project. The delegate of Lebanon asked some embarrassing questions which showed the impossibility of partition from the practical point of view and the absurdity of partition. As for me, I asked about the stand of the United Nations vis-a-vis a people who will defend themselves if their country is invaded. would the United Nations declare war on e people who would surely defend them selves driven by the instinct of survival. Then several delegates spoke, some approving the project of partition and others objecting. I spoke for the second time calling attention to the fact that the partition project contradicted the United Nations Charter in letter and spirit. I warned of the dangers which would ensure from imposing partition and stated that the Arab countries would all be disturbed and resort to force. I addressed the American delegate very sharply requesting him to follow the path of peace and justice and not the path of force and imposition by influencing the neutral states. I asked him if the United States was reedy to send force to fight the Arabs, and, if that were the case, would she provide the opportunity for others states also to send force? If both the United States and the Soviet Union send force to Palestine, what would the effect be on the international situation?

The next day Nuri as-Sa'id delivered a speech regarding the Communist danger facing the Arab lands from the ports of the Black Sea and how there are persons, who are not Jews, who infiltrate with the Jewish immigrants for political aims which will cause trouble throughout the Middle East. I intended to speak for the third time but Chairman Evatt would not permit it, so I passed my word to my Egyptian colleague who read it after his own speech without reference to Iraq. Some amendments were proposed to the partition project to avoid British objections regarding implementation and regarding reference to the Security Council for the General Assembly had no competence in this matter. The vote on the project for partition was taken in an evening session. There were 25 votes in favour, 13 against and 17 abstention. The project for a unitary state was automatically rejected since the plan for partition had received a majority vote.

The General Assembly Vote on Partition

Next came the struggle to prevent the passing of a Resolution to partition Palestine. To be accepted, the resolution would require a vote in favour by two-third of the voting. It is customary in the United Nations at times to do some 'horse trading’ between member states. When you request a delegation's support in a question which concerns, you, that delegation will expect your support in a question that concerns it. The Arab delegations had six votes in the United Nations at that time, for Yemen had joined the UN in that session. We were ready to exchange votes with whoever supported us in defeating partition. When the Greek government brought a complaint to the United Nations against Soviet intervention in northern Greece where the Greek rebels were getting soviet support in their activities, the complaint was discussed in the General Assembly. When the question came to a vote, most of the Arab states abstained. Iraq was the only Arab state that voted on the side of Greece. Iraq had, as a principle, always stood against Communist intervention and against subversive movements anywhere in the world.

When the time came for voting on the partition of Palestine, Mr Dandramis, Head of the Greek delegation was including to abstain from voting thus returning tit-for-tat to the Arab states who had abstained on the Greek question. I sought the help of the head of the Turkish delegation Saleem Sarper, And we went together to meet Mr Dandramis and to ask that he should reciprocate in the matter of the Iraqi vote for Greece with a vote against the partition of Palestine. We said that it would not be appropriate for him to refrain from giving Iraq a supporting vote. On the contrary, it would be most appropriate for him to vote against the partition of Palestine. Ever since, so far as I know, Greece has supported the Arab stand on the Palestine question.

At a meeting of the Heads of Arab delegations Faris al-Khouri and Farid Zainuddin, who were in contact with the Soviet bloc, suggested that we should come to un understanding with the Soviets that we would vote with them on their problems if they would help us by voting against partition. In the name of the Iraqi delegation I said that we were ready to do that. We were ready to cooperate with the Soviets in the United Nations if they would guarantee their stand on our side and their votes against the partition of Palestine. But we would not support them without previous assurance that they would stand with us. The meeting authorized Faris al-Khouri to contact the Soviet bloc on this basis. Not many days passed before Andrei Gromyko, delegate of the Soviet Union, went to the rostrum of the General Assembly to announce the sympathy of the Soviet Union for the Jews who had been persecuted by Hitler and to say that they deserved to be helped to establish a state of their own in Palestine. He said that the Soviets would support the partition of Palestine.

The Arab delegation continued to exert great efforts to win support for Arab rights in Palestine and their efforts were about to yield fruit, for there were enough votes to ensure that the General Assembly would reject the Resolution on the Partition of Palestine. Had the General Assembly voted before the American Thanksgiving Day recess there would not have been a two-thirds majority in favour of the Resolution. But, due the influence of the American delegation and the machinations of the United Nation Secretariat led by Trygvie Lie, a postponement of the voting was arranged. The argument against taking the vote was that there were still several speakers on the list and that it would not be possible to take the vote on the day before Thanksgiving Zafrullah Khan and I went to the President of the General Assembly, Dr Arania, and asked to withdraw our names from the list of speakers and we assured him that other delegates including those of the Arab delegations were willing to withdrew their names from the list of speakers. Dr Arania did not grant our request for he was under political pressure.

In the Session a motion was made to adjourn until after the American Thanksgiving Day. This was passed by a simple majority vote. During the recess came President Truman’s intervention and his pressure on some states needing American aid. The Zionists redoubled their efforts in the capitals of the world. As a result, several European and South American delegations changed their stand from anti-partition or abstention to the stand for partition. Thus, when the Session was resumed we found ourselves facing defeat. As a last resort I went to the rostrum and delivered a speech asking for time for further negotiation and efforts to reach en agreed solution of the Palestine problem and to avoid a greet catastrophe. Many eloquent speeches were made, notably by Sir Zafrullah Khan and Dr Lopez, the Head of the Columbian delegation, in which they challenged the legality of partition and its violation of the principles of the Charter. They emphasized the danger to peace and stability in the Middle East. The Columbian, refuting the arguments in favour of the partition policy, revealed the greet pressure being brought on him to vote for partition. He warned the UN against taking precipitous action which would endanger world peace. He stated that the question of Palestine could be deferred for another two months for further study and negotiations. The delegate of France stated that he saw a ray of hope in the speech of the-Iraqi delegate and he proposed a postponement of the debate for 24 hours so as to permit the two parties to reach an understanding. The motion was carried.

The Arab delegations welcomed the postponement. The Americans and the Soviets, on the other hand, opposed it, for it was hoped that voting on the partition would be concluded without delay. The Zionists had prepared in advance their jubilant celebrations. The success of the French proposal was a disappointment for them. The Arab delegations met and their meeting continued until late at night. It was thought that it was in the interests of the Arabs that they should make a last attempt and a show of good will in an effort to come to an understanding with the Zionists. The Arab delegations decided to submit a federal plan for Palestine, a plan in the formulation of which Jamal al-Husaini, representative of the Arab Higher Committee of Palestine, would not take part and for which he would accept no responsibility. Faris al-Khouri of Syria and Camille Sham'un of Lebanon were asked to prepare the draft resolution and to contact Mr Lopez, the leader of the Columbian delegation, on the method of its presentation.

The draft resolution was submitted by Camille Sham’un in the afternoon session. The American, Russian and Canadian delegations opposed it vigorously and refused to discuss it. Each of them emphasized that there was no solution except partition and that any attempt at conciliation was designed for procrastination and to gain time. The delegate of Columbia was ready to propose adjournment in order to give time to study the federal plan, but the American delegate requested him not to do so. On learning of this, I asked the Head of the Iranian delegation, Mr 'Adl, to ask for the adjournment, which he did. He submitted a proposal asking for adjournment long enough to study the Arab draft resolution. President Arania refused to submit the proposal for discussion or a vote. Faris al-Khouri went to the rostrum end criticized the manner in which the question was being treated and the spirit prevailing in pushing the partition plan through the United Nations. He said that the United Nations had not exerted any effort to bring about an agreed settlement.

President Arania went ahead and put the Resolution on the Partition of Palestine to the vote. The result was 13 states against, 33 for, and 10 abstentions.

Voting against partition were: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen.

Those voting for partition were: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bylo-Russia, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Equador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Holland, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrania, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Those that abstained were: Argentine, Chili, Chine, Columbia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

The delegate of Thailand absented himself.

After the result of the vote had been announced, Prince Faisal for Saudi Arabia, Zafrullah Khan for Pakistan, I myself for Iraq and Emir ‘Adil Arsalan for Syria, each went to the rostrum to deprecate the Resolution on Partition and to express bitter disappointment in the United Nations and to announce that the Arab states would not be bound by the Resolution which was unjust and unfair to Arab rights and contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter. Then all the Arab delegations quit the Assembly in protest. Their departure created a sad and solemn atmosphere. Next the Arab delegations met and prepared a strong statement which was delivered to the press. The Arab delegations had tried actively to convince other delegations to vote against partition by appealing to logic, justice and law. Their efforts were successful with delegations who had a living conscience end an independent judgment. But some delegations were compelled to change their stand when they saw power end the material interests of their countries on the other side. We remember how the delegate of Haiti shed tears when he was forced to change his country's vote to one in favour of partition. We recall how General Romulo of the Philippines left the U.S.A, because of Zionist threats. Dr Arce of the Argentine, who had stood against partition, came to me and said that he was sorry that he had to abstain rather than to vote against partition, but this was the result of pressure on his government. These are a few of the several delegates who were forced to vote against their convictions.

Sometime before the vote was taken I was talking with Lester Pearson, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada and later Prime Minister. I said, "Mr Pearson, do you believe that the act of partitioning Palestine against the will of its inhabitants is an act dictated by conscience and law?" He answered me frankly, "Dr Jamali, politics doesn't know conscience or law unless they are supported by power. As for us today, we are obliged to comply with the policy of the U.S.A. in what she decides on Palestine." Thus Lester Pearson remained a strong supporter of Zionism, not because of conscientious conviction or for legal reasons, but because power and political interests required it of him. The same held true for the representative of Czechoslovakia who also said that the legal aspect of the Palestine problem had been ignored and that the politics of the Great Powers decided the issue and that the U.S.A. had the last word in the matter of Palestine.

The Arabs owe a debt of gratitude to Ambassador Belt of Cuba who courageously and forcefully fought the resolution on the partition of Palestine on the basis of its being unjust, illegal and not conducive to peace in the Middle East. When, at the last minute, his government decided to change its position and vote partition he resigned his post rather then to follow his government's instructions and vote against his own conscience.

Arab Confrontation with Zionists at the United Nations

The Arab delegates had to enter into lengthy debates with other United Nations delegates privately or in the United Nations to refute Zionist claims. This is the Arab point of view:

The Arabs are not anti-Jewish, for the Jews have lived with them for centuries in peace and harmony. There is much in common between them racially, religiously and culturally. It is the invading, aggressive Zionism that they oppose and object to, for it is poisoning the atmosphere in the Middle East. Zionism is a reactionary, nationalistic movement. It is based on racial and religious discrimination and segregation by the Jews. In reality it represents neither race nor religion. The Jews of the world do not represent one race. They have mixed with several other human races" and they have assimilated non-Semitic peoples who were converted to Judaism. As for religion, not all Zionists practice Judaism. There are those who are laic, and there are those who are anti-religious atheists. There are also those Jews, a respectable group, who refuse to march under the Zionist banner. The non-Zionist or anti-Zionist Jews hold to their religion as a religion and do not mix it with nationalism. So Zionist nationalism based on race and religion is a myth. Furthermore, it is a reactionary myth because it tries to undermine Jewish loyalty in any country where it penetrates. It tries to inculcate amongst the Jews a new loyalty which alienates them from the mother country in which they live. It disunites humanity instead of uniting it. In this sense it is a reactionary movement.

As for Zionism being an aggressive movement, this hardly needs an explanation, for the Zionists invaded a country inhabited by its people and evacuated those people by force and, took their place. That is aggression in its worst form. The Zionists came to the United Nations using the following arguments:

Palestine has been the national home of the Jews for thousands of years, and the Jews dispersed allover the world, have never cut their spiritual relations with Palestine at any time.

The Arabs possess vast lands. Why should they not give up a small portion of their lands to the Zionists?

The Zionists developed Palestine and brought modern civilization to the Middle East.

Hitler persecuted the Jews and exterminated millions of them. After this persecution the Jews deserve to have a home of their own to which they can go.

The Arab delegations would answer as follows:

The whole of Palestine has never been the home of the Jews at any time in history. The Jews did rule over parts of Palestine for a period of about 400 years, but that was over 2000 years ago. As for the existence of a Jewish minority in Palestine throughout this period, this does not give the Jews who are outside Palestine any right to the country. What is to apply to Palestine should be a general rule made to apply to all human beings. If the people of the world today are to return to the homes of their forefathers of thousands of years ago, the whole map of the world would have to be revised today.

As for the argument that the Arabs possess vast lands, so does the U.S.A., so does Canada and China and Australia and Brazil, etc. Does the vastness of a country give others the right to come and occupy it? Here again there must be a general rule which is applicable to all the world. Nothing should be applied to Palestine which is not applicable to other lands as well.

As for the argument that the Zionists developed Palestine and introduced modern scientific methods in agriculture, health, etc., this is exactly the logic of the old European imperialism, and imperialism is what definitely characterizes Zionism in addition to reaction and aggression. What the Zionists did in Palestine in the way of development is no different from what the white colonialists did in Asia and Africa. It does not give them the right of domination. In their new renaissance the Arabs do not need Zionism, for the main sources of modern civilization are available to all mankind.

As for the cruelties of Hitler, they were directed toward all the enemies of Naziism, Jews and non-Jews alike. Granting, however, that Hitler crushed the Jews, should the Jews in their turn crush the Arabs? And should the Arabs of Palestine alone carry the weight of retribution for Hitler's cruelty? Is this justice and humane logic?

Zionist influence in the United Nations did not draw its power from right or logic, but rather from world Zionism and its influence in the capitals of the Great Powers through commerce, politics, economics, science and propaganda. Moreover, the Zionists spent money generously to influence some responsible men in different countries. In the U.S.A. they exploited their political power in a most subtle way. Most Jewish votes, money and propaganda in the elections were given to those who supported Zionism and who went farthest in pleasing Zionist extremists. Besides, the Zionists exerted great efforts in the corridors of the United Nations to influence the delegates of some small powers with inducements, material gifts, propaganda in the press, entertainments and parties. In this connection I wish to mention that the delegate of Guatemala, who was very enthusiastic for Zionism, saw me one day and assured me that the rumour current that he had 'received' was not true. In spite of the Zionist strength they could not deceive the "many conscientious delegates who scrupulously supported the Arab point of view. In fact, had not the two great powers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union stood behind Zionism in the United Nations, the Resolution on the Partition of Palestine would not have passed.

The reasons why these two giant powers stood behind Zionism is simple to understand. Zionism in the United States considers Israel as its foothold in the Middle East for political, economic and military purposes, since strategically Palestine touches three continents, Asia, Europe end Africa. It also has important harbours on the Mediterranean. Therefore American Zionism should be considered as a tough imperialistic movement. It is even worse than Western imperialism for it uprooted a whole people and dispersed them. Besides, Israel is considered by some reactionary forces in the West as their bridgehead in the Middle East, or as a dumping ground for undesired Jews.

In 1947 when the question of the partition of Palestine was being debated at the United Nations and the American Zionists were most active in favour of the creation of Israel, I attended a reception given by the Indian delegation to the UN. At that reception I met Rabbi Newman, a prominent American Zionist who was quite smooth and courteous. I asked him, "Why don't the American Jews themselves want to go to Palestine although they are urging Jews of other countries to go there?" He was frank to say, "The Jews are not at home here in the U.S.A. and the day will come when they also will want to seek refuge in Palestine." This made me think that Zionism is preparing a very dark future for the Jews of U.S.A. and a troubled future for peace in the Middle East. As for the Soviet Union, in spite of its ideological opposition to Zionism which it considers as a reactionary, imperialistic movement, it nevertheless uses Israel as a wedge between the Arabs and the West, for the Soviet Union rejoices over anything that leads to alienation between the Arabs and the West. A few years after the partition of Palestine and the establishment of Israel, I was dining at the home of Mr Vishinsky, the head of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations. After dinner I addressed the following question to him. "Mr Vishinsky, knowing that Communist ideology considers Zionism as a reactionary movement, how did it happen that the Soviet Union came out in support of Zionism in the creation of the state of Israel and gave it immediate recognition?" He smiled end said, "I cannot answer your question."

The East and the West, then, were united on the partition of Palestine, but for quite contradictory ends. He know of no factor more effective than the partition of Palestine and the creation of Israel in the heart of the Arab world to cause alienation and repulsion between the Arabs and the West. There is no doubt that the Soviets were jubilant when they sew President Truman slip in such a blind manner as to expose peace and stability in the Middle East to continual danger. Truman opened the gate wide in the Middle East for Communism to enter Arab hearts and minds. The Soviets gave their blessing to this American policy and they supported the step which was short-sightedly taken by the President of the United States. Another Zionist maneuver was the penetration of the United Nations Organization and its administrative structure, both with their strong influence and sometimes with their specially qualified men. They had some key men in the 0rganization itself, a fact which contributed to the steering of the Palestine question toward partition since they influenced the procedure of the General Assembly.

Later it was proved (a thing which I had felt from the beginning) that the secretary General of the United Nations, Trygvie Lie, had exerted great efforts toward the founding of Israel. When the Soviet Union objected to the renewal of Trygvie Lie's contract as secretary General of the United Nations, the Iraqi delegation was the only Arab delegation that voted on the side of the Soviets on this issue. In explaining Iraq's position I said that, in spite of our respect for the personality of Trygvie Lie, we would not vote in favour of renewing his contract because of his frank bias in favour of Zionism. After he left his position as Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygvie Lie was engaged by the Zionists of the United States as a propagandist for raising American funds for Israel.

Palestine and Western Interests in the Arab World

The Arabs are the legal owners of Palestine. They have the right to their own country. There is no doubt about that. But right cannot be guaranteed to the Arabs unless it is protected by might. Do the Arabs have any might besides the force of right itself? In our view, the answer is in the affirmative, for the Arabs have material power besides the morel power of right. This power rests on at least two important factors in the international field. The first is the strategic position of the Arab lands, and the second is oil. Did the Arabs profit from these two factors for the sake of saving Palestine?

As regards the strategic position, the West considered the Middle East as a region vital for the safety of Europe. The West seemed to be reedy to win Arab friendship And guarantee that Palestine would remain Arab if the Arabs would agree to enter a general defence system with the West. This was the theory of Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain. "The friendship of the Arabs is more important for Britain then military bases or armies stationed in the Middle Seat." This is what he told me personally, but at the same time he wanted to have a Defence Treaty signed by Great Britain and Iraq. Mr Bevin's stand on the Palestine issue was made plain in the British Parliament where be clearly declared his opposition to the policy of President Truman and to his request that unlimited immigration into Palestine should be permitted. Bevin's policy led to tension with Truman, and the Zionists openly attacked Bevin in their propaganda, some even calling him a second Hitler. On my return from the United Nations Session of 1947, after the Resolution on the Partition of Palestine had been passed, I called on Mr Bevin. When he asked me how I was, I answered, "As tired as can be. We laboured day and night at the United Nations so that justice might prevail in Palestine, and, when we were about to succeed in our efforts, Truman overwhelmed the United Nattions and made it pass the unjust Resolution on partition." Mr Bevin answered, "Don't De in despair. Your efforts will not be wasted and the Zionists will not be able to form a state in Palestine."

Portsmouth Treaty

I received a telegram from Baghdad asking me to wait in London to join the Iraqi delegation coming to negotiate the Treaty of Alliance between Great British and Iraq, which was called the Portsmouth Treaty. I remained in London until we signed the Treaty on January 15, 1948. When the delegation headed by Prime Minister Saleh Jabr arrived in London I accompanied him on his first call on Mr Bevin, on January 7. The conversation started by general remarks concerning the heavy duties of the Prime Minister of Iraq. Saleh Jabr said jokingly, "My Foreign Minister, Dr Jamali, went to have a nice time in America and left me to carry the burden." I answered, "The fact is that I did not go for a good time, but for a tough fight for Palestine. Unfortunately it was a lost battle." Mr Bevin answered, "No, Dr Jamali. Don't think that it is lost. The time will come when your efforts will bear fruit." After the ceremony of signing the Portsmouth Treaty, Mr Bevin remarked, "No doubt you would like to have a meeting to discuss various problems besides the Treaty end especially the problem of Palestine." On Wednesday, January 22, Prime Minister Saleh Jabr was giving a luncheon at Claridges Hotel in honour of Prime Minister Clement Attlee. In the morning I had a call from the Foreign 0ffice informing me that Mr Bevin wished to call on me in my suite in Clardiges an hour before lunch in order to discuss the Palestine problem. I informed Prime Minister Saleh Jabr and we agreed that he and Nuri Sa’id should be present in my suit on the arrival of Mr Bevin. At the appointed hour Mr Bevin arrived with Mr Creech Jones, Secretary for the Colonies, Mr Michael Wright, Director of the Near East Section of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sir Henry Mack, British Ambassador to Iraq, and Mr Harold Beeley, specialist on Palestine in the Foreign Office.

Mr Bevin opened the discussion saying, “We have decided to leave Palestine. What you want us to do now?” Nuri Sa'id answered, "we want you to hasten in terminating the Mandate and to do it immediately if possible.” Mr Creech-Jones answered that the military authorities agreed that there should not be a long period between terminating the Mandate and the complete withdrawal of the British army, for ending the civil administration would have a direct effect on the plans for the military withdrawal. Mr Bevin added, "It seems that this is the only point on which you are in agreement with the Zionists, for they also want us to terminate the Mandate quickly and withdraw. We will do our best to terminate the Mandate and withdraw in the shortest possible time." Nuri as-Sa’id suggested that the military should be asked to review their program and quicken their withdrawal. I intervened and asked, "Is it true that the process of withdrawal will be delayed on account of the season for exporting oranges from Palestine?" Mr Creech-Jones answered, "The press has written a good deal on this subject, but it is not correct. Exporting oranges has absolutely nothing to do with the plan for withdrawal." Nuri as-Sa’id raised the problem of control of petroleum. He did not want it to pass to the Zionist so that they could fight the Arabs. Mr Creech-Jones said, "Control of petroleum is under consideration. I told the representatives of the oil companies to inform their American counterparts to be frank with President Truman about the difficulties which the oil companies face as a result of American policy in Palestine. I was told by them that this week the American oil companies in the Arab world approached both President Truman and General Marshall, Secretary of State, and informed them a bout the critical situation of the oil companies in the Arab world and the unreadiness of the Arabs to take any new steps in expanding their oil projects so long as the situation in Palestine end the Arab world remains as it is. I proposed to the representatives of the Ministry of Fuel that they under take a similar move to make the Americans understand."

Then we dealt with the military aspects and we stated that Iraq alone, mobilizing the Palestinians for self-defence, would undertake to save Palestine. It was agreed that Iraq would buy for the Iraqi police force 50,000 tommy-guns. We intended to hand them over to the Palestine army volunteers for self-defence. Great British was ready to provide the Iraqi army with arms and ammunition as set forth in a list prepared by the Iraqi General Staff. The British undertook to withdraw from Palestine gradually, so that Arab forces could enter every area evacuated by the British in order that the whole of Palestine should be in Arab bands after the British withdrawal. The meeting ended and we were all optimistic about the future of Palestine. While still in London Saleh Jabr thought of purchasing some German torpedo boats that were for sale in Belgium. They were small, swift boats which he thought would protect the shores of Palestine and prevent any support coming to the Zionists from outside. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which was neither seen nor read by 99% of those who attacked it, was intended to be a pattern of cooperation between Britain and the Arab states It was hoped that other Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Egypt would join a defence agreement with the West so that the West could guarantee that Communism and Soviet influence would not penetrate the Middle East. However, it seems that this policy became known to the Zionists who considered Bevin as a bitter opponent. They cooperated with the Communists in Iraq and exploited the sentiments of some Iraqi nationalists to organize al-wathbeh, a sanguinary uprising against the Treaty. Iraqi public opinion was mobilized not only against the Portsmouth Treaty but against any defensive cooperation whatever its nature with the West.

The result was that the Portsmouth Treaty was abandoned, and the Iraqi Cabinet which signed it had to resign after the sanguinary events in Baghdad. Mr Bevin's whole defence system against Communism in the Middle East fell to pieces. Mr Bevin himself lost his political battle inside the British Cabinet. He was overcome by the supporters of Zionism who were quite strong in the Labour Cabinet and in the British Parliament. The sanguinary disturbances in Baghdad, the resignation of Saleh Jabr's Cabinet, and the abandonment of the Portsmouth Treaty, all led to the defeat of Mr Bevin's policy, which was intended to gain Arab friend ship and to guarantee security in the Middle East. After the rejection of the Portsmouth Treaty by the succeeding Iraqi Cabinet, Iraq did not get the arms which were intended to save Palestine. This reversal was capped, when the British army was leaving Palestine, by a British General who handed over guns and tanks to the Zionists so that they could fight the Arabs. This was done, as the General is reported to have said, "to defend the honour of Britain" which had been tarnished by Mr Bevin. There is no doubt that thoughtful Arabs today regret the losses and sacrifices in Baghdad caused by the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty, especially since world strategy has been fundamentally changed by modern arms, so that military bases, treaties and alliances do not carry the same significance that they carried when the Portsmouth Treaty was signed. Regret for the sanguinary events in Baghdad connected with the Portsmouth Treaty is increased when one realizes that they were probably the immediate cause of the Arab defeat in Palestine. It can be clearly seen then, that the Arabs did not utilize the strategic position of their lands in order to win the Palestine case.

Oil

As for the subject of oil we had our personal opinion on the matter. I had proposed in the Arab League meeting in Bludan that the Arab League Council should pass a resolution warning Western powers that the oil supply would be cut off if they supported Zionism in Palestine. The Arab League Council did not pass that resolution because they held that agreements with oil companies were to be considered legal, juridical contracts which should not be tampered with for political reasons. As for Iraq, we maintained that, if the Arabs posed a genuine threat to cut off the oil, and, if they acted seriously in the matter, the oil interests in America would certainly rise against the pro-Zionist policy, and President Truman would not follow the Zionists in America so blindly. But, since Truman could see no threat to oil supplies from the Arab side, he yielded to Zionist pressure, thereby sacrificing Arab rights. As soon as Israel came into existence, Iraq cut off the oil supply to Haifa. We realized that the continued pumping of oil from Iraq to Haifa would help Israel to establish several petrochemical industries. Israel would receive great quantities of Iraqi fuel cheaply and this would. contribute millions of dinars to Israel annually in the form of wages for labour. In other words, the oil of Iraq would become the backbone of Israeli economy.

The United States government put pressure on the British government to urge the Iraqi government to let the oil flow, and the Iraq Petroleum Company insisted that oil should flow to Haifa. The pipeline to Benias in Syria had not yet been constructed, and Iraq was in great need of the oil revenue. Nuri as-Sa’id, Prime Minister of Iraq in 1949, called me, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mount Salahiddin in the north of Iraq where he was enjoying a short rest. He told me that Iraq would be obliged to permit the pumping of oil to Haifa because the Iraqi Treasury was in urgent need of cash, since there was no money for the salaries of government officials at the end of the month. I told him that I could not be part of a government that permitted oil to go to Haifa to support the economy of Israel, and I offered to resign from the Cabinet. Nuri as-Sa’id thought for awhile and then told me that he shared my view of the matter and that he himself preferred to resign rather than to permit oil to flow to Haifa.

He asked me to return to Baghdad to inform the British Ambassador that the Iraqi government had decided to resign because of lack of cash in the treasury and because of its inability to be lenient in the matter of letting oil flow to Haifa. At the same time the Iraqi government requested the British government to use its influence with the oil company so that it would give a loan of J million dinars to the Iraqi treasury, and so that it would definitely abandon the idea of pumping oil to Haifa. Should this not be arranged, the Iraqi government would have to resign I returned to Baghdad and had an immediate meeting with the British Ambassador, Sir Henry Mack. I informed him about my talk with the Prime Minister regarding the pumping of oil to Haifa, and the urgent need of the treasury for funds. He requested that no haste should be made in tendering the Cabinet resignation. He promised to convey our views to London. Eventually an advance of 3 million dinars from the oil companies was arranged. The pumping of oil to Haifa was never resumed and the pipeline has remained cut from that time until now. This being the case, I was greatly surprised when I read in the Iraqi press in 1956, while I was at the United Nations, that Kamil Chadirchi, the leader of an opposition party in Iraq, had accused the Iraqi government of permitting oil to flow to Haifa. He was referred to a court for his unjustified, false accusation, and was sentenced to three years I imprisonment. I still do not know why the honourable leader of the opposition party did not trouble himself to study the problem before making his accusations. As a matter of fact, Iraq has been losing an estimated 15 million pounds sterling annually by not pumping oil to Haifa.

When I was Prime Minister of Iraq, 1953-54, I asked the oil company to build an extension of the pipeline from Mafraq in Jordan to 3idon in Lebanon. This diversion would not have cost more than 3 million dinars at the time. The company agreed to the scheme after reaching agreement with the Lebanese government on royalties for the passage of oil. My government resigned before a final decision was reached. I do not know why successive Iraqi governments have not followed up this project in order to increase Iraqis oil revenue. In brief, we can say that Iraq was ready to cut off the entire Iraqi oil supply if the Arabs had agreed to use oil as a weapon to save Palestine, but this weapon was not fully used. Having failed in their efforts to prevent the creation of Israel, the Arabs decided to take the following three measures:

1. Iraq prevented oil from flowing to Haifa.

2. Egypt prevented Israeli ships from passing through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. Egypt opened the Gulf of Aqaba after the 1956 assault on her by Britain, France and Israel.

3. All the Arab states subscribed to the economic boycott of Israel and all those companies that contributed to building the Israeli economy. A special agency for boycotting Israel and the agencies supporting her was attached to the League of Arab States.

My recollections of the Palestine War

In March, after the sanguinary events in Baghdad that followed the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty, I went to visit Iran for the first time in my life. At that time the Arab Zionist conflict was growing more serious. The Palestine Arabs, not allowed arms by the British, and unprepared for war, could not defend themselves against the well-armed find well-trained Haganah, the Jewish army, or the Zionist terrorist organizations of the Irgun end the Stern Gang. Atrocities like that at the village of Deir Yeseen on the outskirts of Jerusalem where hundreds of men, women And children were killed and mutilated while the British were still in Palestine, horrified thousands of Arabs and made them flee in terror. In order to do something positive for the sake of Palestine I arranged a meeting with a number of heeds of Arab diplomatic missions in Teheran. I remember Dr Saleem Haidar from Lebanon, Dr al-Khani from Syria, and Mohammed Saleem ar-Radhi from Iraq. It was decided that we should go to the town of Qum, the abode of the highest religious authority or the Shiite Muslim sect, Ayat Ullah al-Buroojerdi (May his tomb be fragrant!) We went to propose to His Holiness that he should issue a fatwa, religious decree, of jihad, holy war, for the sake of Palestine. We were accompanied on this visit by Sayid ul-Traqain, one of the sincere friends of the Arabs in Iran.

We went to Qum and had an audience with Imam al-Buroojerdi who was a model of wisdom and prudence. Undoubtedly he had the Palestine question very deeply at heart, but he was realistic and cautious in politics. The answer he gave after some discussion and meditation was that he would contact His Holiness Sayid Abul Qasim al-Qashani in Teheran and request him to contact His Imperial Majesty the Shah-in-Shah and ask him to do what WPS necessary to awaken the Muslims of Iran to the Zionist danger in the Holy Land, and to call them to defend the rights of Islam. This is all that we could expect from our visit to Imam al-Buroojerdi (May his grave be fragrant!) He indeed performed what he had promised for we later heard of the tumultuous demonstrations and the fiery speeches for Palestine made in public meetings in Teheran organized by Sayid Abul Qasim al-Qashani. After finishing my tour in Iran I returned to Iraq. I had no connection with the government then in power, headed by His Eminence, Sayid Mohammed as-Sadr.

After the Cabinet changed and Muzahim al-Pachachi came to power in June, 19th, I was asked to accept appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I agreed. That was after the first Armistice between the Arabs and Israel had come to an end, and the siege of Falouja had begun. Popular demonstrations in Baghdad asked the Iraqi government to move to attack the Zionists in order to break the siege around Falouja,and thus to help the Egyptian army. Muzahim al-Pachachi called me to his office and charged me with the duty of going to Cairo to talk with Prime Minister Naqrashi Pasha, with whom I had a close friendship about the help the Iraqi army could render to the Egyptian army. Muzahim al-Pachachi offered Naqrashi Pasha the following proposals for mutual military assistance;

a. Iraq is willing to put the Iraqi army in Palestine under Egyptian command so that they may direct the army to the best advantage.

b. Iraq asks Egypt to give the Iraqi army some of the air force ammunition which is available for the Egyptian air force, but is in short supply in the Iraqi air force.

c. Iraq asks Egypt for a loan of 1 million guineas with which to buy the ammunition which the Iraqi army requires in case it should be asked to fight.

I left Baghdad with Brigadier Isma'il Safwat in a military plane headed towards Amman where we spent the night on our way to Cairo. As soon as we reached Amman a military car carried us to the headquarters of the Iraqi command in Zarqa. I was met there by an officer of the command and was taken inside the room which contained the war maps. I was shown the positions of the Iraqi army at the front. The war situation was explained to me, and I learned the following facts:

a. The Iraqi army at the front was in on exposed position very dangerous to its safety. The enemy could at any time and very easily cut the line of communication and isolate the Iraqi army.

b. The amount of ammunition which the Iraqi army had at its disposal was extremely small. The army could not fight more than two days with the ammunition available at that time.

c. I was told that any move by the Iraqi army required air cover and that this was not available, for the Iraqi planes (Fury) had no ammunition.

These three conditions, and especially the first, were enough to render the Iraqi army unable to give help to any other Arab army. It was not my specialty nor my duty to investigate the reasons leading to this painful situation, and I had no knowledge of the circumstances which had led to this situation, for I am not a military man.

In the evening I had dinner with H.M. King Abdullah who complained bitterly about the predicament in which he found himself. He said that he had been appointed as Commander-in-Chief of all the Arab armies in Palestine, but he knew nothing about those armies. No facilities were made for him to know about the plans, the movements and the needs of those armies. That is why he knew nothing about the Egyptian army besieged in Falouja and its needs. He inquired, but got no response. Everything was kept secret from him I found His Majesty also complaining about the lack of ammunition for the Jordanian army. A ship carrying ammunition was stopped in the Suez Canal by the Egyptians and the ammunition taken over, so it did not reach the Jordanian army. Without that ammunition the Jordanian army could not wage a successful war. In short, what we found in Amman was most regrettable and painful. The next morning I left Amman with Brigadier Isma’il Safwat and headed for Cairo. As soon as I got there I had a meeting with Naqrashi Pasha. No protocol or formalities between us. I explained to him the mission for which I had come and said that Prime Minister Muzahim al-Pachachi was very much concerned about giving help to the Egyptian army. I stated the proposals of Muzahim al-Pachachi. I found Naqrashi Pasha complaining and in despair. He was not convinced of the ability of the Egyptian army to undertake any serious war, for Britain had not permitted Egypt in the past to built up a fighting army. The Egyptian army was formed merely for demonstrations and parades and not for fighting. That was why the Palestine war came as a serious predicament so far as the Egyptian army was concerned.

As for Iraq's proposals, Naqrashi Pasha accepted none of them. His answer was that Egypt could not bear the responsibility of commanding the Iraqi army. Egypt could not offer any ammunition to the Iraqi air force. Egypt had no lend-lease law by which it could give a loan of 1 million guineas to Iraq for the Palestine wore (I had heard that the Egyptian budget for the Palestine was 30 million guineas.) Instead of accepting the Iraqi proposals, Naqrashi Pasha asked Iraq to offer its Fury airplanes to the Egyptian army rather than to seek ammunition for the planes. After that meeting I wired to Muzahim al-Pachachi suggesting that he himself should come to Cairo because of the seriousness of the situation. He came with the Minister of Defence, Shakir al-Wadi. An agreement was reached with Naqrashi Pasha that Iraq w0uld offer three of its Fury planes to Egypt. This decision was carried out.

Zionist Expansionist Designs

The United Nations appointed Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden as a Mediator charged with task of ending the clash between Arabs and Zionists. He and United Nations observer, Colonel Andre Serot were assassinated by Zionist terrorists at Jerusalem on September 17, 1948. However, one day prior to his assassination he had completed and signed the report which recommended that the United Nations should order the repatriation of the Palestine refugees and make certain modifications in the territorial plan.

(UN Document A/648, September 16, 1948)

An American, Ralph Bunche, became Acting Mediator. On the Island of Rhodes in 1949, Armistice agreements were negotiated between Israel end each of its neighbouring Arab states, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

The United Nations General Assembly appointed a Conciliation Commission for Palestine, formed of representatives of the United States, France and Turkey. In 1949 it held meetings in Lausanne, Switzerland, with the representatives of the four Arab states on the one hand and the representatives of Israel on the other. As a result, all parties agreed on May, 1949, to what was called the Lausanne Protocol according to which a settlement was to be negotiated on the basis of the United Nations Resolution on Partition. This Resolution included the internationalization of Jerusalem.

I learned that H.M. King Abdullah was furious with Dr Fawzi al-Mulql, representative of Jordan, for having gone so far as to subscribe to the Lausanne Protocol without excepting the internationalization of Jerusalem. Israel torpedoed the Protocol by making it clear to the Commission that she would not abide by the United Nations Resolution on territory, refugees or Jerusalem. In fact, from the beginning Israel had no intention of abiding by the 1947 United Nations Resolution. Years later David Ben Gurion revealed that, deliberately, he did not mention the boundaries of Israel as prescribed by the United Nations Resolution of 1947 in his Declaration of the founding of the state of Israel.

As a matter of fact, the Arabs had warned in advance that Israel would use the UN Resolution on Partition as a stepping-stone to expansion. This was proved by experience. The UN Resolutions on the demarcation of boundaries, on the refugees and on Jerusalem were all ignored by Israel. She violates the rights of the Palestinian Arabs to their own territory, the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homeland, and the UN Resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem
The Zionists tried to treat the Palestine question as one to be liquidated. It was to become a problem of refugees which might be brought before the United Nations as a humanitarian item. Having occupied Arab lands, uprooted and dispersed the Arab populations, Israel stood with her sword drawn facing her neighbours. Incidents on the Armistice lines, which were supervised by United Nations observers, were met by heavy Israeli attacks in which they destroyed villages, killing men, women and children. Israeli attacks on Jordan, Syria end Egypt led to loss in life and property. I have already referred to my visit to the village of Qibia after it had been attacked by the Israelis.

of (See Jordan, p. )

The Arabs time and again lodged complaints with the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council would censure Israel. Israel would not heed. That became the pattern of Israeli relations with the neighbouring states. The wound in Palestine continued to bleed. Then came the attack of 1956 on Egypt via Sinai, October 29, 1956. On that day a curfew was ordered throughout Israel. This order could not reach the peasants who were working on their farms during the day. On returning home in the evening some fifty innocent Arabs from the village of Kafer Qasim were mowed down with bullets by the Israeli army. This massacre was carried out by Israeli soldiers without regard for innocent human lives. In all these sad situations the Arabs never ceased to raise their voice in the General Assembly of the United Nations. But the United Nations and its orgins seemed impotent vis-a-vis Israel who continued to defy them.

The Zionists, after accepting what the General Assembly of the United Nations had decided to give them in the 1947 Resolution on Partition, began to reveal their expansionist design. They occupied whatever they liked of those parts of Palestine which had been allotted to the Arabs, such as Jaffa, Lydda, Ramleh, Bersheeba, Western Galilee, the Arab triangle, etc. That was all done by a combination of force and treachery. I saw a letter sent by H. M. King 'Abdullah of Jordan to President Truman asking his help to stop Zionist expansion and to prevent the Zionists from occupying lands not allotted to them by the United Nations. Truman's answer was that he could do nothing in this regard. All that the Arabs had to do was to come to an understanding with the Zionists. So the Zionists gnawed from the body of Palestine whatever they liked. Zionist aggression did not stop at trespassing against Arab rights, but it encroached upon the rights of the world as a whole and that was by obstructing the internationalization of Jerusalem.

Israel entered the United Nations as a member in 1949 on the basis of its acceptance of the 1947 Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly with regard to the partition of Palestine and the internationalization of Jerusalem, but Israel soon overran some important parts of the Jerusalem area (the corpus separatum), and used modern Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, thus defying the United Nations and all those states who had voted for the creation of Israel and the internationalization of Jerusalem.

Arab-Israel Negotiation

Israel's propaganda machines tries to show Israel as a peace-loving nation that wants to negotiate with the Arab but that the Arabs, for their part, do not respond. The Israelis also speak of negotiations with no preconditions. But the Israelis themselves put preconditions concerning:

territory, Israel must retain any parts of the Arab lands that suit her purpose,

refugees, they should be settled outside Palestine,

Jerusalem, it is a Jewish city and it is the capital of Israel. Having put these preconditions, Israel is "ready to negotiate with the Arabs without preconditions".

In the matter of negotiation I think the Arabs should say, "We do not oppose negotiations in principle, but we will negotiate only on the basis of the application to the Arabs of Palestine of the principles of the two documents, The United Nations Charter and The Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

I remember that the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the United Nations passed a Resolution in 1952 calling the Arabs and Zionists to negotiate a settlement. The Resolution might have been adopted by the General Assembly because of its apparent simplicity. But, on the morning when the Resolution was to be discussed by the General Assembly, the New York Times appeared carrying an interview with David Ben Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, in which he categorically stated that Israel was not ready to yield any territory which it occupied; it was not ready to accept the refugees back to their homes; and it was not ready to internationalize Jerusalem.

When the meeting of the General Assembly was called to order, I asked to speak, and I proposed the reopening in the General Assembly of the debate on the Resolution on negotiations. By a simple majority the General Assembly accepted my proposal to reopen the debate. I went back to the rostrum again and read Ben Gurion's statements as reported in the New York Times. I asked how the Arabs could negotiate with a man who had already closed the doors to negotiation. I asked, "What is the use of negotiating with a person who, in advance, has closed his mind to any legal Arab rights?" I was followed by Ahmad Shuqairi who supported me in what I had said and dealt at length with the subject. After the continuation of the debate and its closure, a vote was taken and the Resolution for negotiations was defeated in the General Assembly.

Let the world understand that it is Israel who does not wish to negotiate on the basis of law and justice, and that it is Israel who does not want a settlement for the Palestine problem. It is Israel who does not went to negotiate on the basis of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter. A settlement of the Palestine problem might mean an end to Zionist expansion end this they do not want.

The Internationalization of Jerusalem

If one rejects the principle of the partitioning of Palestine and believes that Palestine belongs to the legal inhabitants, he has to reject the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem, too. That is why the stand of the Iraqi delegation in the United Nations was frankly against the internationalization of Jerusalem and stressed the city's Arab character. Jerusalem is an Arab city, and the Arabs have been, and still are, in the vanguard of peoples who believe in freedom of religion, and the principles of tolerance end brotherhood amongst mankind. The best evidence for Arab tolerance and their fraternity with members of other religions is that the Christians themselves have entrusted the Muslim Arabs with the keys of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The other Arab delegations at the United Nations, having seen that Israel had violated the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem and reneged on its international undertakings, found it preferable to adopt the principle of internationalization.

On the 25th of March 1949, while in Cairo, I addressed the following letter to the Prime Minister of Egypt, Ibrahim Pasha 'Abdul Hadi.

Dear Excellency,

Greetings and respect.

Your Excellency remembers that, during your meeting with H.E. Sayid Jamil al-Madfa’i representing the Iraqi government, agreement was reached that, in their negotiations with the Conciliation Committee, the Arab states should uphold the principle that Jerusalem is an Arab city.The Iraqi government has learnt from its representative at the latest meetings with the Committee in Beirut that some representative of Arab states have deviated from this plan and have accepted the internationalization of Jerusalem.

I believe Your Excellency appreciates the consequences of such a deviation and that it may lead to encroachment on Arab rights in Palestine. That is why I wished to inform Your Excellency that the Iraqi government is still firm in following what was agreed on in Cairo regarding the Arabism of Jerusalem and that it does not bear the responsibility of deviation from this policy.

I take this opportunity to express to Your Excellency My highest esteem and respect.

Mohammed Fadhel Jamali

Foreign Minister of Iraq

Jordan, headed by H.M. King 'Abdullah, opposed internationalization. Jordan wanted to preserve the Arab character of Jerusalem. Israel also opposed internationalization, but for a conflicting reason. Israel wished to enlarge its area and to turn Jerusalem into its capital. Since Jordan was not yet represented in the United Nations, Iraq always undertook the duty of defending Jordan's point of view. When the question of the internationalization of Jerusalem was discussed in the Ad Hoc Political Committee the position of Iraq, whose representative I was, became very embarrassing indeed. Many of the non-Arab states had supported and still support the internationalization of Jerusalem for sentimental and religious reasons. Besides, it was part of the Resolution of the United Nation General Assembly which brought about the partitioning of Palestine. The Arab states, with the exception of Iraq, began to support internationalization. Iraq opposed internationalization and consequently found itself isolated from the other Arab states on this subject. Israel opposed internationalization although for totally opposite reasons.

Jordan, by upholding the Arab character of Jerusalem, was not bringing anything new into the situation, and was not trespassing on anybody's rights. But Israel, in resisting the internationalization, was already betraying the under taking which it had made to the General Assembly. After some thought and meditation, I decided that Iraq should change its stand fundamentally and support internationalization for the following reasons:

1. It is always preferable that the Arab states should stand together in the United Nations if possible, and that is especially true in matters touching on Arab affairs.

2. Supporting internationalization gave us an opportunity to expose, before world public opinion, Israel as it really is, a breaker of undertakings.

3. Supporting internationalization would win the sympathy of many of the Christian states in the world.

4. Internationalization could not be realized in practice, anyway, so long as Jordan and Israel each occupied a part of Jerusalem, and the United Nations could do no more than bring the pressure of world opinion to bear on them.

5. If Jerusalem were actually to be internationalized (which will not happen) the loss to Israel would be far greater than the loss to the Arabs, and some thing like 180,000 Palestine Arab refugees could return to their homes in the part of Jerusalem now occupied by Israel.

For these reasons I decided to change the stand of Iraq in spite of my full conviction as to the righteousness of the Jordanian point of view and the Arab character of Jerusalem. Since I received no objections from Baghdad to this new policy, I went ahead with those who asked for the internationalization of Jerusalem, and, when members of the United Notions were considering the admission of Israel to membership, I started a strong attack on Israel for its defiance of its own undertaking as to the internationalization of Jerusalem. H.M. King 'Abdullah was enraged by the new stand which I had taken. I heard that he traveled from Amman to Baghdad and spoke bitterly to Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa' id Protesting the stand of the Iraqi delegation, with respect to the internationalization of Jerusalem. It was not easy to convince His Majesty that the change in Iraq's stand was a change in strategy in the United Nations and not an abandonment of the basic aim. The Ad Hoc Political Committee approved the reference of the subject of the internationalization of Jerusalem to the Trusteeship Council who were asked to formulate a constitution for the internationalization of Jerusalem.

In 1949 I was appointed as Iraqis Permanent Delegate to the United Nations Organization, and as such I attended the meeting of the trusteeship Council. My appointment came after I had been Minister of Foreign Affairs for six months without being a Member of Parliament, the maximum period permitted by the Constitution of Iraq. The Trusteeship Council first met in New York City and decided that its next session would be held in Geneva at the beginning of 1950. The Council requested its President, Mr Garreau of France to approach both Jordan and Israel on the subject of their cooperation in implementing the internationalization of Jerusalem.

If I remember correctly, Jordan did not answer Mr Garreau's letter. But Israel answered requesting the internationalization of the Holy Places only, and stating that it would retain what it held of the Jerusalem area and not permit it to be internationalized. In other words, it wanted internationalization at the expense of the Arabs only. When the Trusteeship Council met in Geneva, Mr Garreau presented his report in which he referred to the rejection, by the government of Jordan and Israel, of the internationalization of Jerusalem as dictated by the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In his report Mr Garreau made a suggestion which was very close to the Israeli point of view. He suggested that the partition of Jerusalem should be accepted as a fait accompli, and that internationalization should be of the Holy Places only. That would be another injustice to the Arab rights, this time on the subject of the internationalization of Jerusalem, the terms of which had already been decided by the General Assembly.

When Ambassador Garreau-had finished reading his report, I raised a point of order, stating that he ha gone beyond the limits of the instructions he had been given by the Trusteeship Council. The mission which had been entrusted to him consisted of obtaining the points of view of both Jordan and Israel and of urging them to cooperate in the matter of the internationalization of Jerusalem. He was not asked to offer new proposals concerning the internationalization, proposal which went contrary to the Resolution of the General Assembly. I told him that he, as chairman, had no right to support a special point of view on the subject. He had to leave the Chair and take the seat of the representative of France in the Trusteeship Council if he wished to submit a new proposal concerning the internationalization of Jerusalem. If he wanted to retain the Chairmanship of the Council he would have to withdraw his proposal. Since he found that my argument was very strong and serious, he had to say that he preferred to retain the Chair and that he would withdraw his proposals.

After that, the Trusteeship Council started formulating a constitution for an internationalized Jerusalem according to the Resolution of the General Assembly. I took part in its formulation, and so did Ahmad Shuqairi for Syria and 'Abdul Mun'im Mustapha for Egypt. We saw to it that this constitution turned the area of Jerusalem into a place where the three monotheistic religions were equal, and where all the refugees from the Jerusalem area could return to their homes, lands and business. The adherents of the three religions, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, should have equality in immigration to the corpus separatum and to the administration of its affairs. The constitution was democratic and it contained all the necessary guarantees for a free democratic life, freedom of worship, protection and maintenance of the Holy Places, etc.

An observer from Israel used to attend the meeting and we used to answer all his arguments and objections forcefully. Jordan also sent an observer, Hafiz 'Abdul Hadi, the Jordanian charge d’Affaires in Paris, who used to convey to me the sentiments of H.M. King ‘Abdullah and his objections to the internationalization of Jerusalem. I used to assure him always that Jerusalem would not be internationalized because Israel did not want it, and that U.S.A. would certainly stand behind Israel. This being the case, why should one worry about the request for internationalization? On the other hand, asking for internationalization had the advantages which we referred to above. More over, from an international point of view it was good tactics. 'Abdul Hadi conveyed my views to H.M. King 'Abdullah and His Majesty, in turn, wrote a letter to 'Abdul Hadi, dated 18 February, 1950, which contained a paragraph to be conveyed to me. This paragraph in high classical Arabic with rhymed lines, represented in a nutshell His Majesty's policies and Arab views.

Tactics is the reason for your insistence on internationalization (of Jerusalem) and it is sheer tactics.

Whether that be tactics or no tactics, insistence on internationalization is being carried on by your Excellency

And the internationalization of Jerusalem is a destruction which is impossible to repair

The stance of Jordan and Iraq together against internationalization may avert many dangers.

The unity of Syria and its federation with Iraq is one of the basic Arab principles decided upon in the Syrio-Iraqi Conference of 1919.

The debate on the constitution for an internationalized Jerusalem was the focus or attention or Christendom in general. Observers from various Christian sects and churches used to attend our meetings and follow the course of the discussion in the Trusteeship Council. There was also a representative of the American Christian Committee for Palestine. This is a committee established in the U.S .A. to promote Zionist aims. The representative or this Committee was given the chance to speak to the Trusteeship Council. and he supported the Israeli point of view that only the Holy Places, and not the whole or the corpus separatum should be internationalized. I told him very frankly that he did not represent the prevailing opinion of the Christian world. I knew already that representatives or His Holiness the Pope and Bishop Tiran of the Armenian Church as well as leaders or several Protestant churches supported the internationalization of the corpus separatum as decided by the United Nations.

The Trusteeship Council completed the Constitution for the Internationalized Jerusalem, and, if internationalization were ever to be carried out, it would be the best possible constitution. But, as we anticipated, the Resolution on the Internationalization of Jerusalem remained mere ink on paper like all the other United Nations Resolutions with regard to Palestine which do not serve Israeli interests. We may conclude that world Zionism, with its economic, political, scientific and propaganda powers was able to influence the great nations and international organizations in order to guarantee its own interests.

The Palestine Refugee Problem

In 1948, the United Nations, faced with a tragic situation in Palestine, passed the Resolution suggested by Count Bernadotte according to which the refugees could have the choice or either returning to their homes in Palestine to live in peace with their neighbours or being compensated for the land or property they had lost. This Resolution was blocked by the Israeli refusal to allow the refugees the right of return. Hence the United Nations had to meet an acute human problem. Hundreds or thousands of refugees living in refugee camps in squalor, misery and despair had to be red and cared for. A special agency was formed to look after the refugees, keep them alive and try to settle them. But the refugees themselves completely rejected the idea of a permanent location outside Palestine and the loss of their human right to return to their own homes. The host countries, namely, the neighbouring Arab countries also rejected this solution.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, UNRWA, submitted its report annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations which passed it to the Ad Hoc Political Committee for Palestine. The Agency report asked for contributions to its budget and described the difficulties of refugee resettlement and their insistence on returning to their homes. As representative of Iraq in the United Nations I always claimed that the best solution of the refugee problem would be to let them return to their homes. They would then not need charity for they would have their own property and they could work on their land. Besides, the daily allowance allotted to the refugees averages about five cents per person per day which is both inadequate and degrading. European refugees in camps were allotted more than a dollar a day per person. Certainly, if the Palestinian refugees were to receive the rent and the produce of their farms and property, the average income would be incomparably greater than the meagre amount allotted to them by the UNRWA.

Year after year the subject of the Palestine refugees is brought to the Ad Hoc Committee for Palestine. It is debated with much heat and varying degrees of sympathy and concern. In one of my debates I compared Hitler's extermination of the Jews of Germany to Israel’s sending the Arab of Palestine to the miserable refugee camps. Year after year the right of the Palestine refugees to choose to return as stated in the 1948 Resolution is reaffirmed. But the tragedy continued to grow as the number of refugees increased by new births. Israel shifts the responsibility to the Arab states. She wants the refugees to be settled outside Palestine contrary to the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Early in the 50's Professor Philip Jessup of the United States submitted a resolution asking the Arab states to settle the refugees in Arab lands outside Palestine. I raised s sharp objection for the United States was encroaching on the sovereignty of the Arab states. I said that the United Nations was not empowered to interfere in the internal affairs of the member states. Professor Jessup withdrew his resolution right away. Other attempts were made by the United States to resettle the refugees by proposing irrigation schemes on land outside Palestine on the supposition that the refugees might settle there.

President Eisenhower delegated Eric Johnston to visit the Arab countries neighbouring Palestine to discuss irrigation projects for areas in which the refugees might be resettled. I was Prime Minister of Iraq at that time. When I was notified of Mr Johnston's plan to visit Baghdad. I advised that he should not come. I had two reasons for this decision. First. he was a member of an organization with Zionist leaning, Second, Iraq was not ready to cooperate in any way with the purpose of his visit. for no true Arab nationalist, or, for that matter, no fair-minded human being would cooperate in a project which would deprive a people of the right of return to their own homeland. In spite of the insistence of my good friend Burton Berry. the American Ambassador in Baghdad. that we should receive Mr Johnston's visit. I flatly warned that public sentiment might lead to anti-U.S. demonstrations for which I could not accept responsibility. Mr Johnston did not visit Baghdad. The tragedy of the Palestine Arab refugees will re main a blot on the conscience of those who caused it and it is their responsibility to remove the blot by restoring human rights and dignity to the Arabs of Palestine.

One must acknowledge with gratitude the great efforts and fine humanitarian work done by the successive directors of UNRWA and their staff. They carried out one of the most difficult jobs under the most stringent conditions and honestly reported their efforts in their annual reports to the United Nations. Year after year UNRWA reported the wish and determination of the Palestine refugees to return to their homeland, Palestine, and their refusal of any final settlement outside Palestine. We submit that it is one of the greet human tragedies that the Jews who have suffered from racial discrimination at the hands of Hitler should apply the same cruel racial discrimination to the Arabs of Palestine. By what moral or legal principle can the Israelis justify the application of 'the law of return' to the Jews of the world end claim that any Jew anywhere in the world of whatever nationality, can come and settle in Palestine end at the same time deny to Palestine Arabs, Muslims end Christians, who are the legal inhabitants of the land, the possibility of returning to their Homeland? This is certainly racial and religious discrimination being practised by Israel. If racial discrimination is to be condemned when it is practised by Hitler, it should surely be deprecated in stronger term when it is practised by Israel.

UNESCO and the Palestine Refugees

One of the best services that the unfortunate refugees receive is in the field of education with the help and contribution of the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization.

In the year 1950, the Iraqi government asked me to lead its delegation to the general UNESCO Conference held in Florence, Italy. It was the only UNESCO Conference that I ever attended. In my speech before the General Assembly I was critical of the vast, dispersed nature of the UNESCO programmes and field Activities. I emphasized the need for concentration on a few specific, significant projects in the field of education, for example, rural education, combatting illiteracy and helping to educate the children of the refugees. I later proposed the item on the education of the Palestine refugee children which was adopted. When the annual budget came for consideration I found no mention of the item. I went to the rostrum end made a sharp protest after which the item was included in the budget. Since that time UNESCO's contribution to the education of the refugees has continued.

The Uprooting of Arab Jews from Arab Lands

Zionism did a great disservice to the Jews and Arab alike by uprooting of Arab Jews from Arab lands. For thousands of years Jews have lived with their fellow countrymen in Iraq, but Zionism used propaganda, promises, threats, plots and violence to make the Jews of Iraq and other states leave their countries and go to Palestine. In Iraq, Zionists from outside the country plotted and designed disturbances in which Zionist agents threw bombs into synagogues and Jewish quarters in order to scare the Jews and make them leave Iraq. Investigations showed that the bombs had been planted by Zionist agents. The Iraqi government suffered great difficulties because of the troubles in Palestine, the illegal operation of smuggling Jews to Palestine via Iran, and the disturbances caused by Zionists in Iraq.

I was in the United States when the Iraqi government decided in 1950 to permit those Iraqi Jews who wished to renounce their Iraqi nationality and go to Palestine to do so. Some 100,000 Iraqi Jews went to Palestine. In January 1951 I was asked by the Iraqi government to approach the American government asking them to provide some airplanes to help expedite the transfer of the Jews who had renounced their Iraqi citizenship. I regretted the decision of the Iraqi government to let the Jews leave, not only because the Iraqi Jews are the ancient sons of the country who should have stayed in their country, Iraq, but also because the Zionists exploited the decision in order to raise hundreds of millions of dollars for the cause of bringing Arab Jews to Israel. Furthermore, the hundreds of thousands of Jews who reached Israel from Arab lends were a force for Israel not to be minimized. Many Iraqi Jews who went to Palestine were disillusioned for, in general, they suffer discrimination on the part of the European Jews.

The Palestine Problem and Iraq’s Foreign Policy

Israeli aggression in an Arab land and the indulgence of the Greet Powers in supporting Israel on the one hand, and the traditional reliance of the Arab states on the West and their fear of Communist danger on the other, caused great dislocation in Arab foreign policy. The Arab states differed Among themselves on what foreign policy to follow. They were not united, a fact which led to internal disturbances and to clashes between the Arab states about foreign policy.

Iraq’s policy, to which I committed myself, was oriented to the West. I analyzed the situation as follows. The West, and especially the United states, were supporting Zionism for two obvious': first, lack of understanding on the part of the general public of the Arab point of view while it was being constantly fed by Zionist propaganda; second, self-interest on the part of politicians who wished to benefit from the Zionist vote, publicity and financial aid in election campaigns, etc.

I thought that, if the Arabs cultivated close relations with the West, if they built up mutual confidence, if they made their point of view well understood, and if they were clear and consistent in their policy, the West could be won over to the Arab side in the long run or at least neutralized. This would need great efforts. I thought that ultimately there was mutual need, culturally, economically, politically and military of the Arabs for the West and the west for the Arabs. On this premise I continued my friendly contacts with the Foreign Office in London and the State Department in Washington.

Iraq and the United States

In all those contacts the question of Palestine and Defence of Arab rights was the chief topic. Those contacts were not fruitless, for the State Department in Washington included men who understood and appreciated the importance of the Palestine problem for American-Arab friendship. They realized that, if the United States supported Zionism at the expense of Arab rights, and Arab Western rift might occur. They foresaw how Communism would exploit it and what danger to world peace would follow. I spent the 21st and 22nd of May, 1947, in Washington, and I called on both Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, and Roy Henderson, Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East Department, with the Iraqi Ambassador, 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayoubi. I sent a telegram to Baghdad dated the 23rd of May which contained the following statement:

I discussed the problem of Palestine with Mr Henderson and learnt from him that the American government has succeeded to a great extent in adopting a neutral policy in spite of Zionist pressure, and that the American government intends to adopt a new policy towards Palestine, but has not yet decided what this policy shall be. Two points in American policy are clear. The first is that a decisive final plan should be made, and the second is that Palestine should be put under a temporary trusteeship. Henderson asked which state would meet the approval of the Arab states or whether the Arab states would prefer a United Nations trusteeship. I answered that I did not see any need for trusteeship, but there might be a period of transition to independence. If the Arabs of Palestine are put under foreign control they will resist it no matter which state is the trust power.

It is well-known that the state Department did not initiate the policy eventually adopted by the United states government on the Palestine issue. President Truman acted under Zionist influence against state Department advice. Loy Henderson, one of America's most accomplished, faithful and far-sighted diplomats was criticized by the Zionists. He was removed from the State Department and appointed Ambassador to India. Two years later I had breakfast with him in New York when he was accompanying Prime Minister Nehru on an official visit to U.S.A. In those days officials of the State Department would fall under heavy Zionist pressure and sharp criticism if they tried to present the Arab side of the Palestine issue or to be impartial. This did not mean that there were no outspoken members in the State Department who would put America's interests before Zionist aims, but the official policy of the United States government, as directed by the White House, adopted the Zionist point of view. United States officials, in their dealings with the Arab world, usually took into considerations what repercussions there would be in Israel and what lionists might say. For example, the United States requested the United Kingdom to put pressure on Iraq to permit Iraqi oil to flow to Haifa, a pressure which we resisted.

My dialogue with the State Department took the following lines:

1. Israel should be made to respect and apply the United Nations Resolutions regarding partition, return of the Palestine refugees and the internationalization of Jerusalem.

2. American cooperation with the Arab state should be completely divested of sny Israeli influence, and American-Arab relations should be separate from American-Israeli relations.

In a report of a conversation with Under Secretary Webb, dated 27th December, 1949, I said, "The United States should cease basing its relations with the Arab world upon Israel's interests. Iraq has no desire for any relations whatsoever with Israel. No attempt should be made to persuade Iraq to open the Haifa pipeline or to have any trade relations with Israel. The United States should not bring the Palestine problem into its relations with Iraq."

3. Iraq continues to hope that the United States will play an impartial role between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine and never forget that the Arabs of Palestine are entitled to their human and political rights in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

On the 14th of December, 1950, I had a meeting with George C. McGhee, Head of the Near East Section of the State Department. Palestine was one of the items dealt with in that meeting. According to my notes, "I asked that the United State should force a territorial settlement upon Israel requiring her to withdraw from all areas allotted to the Arabs of Palestine in the United Nations Resolution. They should be restored to the Arabs so that the Palestine refugees could return to settle therein. I pointed out that the Israelis had continued to seize territories in violation of the Truce, and that they had continued to create refugees after the Truce was signed."

On the 21st of October, 1952, I had meeting with the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in the State Department. I suggested the following six principles as forming a basis for Arab-Western cooperation. I assumed that most responsible Arab statesmen would endorse these suggestions.

1. Arabs should be treated as equals by the Western world.

2. There should be an immediate solution of the Palestine question as decided by the United Nations.

3. North Africa should be liberated.

4. The West should not put obstacles in the way of Arab unity.

5. The West should give the Arabs economic and cultural aid.

6. The West should give the Arabs military aid.

I expounded each of these principles and emphasized the fact that the Palestine problem was the main thorn in the United States-Arab relations. This thorn should be pulled out. "All that the Arabs of Palestine want is justice and their natural human rights. Some responsible Arabs have gone so far as to accept United Nations Resolutions on Palestine no matter how unjust and illegal they may be. They take a great risk in doing so for they enrage Arab public opinion by their stand. The United states should, at the very least, make Israel yield to United Nations Resolutions."

These are examples of the numerous meetings I had with State Department officials, United States ambassadors and diplomats, as well as with press men and leaders of thought. All my statements were made in the same tone.

John Foster Dulles and the Palestine Problem.

The rise of Israel in an Arab land happened with the help of the Democratic President of the United States, Harry Truman. After the departure of Truman from the White House, the Republican Party took the helm. General Dwight. David Eisenhower became the President of the United States, and he appointed John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. Mr Dulles was a religious man who upheld his Christian beliefs. He was connected to the Holy Land by religious sentiments. Some of his relatives had worked in the mission field in Syria and Lebanon at the end of the last century and the beginning of this one. Thus he had some knowledge and background concerning the Palestine problem. At the same time, he himself was a realist. He well knew the strength of Zionism in America and he minutely measured the extent to which he could go in the Palestine problem. I came to know Mr Dulles when he was a member of the American delegation to the United Nations during the Presidency of Mr Truman and I was the heed of the Iraqi delegation. There was one bond which brought us together in the United Nations, end that was our resistance to the current of world Communism. When he was nominated as Secretary of State, Mr Dulles invited me to tea at his home in New York City. We met together in his study where we had a long, informal discussion. The topic of conversation was tae problems of the Arab world. The question of Palestine was one of the first and most important topics we discussed.

I started my talk with Mr Dulles by quoting a verse from the Bible which said that the fathers had eaten sour grapes and the teeth of their sons were set on edge. Mr Dulles, who used to teach Bible in Sunday School, was surprised to hear the verse and said that he did not remember such a verse being in the Bible. Since I insisted that it was in the Old Testament, he looked up the words, sour grapes, in the concordance, and there he found the verse. I told him that the verse applied exactly to American politics in the Middle East. The predecessors of Mr Dulles in international affairs, including Truman and the allies of America, namely, the British and the French, had all eaten sour grapes in their politics in the Middle East and North Africa, and, consequently, the teeth of Mr Dulles would be set on edge today.

Then Mr Dulles started expressing his sentiments towards Palestine and sympathizing with the Arabs of Palestine in their suffering. "But," he said, "today I find myself before a fait accompli." I told him that acceptance of the fait accompli would not guarantee Arab friendship for the United States, and would not serve the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East, for peace and stability must be based on principles of justice and humanity
He assured me that he would not be biased in favour of Zionism. The Zionists opposed him when he stood for election to the Senate from New York, and, as a result, he lost the election. The Zionists supported Senator Lehman, one of the prominent Jews of New York City. "But now," Mr Dulles said, "the Zionists regret that they opposed my election, and they wish they had elected me so that I would not have become Secretary of State." Mr Dulles promised to do his best to handle the Palestine problem in a spirit of justice and equity without favouring the Zionists.

Secretary of State Dulles's Visit to Iraq.

One of the first things Mr Dulles did after becoming Secretary of State was to visit the Middle East. Iraq was one of the countries he visited. I was President of the House of Representatives at that time and he called on me in my office early in 1953. We spoke then on several subjects touching Arab affairs, and the Palestine question was again in the forefront. The major topic raised by the Iraqi government on the occasion of Mr Dulles's visit was the subject of providing Iraq with arms. The Iraqi government was headed then by Jamil al-Madfa'i, its Defence Minister was Nuri as-Sa’id, and its Foreign Minister was Tawfiq as- Suwaidi. They handed Mr Dulles a memorandum requesting U.S.A. to provide Iraq with arms. He promised favourable consideration of the matter.

American Military Aid to Iraq.

When I took charge of the government of Iraq in the year 1953-54, after the resignation of Jamil al-Madfa’i, the United States Government had not yet respond to the memorandum on military aid sent by the previous government. When the American Ambassador to Iraq, Mr Burton Berry, called on me, I talked to him with complete frankness about the causes of tension prevailing between the Arabs and the West, especially with the U.S.A. I said that the main cause for the tension was the Palestine problem. .After the Zionist aggression in Palestine, every Arab began to look at America as if it were an aggressive state, supporting aggression. Because of the bitter Arab criticism and emotional outbursts against America on account of the Palestine tragedy, the Zionists began to capitalize on the situation and influence America to shrink from rendering any help to the Arabs. When the Arabs found that the United States was shrinking from helping them, while, on the other hand, it helped Israel so generously, their outbursts criticizing and attacking America increased. This was a vicious circle which had to be broken if the government of President Eisenhower wished to correct the situation in American-Arab relations.

Ambassador Berry and I agreed that the first step in breaking that vicious circle should be the offering of military aid to Iraq. We also agreed that we should enter into negotiations in order to secure American military aid for Iraq similar to the aid procured by both Turkey and Iran. If America offered military aid to both Turkey and Iran in order to resist Communism, why should Iraq be denied such aid while it was no less exposed to Communist danger than the two neighbouring countries, and Iraq was no less enthusiastic in combatting Communism.

On this basis we started our negotiations for procuring American military aid without any political strings attached. The United States did not ask us to do more than to give an undertaking that the arms would not be used for any aggressive purposes, and that they would not be sold or given as a present to a third party. These two conditions we could agree to, for Iraq had no intention at any time other than to be a defender of its own rights and the rights of its sister Arab states. As for aggression, we would be the farthest from being aggressors. As for not selling the arms or presenting them to a third party, that went without saying, for we wished to have the arms for ourselves and not for sale or presentation.

When the negotiations were about to reach a conclusion, the Zionists in the United states, and their supporters in the Congress, exploiting the season for the election of Congress in the year 1954, began to bring pressure on the Department of State in Washington. This led to the stoppage of negotiations. I telegraphed a personal message to the Secretary of State Dulles through our embassy in Washington, stating that he would not be able to face communist danger in the Middle East unless he guaranteed Arab friendship and that he could not win Arab friendship except in the following ways:

a. Helping Egypt in realizing British, evacuation of the Suez Canal zone.

b. Solving the Palestine problem in a spirit of justice and equity.

c. Helping the countries of North Africa in their struggle for liberation from French colonialism.

d. Arming Iraq and helping it to become a model in strength and development.

I wish here to express my appreciation for the stand taken by American Ambassador Burton Berry on Arab affairs, and for his support and honourable stand in the matter of arming Iraq. The negotiations were resumed and the Americans tried to set a written promise that the arms would not be used against Israel. We flatly refused that request and said that we undertook not to use those arms in any aggression anywhere, but we would use them in defending our rights and Arab rights against any aggression that might come from Israel or other quarters. It must be stated that our stand with regard to the Palestine problem has at no time been aggressive. It has always been defensive. Aggression has always come from the Israeli side.

After a give and take which lasted a few months, we achieved a Military Aid Agreement by which Iraq become militarily one of the strongest states in the Middle East. After exchanging the letters of agreement for the Military Aid I immediately submitted the resignation of my Cabinet. This decision was due to a disagreement which had arisen between me and Nuri as-Sa'id who was the leader of the majority in the House of Parliament at that time. The disagreement concerned the federation of Iraq and Syria, a project which I was doing my best to realize.

Arshad al-'Omari formed the next Cabinet in which I was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. One day I collapsed in my office and was carried home in a fainting condition. Medical examination showed that I had developed a duodenal ulcer, and I went to the American University hospital in Beirut for treatment. After convalescence I went to the United States for a medical check up. On the same occasion I received an honorary degree from Columbia University, N.Y., and I met President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

President Eisenhower and Palestine.

This is a record of the talk I had with President Eisenhower regarding Palestine when I called on him in the White House on July 15, 1954. After exchanging courtesies I told him that the most important matters disturbing Arab-American relations were America's stand vis-à-vis Zionism, and the stand of the American delegation in the United Nations with regard to Tunisia and Morocco.

When we entered into discussion of the subject of Palestine he told me, "Dr Jamali, be sure that I shall not bend before Zionist pressure, and that the Arabs will never receive any injustice at my hands. As for the mistakes of the past, it is not within my power to remove them all."

I asked him if the two American parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, could not agree to consider the question of Palestine I'S a foreign problem which should not be inserted into the presidential and congressional elections of the United States.

He answered that there was not one Democratic Party, or one Republican Party in the United States, but 48 Democratic Parties, and 48 Republican Parties. Each state had its own parties. Even if the parties in all the other states decided to take a neutral stand on the question of Palestine, one could not oblige the parties in New York state to exclude the question of Palestine from election campaigns because of the Zionist influence in that state.

While still in America, and after the election campaign for the American Congress was over (July 1954), I sent the following statement to some leading American newspapers:

During the last election campaign in the United States, the Zionists and their friends here, acting on behalf of States policy of arming the Arabs and injected this issue into the elections. Since this issue touches Iraq directly, for it is the only Arab state that has concluded an arms agreement with the United States, we feel it our duty to react to this campaign and express our views on this matter to our friends, the citizens of the United States. At the same time, we felt that any statement of this kind before the elections were ended might be considered as an intrusion.

Now that the elections are over, we wish to present to the American public the following facts:

a. In recent years friendship end mutual confidence between Iraq and the United States have made big strides, to the advantage of both countries.

b. The defence of Iraq constitutes an integral part of the defence system of the free world. It is that defence in which the United States is taking a keen interest for it is so vital to its own self-defence.

c. Iraq is an out-and-out anti-Communist state. It is the first state in the Middle East to suppress, make illegal, end combat Communism most vehemently. This makes Iraqi policy consonant with that of the United States in this respect.

d. Iraq has consistently followed a free-world policy in the United Nations on all matters dealing with Communist aggression. Its record in the United Nations shows that in all matters touching on conflicts with Communism, Iraq has consistently been on the side of the free world.

e. Modern Iraq is a progressive country which is doing its utmost to develop its natural resources. Seventy percent of the annual revenue from oil is directed to major development projects in irrigation, agriculture, industry, health and education. It is launching evolutionary social and economic reforms. This, it is hoped, will make it a great bulwark of anti-Communism in the Middle East.

f. Iraq is a constitutional monarchy with a stable regime devoted to the ideals of the free world and the principles of the United Nations Charter.

g. Iraq has proved that it is a peace-loving country and has no aggressive intentions towards any quarter. This policy we have solemnly pledged ourselves to faithfully observe. On my recent visit to Washington, D.C., last week, I again assured Mr Dulles of this fact, which he recognizes full well.

In the light of these considerations we wish all fair-minded Americans concerned primarily with the interest of the United States and world peace to be assured that any arms to Iraq will never be used for aggressive purposes, and to beware of Zionist propaganda which does not serve either American interests or world peace, for a weak and unarmed Iraq serves only the Communist cause.

Mr Dulles prepares a public statement on Palestine.

In the summer of 1955 when I was a Member of the Parliament, but not a member of the Iraqi Cabinet, I enjoyed a vacation in Mont Vert Hotel in Broummana, Lebanon. An American government official came to me there and showed me a statement which Secretary of State Dulles had formulated. It called for a settlement of the Palestine problem on the basis of a mutual Arab-Israeli understanding according to which the boundaries between the Arab states and Israel would be adjusted, and most of the Arab refugees would continue to reside in the Arab states in which they found themselves, while the United States would express its readiness to take part in offering the amount of money required for the settlement of Arab claims and compensation.

The official asked my opinion with regard to the statement, and I answered that the statement in that form was very disappointing, for it did not guarantee the Palestinian Arabs even the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions which were themselves unjust to the Arab rights. I did not believe that any responsible Arab statesman could support such a statement.

I learnt that Mr Dulles did make a statement, but I do not knew whether it retained the same wording or was revised.

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The Baghdad Pact and Palestine.

On no subject of foreign affairs did the Arab states differ so sharply as they did on the question of joining the Baghdad Pact and the policy of positive neutrality. I think it is only fair to refer here to some advantages which Iraq tried to reap from the Baghdad Pact for the cause of Palestine and other Arab affairs.

a. Nuri as-Sa’id exerted gigantic efforts in the secret sessions of the Baghded Pact to make the West modify its stand with regard to the Palestine problem. As a result, the United States government aid to Israel began to diminish gradually so as to eventually become commensurate with Israel's size.

b. On account of the Palestine problem America did not join the Baghdad Pact, for the American Congress wanted guarantees for the present boundaries of Israel if America were to join the Pact, but Mr Dulles refuse to give such guarantees.

c. While Turkey had been siding with Israel before the Baghdad Pact, it began to shift to the Arab side and gave an undertaking to stand for the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions with regard to Palestine. Letters were exchanged between Iraq and Turkey on this subject at the time of signing the Pact. Prime Minister 'Adnan Menderes assured me personally that the Turkish government was curtailing its relations with Israel. He showed me the marked reduction in the amount of trade between the two countries and he also recalled the Turkish Ambassador from Israel.

d. Nuri as-Sa'id insisted, in the Baghdad Pact meeting in Ankara, January, 1958, that states, members of the Pact, should undertake a settlement of the Palestine problem in accordance with the United Nations Resolutions, that the natural rights of the Arabs to their homes in Palestine should be recognized, and that a public statement should be made to this effect. When there was no unanimity on the making of the public statement, Nuri Pasha was angry and enraged, a fact which made Mr Dulles come to the Iraqi Embassy in Ankara to explain his stand. Tawfiq as-Suwaidi and I were present with Nuri as-Sa’id during the talk with Mr Dulles.

Mr Dulles's stand could be summarized as follows:

The government of President Eisenhower did not come to power with the help of Zionism, nor was Mr Dulles indebted to the Zionists in any way. It would be rare that the Arabs would find a government in the U.S.A. so unbiased in dealing with the Palestine problem. But the Eisenhower government was bound by the decisions of the Congress and could not take any basic decisions in the matter of Palestine without the approval of the Congress or through the United Nations.

It was agreed that the question of Palestine would be raised anew in the United Nations in the next session of the General Assembly in the autumn of 1958, and that new support would be procured for the past Resolutions of the United Nations with regard to Palestine and for requiring Israel to implement them. The following is Mr Dulles's final statement at that session:

The United States government, having taken into consideration the successive declarations by the Baghdad Pact meetings that the Palestine problem constitutes a basic cause of instability and threat to international peace in the area, finds it appropriate to make a new declaration of its desire and readiness to help solve this problem. It, therefore, proposes that the United Nations should reactivate the Conciliation Commission for Palestine which will resume its efforts towards a settlement of the problem taking full account of the 1947 and 1948 United Nations Resolutions on Palestine.

It is strange indeed that some of those who attacked the Baghdad Pact claimed that it was intended to protect Israel and that it would expose Arab lands to dangers no less serious than the dangers that befell Palestine.

The Bandung Conference and Palestine

There is no doubt that the Conference of the Asian-African nations in Bandung in the spring of 1955 was one of the most important events of recent history, because, in Bandung, for the first time in modern history, the personality of the two continents, Asia and Africa, became prominent in world affairs, and the world began to give weight to these two countries in the struggle between East and West, and in the balance of world powers.

I went to Bandung at the head of the Iraqi delegation on behalf of Nuri as-Sa’id, the Prime Minister of Iraq, although I was not a member of the Iraqi Cabinet at that time.

One of the first issues raised at the Conference concerned Palestine and whether or not the Palestine problem should be discussed in the Bandung Conference. There were those like U Nu, then Prime Minister of Burma, who insisted on keeping the Palestine problem out of the Conference. He is a friend of Israel, and his argument for keeping the problem of Palestine off the agenda was the absence of Israel from the Conference. Israel had not been invited to Bandung, and he argued that it would not be right to discuss the Palestine problem in the absence of Israel.

I answered him saying that it would also not be permissible to discuss the problem of colonialism since the colonial powers were not present. If the subject of colonialism was to be discussed in the absence of the colonial powers, what logic would prevent the discussion of the Palestine problem at Bandung in the absence of the state which was the aggressor?

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, supported U Nu, saying that the Palestine problem might lead to a hot discussion which might disturb the peace of the Conference. As the argument continued, I found some Arab states wishing to accommodate Nehru and lacking in enthusiasm to press for the inclusion of the question of Palestine on the agenda. I threatened the withdrawal of the Iraqi delegation if the Palestine problem was not put on the agenda. As a result the Palestine problem was included.

My opening speech contained the following paragraphs about Zionism:

The second disturbing force in the world is that of Zionism. Zionism is certainly the last chapter in the book of old colonialism. It is one of the blackest and darkest chapter in human history. It is the worst offspring of imperialism, for imperialism as practised so far included occupation, partition, subjugation and moral disintegration of lends and peoples which are ruled by it. Zionism, however, with its state of Israel, has added to all these evils the uprooting of a whole population and the expulsion by force of innocent people from their homes, thus making destitute and homeless nearly one million Palestinian Arabs, Christians and Muslims alike. Not only that, the loyalty of the Jews to their respective countries is undermined by developing a loyalty to Israel in order to create a Zionist state based on racial and religious discrimination.

This is no time to recapitulate the tragic story of the Palestine problem in recent years. Suffice it to mention only two facts. The first is that the peoples of the world cannot remain hoodwinked indefinitely by Zionist propaganda so as not to see the truth about Palestine. That is why we sincerely hope that the states represented at this Conference, as well as all fair-minded peoples in the world, will continue to brand Israel as an illegitimate state and as an aggressor and to see to it that Arab rights to their own home in Palestine are recognized end restored.

The second fact is that the Arab people, and behind them the Muslim and most of the Christian worlds are determined never to give up their political or religious rights in Palestine. Spiritually Palestine belongs to the peoples of the three great religions, Islam, Christianity and Judaism alike, and never belonged to the Jewish faith alone. Politically Palestine belongs to its legitimate inhabitants, the Arabs who lived there for centuries before the imperialistic designs were imposed on the Holy Land.

The conclusion is that Zionism will continue to be a primary source for disturbance of peace and harmony in a most vital and strategic part of the world, the Middle East.

At Bandung the Arab delegations met in the residence of President Gamal 'Abdul Nasir and selected a committee of three -– myself, Charles Malik and Ahmad Shuqairi -- to lay down a plan for handling the Palestine problem in the Conference. The meetings of the committee were also attended by 'Abdul Khaliq Hassouna in his capacity as Secretary General of the Arab League.

After discussing the matter, the committee recommended that the subject of Palestine should be entrusted to the delegate of Afganistan Prince Mohammed Na'im who would submit a proposal on Palestine to the Conference with the suggestion that it be approved unanimously. As for the text, it is to be found in the Final Communique of the Bandung Conference and reeds as follows:

In view of the existing tensions in the Middle East caused by the situation in Palestine and the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

Positive Neutrality or Non-alignment and Palestine.

The policy of positive neutrality upheld by President Gamal 'Abdul Nasir was a post-Bandung development. It was an adaptation of the policy of Prime Minister Nehru of India. Now that most Arab states have adopted the policy of positive neutrality, which is to the advantage of the Soviet Union, I wish that they would get from Russia a promise to help the Arabs in seeing to it that the United Nations Resolutions on Palestine ere implemented. The Arabs should also secure a promise that there will be no Zionist immigration from Communist countries to the occupied part of Palestine before the return of the Arabs of Palestine to their homeland. This is the least that one would expect as a fruit of the policy of positive neutrality

German Reparations for Israel.

One of the well-known facts is that Israeli economy stands on two pillars. The first is what Israel receives in terms of donations from the Zionists of the U.S.A., and the aid from the United States government. The second is what Israel receives in terms of reparations from Western Germany. Each of these two sources has already provided Israel with more than one billion dollars. As for the aid which Western Germany was obliged to pay to Israel, it is not based on right or logic. Reparations should be made to persons who were victimized by Hitler or their heirs, irrespective of race or religion. The state of Israel is not the heir of the Jews whom Hitler persecuted. But German need for Zionist help in the United States, and German desire to be cleared of the crimes of Hitler, both led West Germany to undertake an act of support for Zionism and to fortify it in Palestine at the expense of the Arabs. Germany, by offering the reparations to Israel, hurt Arab rights in Palestine, consciously or unconsciously.

The League of Arab States looked into the matter in the summer of 1952 and sent an Arab delegation to West Germany to advise the West Germany government not to undertake that operation. The Arab delegation did not succeed because the Zionist pressure through the United States government was very strong indeed, and Germany, who was working hard to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, needed very badly to placate the Zionists of the United States. The League of the Arab states looked into the question of threatening West Germany with an economic boycott if she pursued her policy of reparations, but the consideration was abandoned because some Arab states had interests with West Germany, and also because of traditional Arab-German friendship.

When I visited West Germany at the invitation of the government in the summer of 1956 I explained my point of view to Chancellor Adenauer and his Foreign Minister, Herr Von Brentano. I told them that the injustice of Hitler had fallen on the heads of the Arabs. The result of Hitler's action can be understood if one imagines a man throwing someone from the roof of a very high building, and, by this act, injuring a person walking peacefully along the street. In the end, as e result of Hitler's persecution of the Jews, the Arabs of Palestine were crushed. Reparations, if they had any legality, should be paid to the crushed Arabs and not to the Zionists who ere crushing them. A million or more Arab refugees ere the true victims of Hitler and not aggressive Zionism in Palestine. This is humanitarian logic and justice. To pay reparations to the aggressor Zionists to enable them to perpetuate their aggression and thus perpetuate the diminution of Arab rights is not in any way the logic of justice or humanity. But international politics, when it influenced by Zionism, does not recognize right or logic.

I was convinced, after my conversation with the Germans, that they were obliged to undertake their act of in justice towards the Arabs by paying huge reparations to Israel. They did it to dispel the feeling of guilt which was the legacy of Hitler on the one hand, and on the other, to promote their politics and interests in the United States, which would be influenced by Zionist propaganda.

Israeli Aggression against Egypt

Probably the most important factor leading to Israeli aggression was the policy followed by the three great Western powers, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, who considered Israel as a cat's paw or surrogate for their interests in eastern Arab lands. They published a Tripartite declaration in 1950 in which they announced their policy of balancing armaments between Israel and the Arab states surrounding it. This was meant to enable Israel to face all the Arab states combined. The policy was unjust to the Arabs for it made Israel grow fierce One day it attacked Jordan, another day Syria, and another day Egypt. She attacked each Arab state individually and in turn with a superior striking force. We cannot forget the tragedies of Qibya, Nahalene, Ghazza, and others. I visited the village of Qibya immediately after the treacherous Israeli attack on that village. I saw the tragedies resulting there from Israeli aggression. Innocent children, women and aged people were killed by Israeli machine guns. A school for children was destroyed by heavy Israeli gunfire. The object of the successive Israeli aggression was to demonstrate Israeli power with ultimate aim of achieving peace with the Arabs on Israeli terms. Until today this objective is still the core of Israeli policy. It seems that, at one time, Israel tried, through the mediation of the United States, to come to terms with Egypt. Some contacts were made with President Gamal 'Abdul Nasir which were referred to in the press. It was said that President Gamal ‘Abdul Nasir asked for the Negev and for a geographical land connection with Jordan as a basic condition for any peacefu1 arrangement, end that Israel refused to grant Egypt's demand.

I do not know if there is any truth in these statements. But I do know that, in 1955, when the clash between Cairo and Baghdad had reached its zenith because Iraq had signed the Baghdad Pact, Mr Dulles asked me to convey his appreciation and esteem to Nuri as-Sa'id for the noble stand he had taken vis-a-vis President Nasir when the latter was engaged in negotiating the settlement of the Palestine problem. Nuri as-Sa’id did not exploit the situation and utilize it politically against President Nasir. Mr Dulles described Nuri as-Sa'id as a statesman who put the highest interests or the state above personal differences. When the negotiations did not come to fruition, Israel used force and suddenly attacked Egypt again, killing innocent people in Ghazza and some soldiers of an Egyptian garrison.

The Triple Invasion of Egypt

When Egypt decided to nationalize the Suez Canal, both France and Britain were enraged. Their short-sighted policy led them into collusion with Israel in an attack on Egypt in October 1956. President Eisenhower came out against the Triple Invasion with all his power. His stand, at the height of his election campaign, was very noble indeed. In fact, the decisive stand of the United States against the Invasion had a direct effect on the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly condemning the Invasion.

I was on my way to the United Nations General Assembly when the Invasion began, and I had no knowledge of the stand taken by the Iraqi government in Baghdad with regard to the aggression. As for the position taken by the Iraqi delegation in the United Nations, l' was one of the toughest stands in facing each of the aggressors, Israel, France and Britain. We denounced the aggression with all the power at our disposal. I later heard that my speeches against the Triple Invasion were not broadcast from Radio Baghdad at that time, and the Iraqi people never heard about them. On the other hand, my speeches against Soviet intervention in Hungary were broadcast from Radio Baghdad. I telegraphed to Nuri as-Sa'id asking him why, if I represented the policy of the Iraqi government at the United Nations, my speeches denouncing the Triple Invasion were not being broadcast. If I did not represent the government policy, why was I staying at the United Nations?

I had no answer to this telegram. Instead I received a long telegram containing a decision by the Council of Ministers that the Iraqi delegate at the UN should propose to the General Assembly the abolition of the State of Israel. Since a proposal in such a form would not have been taken into serious consideration by the United Nations, I put it into my speech in the following form: "The Government of Iraq asks that the Israeli danger be abolished from existence." It was to be understood that the existence of Israel and the Israeli danger were one and the same.

I remember that, in answering the Israeli Foreign Minister, Golda Meir, after she had made a speech attacking President Gamal 'Abdul Nasir, I said, "Each of us is a Gamal 'Abdul Nasir vis-a-vis Israel, and each of the Arab states if an Egypt." I also called for the dismissal from the meeting of the Israeli Foreign Minister as an impudent aggressor, not worthy to sit on a seat at the United Nation.

While the General Assembly was dealing with the Israeli invasion, and while Israel- was procrastinating over its withdrawal from Egyptian territory, an Iraqi delegation arrived in U.S.A. It was headed by Prince ‘Abdul Ilah and included Tawfiq as-Suwaidi, ’Ali Jawdat al-Ayoubi, Saleh Jabr and Ahmad Mukhtar Baban. I was asked to join the delegation and be their spokesman at a meeting in the State Department with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The Iraqi Ambassador to the U.S.A., Musa ash-Shabandar also attended the meeting.

The main topic of discussion with Mr Dulles was the problem of Palestine, and most of the members of the delegation took part in the discussion, emphasizing the seriousness of the Palestine problem and its importance for the stability of the Arab world and the Middle East. The delegation suggested that the United states should undertake some effective measures to make Israel withdraw from Egyptian territory and the Ghazza sector, and that no attention should be paid to the excuses given by Israeli for delaying its withdrawal.

Mr Dulles said that he had emphasized to Israel the necessity of urgent withdrawal from Egyptian territory and the Ghazza sector. He mentioned also that an American Zionist delegation had come to see him protesting American pressure on Israel to withdraw while the Soviet Union had not withdrawn from Hungary. He had answered them that Israel had its own Ambassador in Washington who could defend the Israeli point of view. "As for you," he said, "you are American citizens and not Israelis."

Then Mr Dulles told us, "I think you know that, had it not been for President Eisenhower's decisive stand, Britain and France would not have withdrawn from the Canal."

I told him, "But the Soviets claim that it was their threat to use missiles that made Britain and France withdraw from the Canal."

He answered that the Soviet threat was made after the two powers had yielded to President Eisenhower's pressure. They had already decided to withdraw.

The main Israeli argument justifying non-withdrawal was its insistence on the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal. Israel said that the prevention of Israeli ships passing through the Canal was contrary to international law. My answer always has been that the prevention of Israeli ships from passing through the Canal is part and parcel of the whole Palestine problem. Israel calls for international law to be observed regarding the passage of its ships through the Canal, but it does not observe international law when it usurps Arab lands and when it opposes the return of Arab refugees to their homes.

At the end of the Triple Invasion it was decided that Israeli forces should withdraw from Egyptian territory and from the Ghazza sector. But United Nations forces were stationed in the Ghszza sector and in Sharm ash-Sheikh, at the outlet of the Gulf of Aqaba. The United Nations forces permitted Israeli ships to pass through the Aqaba Gulf, though it had been closed to Israel before the Triple Invasion. Thus Israel secured one of its main objectives, namely, access to the markets of Asia and Africa. Its trade began to flow, and there was no longer any urgent need of the Suez Canal. The United Nations forces, which were costing the UN millions of dollars a year, were in the service of Israel and guaranteed her economic, political and military interests.

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IRAQ AND KUWAIT

In the days of the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait and the Sheikhdoms of the Basrah Gulf were part of the Basrah wilayat or province. During the 19th century, Kuwait and the Sheikhdoms of the Gulf came under British protection. It was British colonial design that all those Sheikhdoms should be kept separate.

Kuwait, before the days of the exploitation of oil wealth, was closely connected with Iraq and particularly with Basrah. When Iraq achieved its independence, an Arab nationalist movement began to emanate from Baghdad. Relations between Arab netionalists in Kuwait and those in Iraq become intimate. In the 30's King Ghazi of Iraq had a broadcasting station in his palace from which he addressed the Kuwaitis calling on them to join Iraq. The Muthanna Club, an Arab nationalist club in Baghdad of which I was an active member, was in direct touch with some Kuwaitis who felt that the unity of the Arab nation required Kuwait and Iraq to unite. In 1938 a legislative council was formed, presided over by sheikh 'Abdullah as-Salem as-Sabah. We learnt that a move by that body to unite Kuwait and Iraq had led to a revolt against the protecting power, which reacted vigorously to suppress the movement. Some individuals were killed in the action, others arrested and still others escaped.

The death of King Ghazi in 1939 and the advent of the Second World War put into abeyance all efforts toward rapprochement. Kuwaitis, however, always had close contacts with Basrah and many families have intermarried. The truth is that no natural boundary exists between Iraq end Kuwait. There is affinity as well as one common geography, history, religion, language and culture. In the summer of 1949 Prince 'Abdul Ilah asked me to jot down some points which he might raise with the British government on his coming visit to London. I prepared a memorandum of eleven points. Item no. 10 was to ask Britain to help Iraq to adjust its boundaries with Kuwait and to discuss the question of the two islands, Warba and Bubian, in order to facilitate the establishment of an Iraqi port on the Gulf. Prince 'Abdul Ilah never told me whether he discussed the question of adjusting the borders with Kuwait or raised the question of the islands with the British government.

When oil began to bring its blessings, Kuwait became a centre of financial and political attraction. A rush of building and construction began. In the early 50's, when work started on the oil pipeline I was invited by Emil Bustani, a Lebanese entrepreneur, to travel with him in his private plane from Beirut to Kuwait, Bahrein and Qattar. It was on that occasion that I saw Kuwait for the first time and enjoyed the gracious reception Pond hospitality of the Emir and his ministers, especially Sheikh 'Abdullah Jabar as-Sabah. A few years later, during my premiership in 1953-54, Sheikh Fahad, Minister of Public Works, visited Baghaad. He called on me in my house and I had a very cordial chat with him. We discussed Iraqi-Kuwaiti cooperation in the field of public works and I expressed Iraq's readiness to let Kuwait dig a canal from the Euphrates to carry fresh water to Kuwait for drinking and irrigation. I said that the offer would be unconditional and that it was only a gesture of Iraq’sbrotherly goodwill towards our Kuwaiti brethren. He welcomed the idea at the time, but nothing was done about it. Perhaps foreign interests who wanted to construct expensive desalination installations in Kuwait worked to arouse suspicions concerning Iraq's generosity. I still believe that the project should be carried out and fulfilled.

During these prosperous years the population of Kuwait more than doubled due to immigration from Arab and non-Arab countries. Palestinians, Egyptians, Lebanese, Iranians, Pakistanis, Indians and even Iraqis flocked to Kuwait attracted by well-paid jobs
The Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh 'Abdullah as-Salem as-Sabah, who had presided ever the Council that had wanted unity with Iraq, had become internationally minded. He maintained his friendship and good relations with Iraq while being greatly impressed by President Nasir. In May 1958 he was invited by the King of Iraq to visit Baghdad and he was approached on the question of joining the Arab Union which federated Iraq and Jordan. He was reluctant to respond, for he had to keep President Nasir's attitude in mind. I had received a small pamphlet published in London and circulated by the Egyptian government in which Egypt maintained that Cairo was the centre from which all Arab oil should be controlled and directed and that oil-producing states had to fall in line with Cairo's policy. The Egyptians quickly recalled and collected that pamphlet. I had only one copy which I presented to the Emir of Kuwait.

At the time Kuwait was not yet independent. It was still under British protection. When Selwyn Lloyd, The British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, passed through Baghdad in 1956 Nuri as-Sa’id and I met with him at Qusr ar-Rehab, the residence of Prince 'Abdul Ilah, in the presence of H.M. the Aing and Frince 'Abdul Ilah. At that meeting I suggested to Selwyn Lloyd that Kuwait should be recognized as an independent state thus terminating British protection. I also suggested that the Emir of Kuwait should become a king so that it could join the Arab Union. Selwyn Lloyd said that the question should be referred to the British Cabinet for final decision.

After the union of Iraq and Jordan had taken place, the Premier of the Arab Union, Nuri as-Sa’id become quite active in approaching the British on the question of independence for Kuwait and its accession to the Arab Union, for he wanted Kuwait to share the expense of maintaining the Jordanian army. But things did not move in that direction. On my return from U.S.A. at the beginning of July 1958, I had a meeting with Selwyn Lloyd at his residence in Carlton Gardens No.1. He told me about Nuri's coming to London and about his emotional outburst concerning the British stand on Kuwait. It was suggested that an Iraqi-British meeting be held in London on the 20th of July, four days before the scheduled meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council. I was supposed to be a member of the Iraqi delegation. One of the topics to be discussed was Kuwait. That meeting never took place be cause of the downfall of the Royal Regime on July 14, 1958.

I heard again about the Kuwaiti question three years later on the night of my release from prison. On that occasion Prime Minister 'Abdul Kareem Qasim had seven of us political prisoners escorted to his office. Referring to a huge map on the wall he gave us a long lecture on Kuwait and its importance for the liberation of Palestine. He maintained that the British meant to strike Iraq in the back from Kuwait if Iraq ever attempted to liberate Palestine. After the downfall of the royal Regime in Iraq, Britain recognized Kuwait's independence. It is now a member of the League of Arab States and a member of the United Nations. My hope continues to be that Iraq’s relation with Kuwait will be based on genuine Arab brotherhood and cooperation.

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IRAQ and THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Saudi Arabia

Yemen

IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA

After the First World War two royal Arab families emerged on the scene, namely, the Hashemites and the Saudis. The Hashemite family, led by King Husain, lived in Mecca, Hijaz, and it was they who declared the Arab Revolution in the First World War in order to liberate the Arabs from Turkish Ottoman rule. The Saudi family, headed by King 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, rose in Nejd in the Arabian Peninsula which he worked to unify. From the beginning, rivalry and lack of understanding between the two families led to a clash and this in turn led to Saudi domination over Hijaz and the ousting of the Hashemite family from that area.

As a result of their defeat the Hashemite family was dispersed. The Father of the Arab Revolution, King Husain, Sharif of Mecca, took refuge with the British who exiled him to Cyprus where he spent the rest of his life. His body was taken to Jerusalem for burial. Before leaving Hijaz, King Husain abdicated in favour of his eldest son, King 'Ali, who in turn had to leave Hijaz and seek refuge in Iraq. King Husain's second son, Emir 'Abdullah, became the ruler of Transjordan. His third son, Faisal, who had entered Syria at the head of an Arab army fighting on the side of the Allies, was crowned King of Syria in March 1920, but was dethroned by the French in July 1920. He was then invited to become King of Iraq. Ex-King 'Ali of Hijaz joined his brother and settled in Baghdad. Thus Iraq became the centre of gravity for the Hashemite family, and relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia gained in importance.

Iraq is closed related to Saudi Arabia culturally, historically, geographically and economically. Saudi tribes get supplies from Iraqi markets in the towns bordering the desert. Iraqi tribes with their camels, sheep and cattle cross the borders to graze in Saudi Arabia, end Saudi tribes cross into Iraq in the same way. These are brotherly tribes bound to each other by bonds of blood end ancestry. The same tribe may have branches inhabiting Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The question of inter-tribal raids, which were a normal phenomenon in Bedouin life, became a frequent cause of friction. It was essential to set up frontier marks and to prevent inter-tribe raiding in order to achieve peace and security in the region. King Faisal I undertook this during his reign.

King Faisal I wished earnestly to clear the atmosphere between himself and King 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud. He wanted their relations to be based on sincere brotherhood. In February 1930, a meeting of the two kings was arranged on board a British ship at 'Uqayr in the Basrah Gulf (Arab and Persian Gulf). Complete understanding, harmony and brotherhood between the two kings resulted from that meeting. As far as I know, the relations between the two countries became very cordial and a Treaty of Brotherhood was signed to which Yemen later on acceded. After the death of King Faisal I, some dissatisfied Iraqis sought refuge in Saudi Arabia end some politicians contacted Saudi Arabia whenever they had difficulties in Iraq. But King 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, who was well known for his shrewdness, always preserved good relations with Iraq and never let the dissident elements influence his policy.

There was nothing between Iraq and Saudi Arabia to disturb good relations. Iraq's interests did not clash with Saudi interests. Iraq always wished the Saudis well. But the relations between the two royal families did not always reflect the interests of their countries. After the death of King Ghazi, the new King of Iraq, Faisal II was still a child and Iraq was ruled by his uncle Prince 'Abdul Ilah, as Regent. The latter was the son of King 'Ali, the deposed King of Hijaz and he considered himself as the legitimate heir to the throne of Hijaz. The Saudis are usually careful politicians. They included in their calculations the possibility of Hashemite influence and power increasing so that a day might come when the Hashemites would attempt to regain Hijaz. That is why Saudi policy towards the Hashemite family became p policy of caution towards Iraq itself. Any political move which might make Iraq strong disturbed the Saudis. This attitude did much harm to Iraq and to the Arab cause in general, including the Saudis themselves, as was proved later on. Thus the clearing of the atmosphere and the reaching of mutual understanding between the two royal families constituted one of the necessities far renaissance in the modern Arab East.

For the sake of truth and history I wish to put on record that Prince 'Abdul Ilah, in spite of his desire to uphold his right to the throne of Hijez, did not, so far as I know, at any time try to influence Iraqi policy in order to oppose Saudi policy. I remember calling on him one day when Saudi Arabia was strongly opposing Syrian-Iraqi federation. I told him, "Sir, if you would only clarify your relations with the Saudi family and come to an understanding with them, Iraq's Arab policy would be in good condition.” He answered, may God bless his soul, "Fadhel, have I ever interfered in your policies regarding Saudi Arabia? If I had done so, you would have some reason for your remark. But since I have not interfered, what do you went from me? How do my relations with Hijaz concern you? This is a problem that concerns me personally". I called on him another day and he began to tell me, with tears appearing in his eyes, that he had heard of a proposition that the Saudis were ready to grant him a sum of three million diners (I don't remember the amount exactly) if he would relinquish his claim to the throne of Hijaz. He considered that as an insult to his dignity and self-respect.

Besides the throne of Hijaz, another problem disturbed the atmosphere for good relations between the two countries for some time, and that was the problem of Haji Rasheed 'Aali al-Gailani, who sought refuge in Saudi Arabia. Haji Rasheed 'Aali had come to power in Iraq as head of government in 1941 during the Second World War, by the interference in politics of 4 Colonels of the Iraqi army. They made Prime Minister Taha al-Hashimi resign and installed Rasheed 'Aali as Prime Minister. The Regent, objecting to the Colonels' interfering in politics, fled to Jordan and was replaced by Sharif Sharaf as Regent. Prince 'Abdul Ilah, along with a few leading Iraqi statesmen, returned to Iraq and took power again with the help of the Jordanian Arab Legion led by Glubb Pasha. Rasheed 'Aali fled the country and went to Germany via Iran and Turkey. Throughout the War he was the guest of Hitler. He was tried in absentia by the Iraqi Court Martial and condemned to death.

After World War II and the downfall of Hitler, Haji Rasheed ‘Aali found his way through France, Lebanon and Syria to Saudi Arabia where he sought and was given asylum by King 'Abdul 'Aziz. The Iraqi government requested the extradition of Rasheed 'Aali, but this was given a strong refusal, for. according to Arab honour and tradition. such an act could not be permitted. The presence of Rasheed 'Aali al-Gailani in Saudi Arabia was always a cause of suspicion and worry to Prince 'Abdul Ilah who feared another plot to undermine the Iraqi regime. it one time I heard that there was an idea of arranging for the liquidation of Haji Rasheed 'Aali. but the idea was found to be unwise snd dangerous and therefore dropped. At any rate Rasheed 'Aali's status as a refugee in Saudi Arabia continued to create tension and mistrust between the two countries.

In spite of everything, the tact and wisdom of King 'Abdul 'Aziz preserved the essential brotherhood and correct relations between the two governments in the international field. During the War, King 'Abdul 'Aziz and Prince 'Abdul Ilah together came to an agreement to unite their efforts to approach President Frankline D. Roosevelt of the United States in defence of Arab rights in Palestine. They each sent similar notes to the President on the Palestine issue.

At the San Francisco Conference to draft the United Nations Charter, the Arab delegations from Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon cooperated excellently. The relations of the Iraqi delegation, of which I was a member, and that of Saudi Arabia, headed by Prince Faisal (now H.M. King Faisal) were most positive and cordial. The Arab delegations continued to work together harmoniously in the United Nations on matters affecting the Arab world.

In the League of Arab states some differences began to appear. One of the subjects on which there was a divergence of policy was that of using oil as a weapon in defending Arab rights in Palestine. In 1946 the Arab League Council met in Bludan, Syria. I, as Foreign Minister, was a member of the Iraqi delegation. One of the Iraqi proposals in that session was that Britain And U.S.A. should be warned that, in case they took sides with Zionism, the oil-producing Arab states would stop the flow of oil to them. The delegate, Sheikh Yusuf Yaseen, stood up and flatly rejected the Iraqi proposal. As a result a very weak resolution was approved by the League Council which voiced nothing but an empty threat. (See Palestine, pp.)

In 1947 when the United Nations General Assembly was discussing the partitioning of Palestine end when President Truman, under Zionist pressure, came out openly to support the partition and brought pressure on some states to vote in its favour, I discussed the situation with Nuri as-Sa'id who was with me as Co-Chairman of the Iraqi delegation. We reviewed the necessity of warning America that the flow of Arab oil would be cut. In this way we might check President Truman in his unjust, precipitous, pro-Zionist policy. Nuri Pasha agreed with me, and he contacted Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia on the subject. I learnt that t he latter agreed with us on the importance of such a move, but he requested Nuri as-Sa’id to fly to Riyadh in order to come to en understanding on the subject of oil with King ‘Abdul 'Aziz. Nuri as-Sa’id did not think that such a trip would achieve anything. He thought that Prince Faisal’s suggestion was only a clever way to avoid giving a direct answer.

It was in the field of inter-Arab relation, especially after the establishment of the League of Arab States, that the clash of families in Arab politics was openly revealed. The League of Arab States, from its inception, was a divided house. The roots of the division go to the Saudi-Hashemite discord. Syria was n prime contributing factor in the clash, and some Syrian politicians, consciously or unconsciously, played an active role in stimulating the conflict. The federation of Iraq and Syria was one of the first aims of Arab nationalists during and after the First World War. Iraq, heeded by Prince 'Abdul Ilah as Regent, felt that one of its national goals was to achieve a federation with Syria when it became independent after the Second World War. The majority of Syrian nationalists cherished the same ideal, but, as soon as Syria had achieved independence, Shukri al-Quwatli immediately flew to Saudi Arabia where he reached an agreement with King 'Abdul ‘Aziz and gave word - that there would be no federation between Syria and Iraq. This was later confirmed by Muhsin al-Burazi, who was Quwatli's companion and confidant on that trip, when portions of Barazi's memoirs were published in Al-Hayat, a Beirut daily. After the coup d'etat of Husni az-Za'im in Syria, 1949, al-Barazi became Prime Minister. (See Syria, PP.)

Not only Iraq, but Jordan's Hashemite King 'Abdullah had thoughts about Syria. King 'Abdullah had dreams of Greater Syria, and opposition to this project pushed some Syrian leaders to align themselves with the Saudis. In 1946 the Syrians brought a complaint to the Arab League about King ‘Abdullah call for the unity of Greater Syria. The Saudis immediately took sides with the Syrians. As Head of the Iraqi delegation to the League of Arab States I came to the aid of King 'Abdullah. The Arab house was unhappily divided. (See Syria pp. ) From the time of the coup d'etat of Husni az-Za'im and the fell of Shukri al-Quwatli in 1949 until 1958 I took special interest in the projected Syrian-Iraqi federation whether I was in the government or outside it. The project led to a propaganda war between Iraq and Saudi Arabia in Syria and Lebanon. I used to feel the effects of this propaganda war whenever I visited Syria or Lebanon, for I would hear of increased Saudi expenditure for propaganda against some Iraqi leaders. Thus my visits to Syria and Lebanon used to please the opposition press more than the press friendly to us, for the opposition press would 'receive' while the press friendly to Iraq got nothing. Iraq took only a defensive part in the propaganda war and never attacked the Saudis so far as I know.

George Wadsworth, who became American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia after having served as Ambassador to Iraq, once told me in New York that H. M. King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz had said to him one day, "I had a restless sleep last night. I am worried about Syria. I don't know what Jamali is doing there." One evening in 1952 in Cairo when the Council of the Arab League was meeting, I was exceedingly frank with H.R.H. Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia; I think I caused some annoyance while talking to him, for I was very enthusiastic at the time for the federation of Iraq and Syria end I was feeling bitter about Saudi propaganda against Iraq. The Foreign Minister of Egypt, Ahmad Tay'i Farraj, was giving a dinner in Semiramis Hotel in honour of the delegations to the Arab League Council. When I entered the dining room I was called by 'Ali Maher Pasha, a former Prime Minister of Egypt, to join him at a table where he was sitting with H.R.H. Prince Faisal. It was a pleasure for me to accept. After exchanging greetings, 'Ali Maher Pasha said, "Now I want to clear up matters between you." I said, "Pasha, as for Iraq, nothing has ever been done in the way of aggression or propaganda against Saudi Arabia. We do not harbour anything but good will for Saudi Arabia, and the Iraqi government has no interests which clash with the interests of Saudi Arabia. I could like you, Pasha, to ask His Royal Highness if he has anything outstanding against Iraq."

His Royal Highness replied, "We have nothing against Iraq." In my turn I said, "I should like to address a question to His Royal Highness regarding the propaganda campaign in Damascus, Beirut, Amman and Baghdad against the present regime in Iraq and the money which is being spent for that purpose. For whose interest is it and with what objectives?" His Royal Highness answered, "I know nothing about the matter." I continued to press the subject send said, "Your Royal Highness, kingdoms belong to God. Individuals perish, but peoples survive. Where is King Ferouq? Where is Quwatli? Where is King ‘Abdullah? Aren't they all gone? But the people remain. Isn't it better that money should be spent for the welfare of the people and for the sake of their good instead of spending it on harmful propaganda between close brothers?"

I now think that I was very harsh in my remark and I disturbed His Royal Highness so that 'Ali Maher Pasha intervened and asked that the dialogue should be postponed for another meeting to take place in his house the following Wednesday during lunch. We All agreed. We went to have lunch at 'Ali Maher's home, but the dialogue was not resumed and the occasion was cordial end friendly. Later Ahmed Shuqairi asked me, "What did you say to His Royal Highness? I have heard that Prince Faisal had a very uncomfortable night after conversing with you.." When I think of the conversation now I regret it. I had a just cause but I used a harsh method. That is why I feel I owe a sincere apology to His Majesty King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Not only did Saudi Arabia stand in the way of Syrian-Iraqi federation, but it also obstructed the Jordanian-Iraqi union. Before his assassination in July 1951, King 'Abdullah had drafted by his own hand a proposal for the unity of the Crown of Jordan and Iraq. After the assassination, Iraq tried to implement the will of King' Abdullah. Prince 'Abdul Ilah and some Iraqi statesmen and young nationalists went to Jordan but were rebuffed by the Prime Minister of Jordan, Tawfiq Pasha Abul Huda who was influenced, on the one hand by the attitude of the local British officials, namely Ambassador Kirkbride and Glubb Pasha, and, on the other, by Saudi objections to the realization of that union. The Saudi Ambassador to Jordan was said to have spent lavishly on some influential personalities in Amman in order to prevent the union.

On learning of the Iraqi approach to Jordan, Prince Faisal, who was visiting Paris at the time, flew to London. It was rumoured that he tried to influence the British government not to encourage such a union. When Iraq joined the Baghdad Pact, President Gamal 'Abdul Nasir's explosion against the Pact caused a big commotion in the relations between Iraq and Egypt. President Nasir tried to isolate Iraq from its Arab sister states. He called the heads of Arab government to a meeting in Cairo. (See Syria, pp. ) None of the heads of Government would consent to pass judgment against Iraq because it had joined the Baghdad Pact with the exception of Saudi Arabia whose Prime Minister, Prince Faisal, frankly said, "Saudi Arabia stands by the side of Egypt in whatever it decides." The Saudi stand against Iraq's joining the Baghdad Pact was quite obvious in that meeting. Thus we find that divergencies of policies resulted from Iraq's intent to federate with Syria and Jordan, and to join the Baghdad Pact. These moves, plus Shukri al Quwatli pro-Sa'ud, inclinations, led Saudi Arabia to join Egypt and Syria in forming a common defence pact which was called the Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus Axis. I attacked the formation of that Axis in the Iraqi parliament on the 15th of March, 1956, and stated: "This Axis is misguided and it is harmful to Arab interests, for Arab interests require close cooperation between Syria and Iraq, if not federation. This fact should be clearly understood by those who set themselves up as leaders of Arab renaissance end spokesmen in the name of the Arab peoples." Saudi Arabia took sides with Egypt against Iraq on the Baghdad Pact issue. While Iraq's Baghdad Pact policy leant towards the West, Egypt's anti-fact policy served Communist ends. Egyptian propaganda fed by Saudi rials began to echo Communist propaganda lines. It was in this setting that, in a speech which I gave in January 1956 in the House of Parliament, I included the following statement: "The Arabs are threatened by Communist activity supported by Egyptian propaganda and Saudi rials. That Egypt and Saudi Arabia could align themselves with Communist propaganda is a matter which makes the heart of every loyal Arab bleed."

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Efforts for Conciliation and Cooperation

The deep differences between the two royal families of Iraq and Saudi Arabia never descended to the level of discourtesy at any time. There were no personal attacks or abuse. In the propaganda against Iraq there were no insults directed at the royal family and no accusations. Neither party resorted to plots or tried to undermine the other. Courtesy and expressions of brotherhood on formal occasions always prevailed no matter how divergent the political out look might be.

Prince Salud came to Baghdad in 1953 to attend the celebration of the coronation of H.M. King Faisal the Second. When King 'Abdul 'Aziz died the same year, he was succeeded by King Sa’ud. Within a year or so Rasheed ‘Aali al-Gailani, dissatisfied with the financial treatment of the new King, left Saudi Arabia and went to live in Cairo. His departure removed a thorn from the relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

From then on one began to hear of mutual friends trying to create a good atmosphere between the two countries Among those who did what they could to bring the two states closer was my friend, Kamil Muruwa, the owner and editor of Al-Hayat, a well-known Arabic daily in Beirut. In the summer of 1955 in Broummana, Kamil Muruwa arrange for a meeting between 'Abdullah Belkhair, spokesman for King Sa'ud, and me. 'Abdullah Belkhair, a Lebanese by origin, was very anxious that any obstacles in the way of rapprochement between the two countries should be overcome. He promised to do his best to this end by convincing King Sa'ud that it would serve the mutual interests of Saudi and Iraq in particular, and the Arab cause in general, if the two countries reached an understanding and worked together. I impressed on 'Abdullah Belkhair Iraq's desire for closer relations and brotherhood with Saudi Arabia, and that the Iraqi government had not at any time harboured malintentions towards Saudi Arabia. The fact that Iraq desired to federate with Syria was not directed against the interest of any Arab state. On the contrary, it was to the benefit of the two countries concerned and a contribution to Arab strength at large.

Other Lebanese personalities who offered their mediation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia were Said Salaam and Haji Husain al-'Oweyni. Both had been Prime Minister of Lebanon. The latter made his fortune and reputation in building up a big business between Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.

In 1957 King Sa'ud visited Washington D.G. and had important meetings with President Eisenhower on the Middle East and Arab policy. This coincided with a visit to Washington by Prince 'Abdul Ilah and his meeting with President Eisenhower. Prince 'Abdul Ilah had come with a number of former Prime Ministers of Iraq including Tawfiq as-Suwaidi, 'Ali Jawdat al-Ayoubi, Saleh Jabr and myself. We did not join Prince 'Abdul Ilah in h*s meeting with President Eisenhower, but we were briefed on the conversation. The main purpose of Prince 'Abdul Ilah was to impress upon President Eisenhower that the United States should join the Baghdad Pact and to ask the United States to press Israel to withdraw from Egyptian territories occupied in the 1956 Triple Invasion.

It became clear that Iraqi and Saudi Arabian interests and policies were one and the same in seeking Middle East stability and resisting Communist penetration and subversion. King Sa'ud returned home thinking very much like Iraq, at the time, on national and international matters. Iraq for its part appointed Dr 'Abdullah ad-Damlouji as special ambassador working for Saudi-Iraqi rapprochement. Dr ad-Damlouji, an Iraqi from Mosul, was Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia at one time. He later returned to Iraq and became its Foreign Minister. He was well known and trusted in Saudi Arabia. Besides he was the personal friend of King Sa'ud. Dr ad-Damlouji went to Saudi Arabia on several missions of good will, sometimes accompanied by Bourhan ud-Deen Bash A'ayan, Foreign Minister at the time. Dr ad-Damlouji arranged for H.M. King Faisal II to visit Saudi Arabia. He also arranged for King Sa'ud to visit Baghdad. Relations between the two countries began to brighten and I was very optimistic that this might be for the good of Arab unity.

At the time when Iraq's relations were improving with Saudi Arabia, Egypt's relations began to deteriorate. King Sa'ud was said to have discovered an Egyptian plot to dethrone him. Egypt united with Syria in the beginning of 1958. King Sa’ud, on his part, was said to have tried to bribe ‘Abdul Hameed as-Sarraj, head of the Syrian Intelligence Bureau and later Syrian Minister of Interior, to plot against President Nasir of Egypt. It was reported that as-Sarraj handed the check which he had received to President Nasir. This made as-Sarraj a firm confid9nt of President Nasir's, but a rift was created between Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Saudi relation with Iraq, on other hand improved from day to day. A new er9 dawned between the two countries, one of brotherhood and good feelings. It reminded me of the early days of King Faisal I, who tried to fraternize with King 'Abdul 'Aziz and practice good neighbourliness with Saudi Arabia. Hashemite and Saudi harmony should have been the foundation of Arab politics in the Middle East. Had that harmony been achieved from the beginning, many dangers could have been averted and many benefits could have been gained.

In 1965 I was invited by the Muslim World League to attend the conference to be held in the Holy City of Mecca and to perform the religious duty of Pilgrimage. On that occasion I had the opportunity of having a private audience in Jeddah with H.M. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. We reviewed the past with all its mistakes and misunderstandings, but, as His Majesty remarked, "At no time did the trouble atmosphere lead us to abuse one another and to create a cleavage such as occurred between the so-called revolutionary and non-revolutionary Arabs of today." I am in full agreement with His Majesty's view that the Arabs should abide by the Islamic principles of brotherhood and cooperation if they intend to win their rights and occupy their place in the modern world.

IRAQ AND YEMEN

The relations of modern Iraq with Yemen go back to the Ottoman days when some prominent Iraqi officers served in what was then a distant part of the Ottoman Empire. Taha al-Hashimi, for example, served in Yemen. Later he became Chief of the General Staff of the Iraqi army and Prime Minister of Iraq. Sati' al-Hasri, the well-known educator and exponent of Arab nationalism was born in Yemen.

In April 1936 Iraq and Saudi Arabia signed a Treaty of Alliance and Brotherhood. Article 6 of that treaty states:

"Considering the Islamic brotherhood and Arab unity which connects the Kingdom of Yemen with the two high contracting parties, they will both exert effort to request the accession to this treaty of the government of Yemen..."

In June of the same year a Yemeni delegation arrived in Baghdad to discuss the question. Later on Iraq sent a mission to Yemen. The delegation was made up of ex-Premier Jamil al-Madfa’i and two members of the Muthanna Club, Sheikh Mohammed Mehdi Kubba and Sa'id Haji Thabit. The mission was quite successful, for the Imam acceded to the Treaty and the instrument of accession was signed in San'a on April 29, 1937. That was the first treaty of alliance and brotherhood among the Arab states in modern times, and it may be considered as a forerunner of the Covenant of the League of Arab States.

Early in the 1930's the Ministry of Education of Iraq began to give scholarships to students from Yemen who came to attend the Teacher's Training College. A few went to the Military College to train as army officers. Iraq also sent some army officers to Yemen to serve in the army of Imam Yahia-Hameed ud-Deen. Also in the 30's, Saif ul-Islam 'Abdullah, son of the Imam of Yemen, visited Iraq and was given cordial hospitality. He came to promote political and cultural relations between Iraq and Yemen.

It was well known that Imam Yahia Hameed ud-Deen had a tight grip on his people and that he had shut the windows of his country to all winds of change. We heard that some of the young men who returned from Iraq were put in jail for a time so that the satanic thoughts and ideas they had brought from the outside world would depart from their heads. I heard that one of the brilliant students, Muhy-'Anasi, whom I knew well, was beheaded. Perhaps one may assume that a basic reason for his execution was his having ideas that seemed dangerous for Yemen.

The years went by and I came in contact with the Yemeni brethren in the meetings of the Arab League Council and also in the London Conference on Palestine where Prince Saif ul-Islam 'Abdullah, an intelligent and open-minded person, represented Yemen. In 1947 Yemen joined the United Nations. Saif ul-Islam 'Abdullah led the Yemeni delegation to its sessions. In all those meetings and organizations Iraqi-Yemeni relations were cordial and brotherly. Saif ul-Islam 'Abdullah had full confidence in Iraq and its politics.

On more than one occasion Saif ul-Islam 'Abdullah and other representatives of Yemen approached me to mediate between Yemen and Great Britain, and, on more than one occasion I did speak with Mr Ernest Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and other responsible men in the Foreign Office. My British friends always expressed good will and readiness to clarify the atmosphere with Yemen, but they put the responsibility for the lack of cooperation in their relations on the Imam of Yemen.

The Yemeni inter-Arab politics was usually sympathetic to Iraq, for the family of the Imam of Yemen and the Hashemite family of Iraq and Jordan are descendants of the Prophet Mohammed’s daughter. But the Yemenis were always careful not to go against Egypt or Saudi Arabia. That is why they played a natural rule in inter-Arab disputes.

In the meantime internal and external intrigues were cooking to bring about the assassination of the Imam and the shaking of the archaic regime. I have already referred to the plot to assassinate the Imam which was prepared in Egypt and communicated to me as Foreign Minister of Iraq by Fudhail al-Wartalani. (Algeria, pp ) One of those who took part in the plot to assassinate the Imam and who was later beheaded was the Iraqi officer Jamal Jamil. I found among my papers a copy of a letter from him addressed to H.M. King 'Abdullah of Jordan and H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Iraq with copies to Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id and Foreign Minister Mohammed Fadhel Jamali. This is a translation of the letter. In the name of God the Most Merciful and Compassionate, His Majesty our Lord King 'Abdullah Ibn al-Husain al-Mufadda (worthy of being sacrificed for) May God sustain him, His Great Royal Highness our Lord, the Crown Prince of Iraq, al-Mufadda, May God sustain him. Submitted at your high threshold. Yemen is an Arab region free from the dirt of imperialism, safe from foreign influence, the region that concerns the heroes of Beni Hashim more than others and from which I address this strong call to your threshold, to your Hashemite magnanimity, to exert efforts to save it from the claws of the cursed Western policies and bad internal administration. Here is to your threshold the actual condition which besets Yemen so that you may kindly be informed about it:

1. Yemen and the Saudi Kingdom. H.M. King 'Abdul 'Aziz exerts all possible efforts to encourage His Great Majesty the Imam in his present internal and external policies. He shows him affection and friendship, hypocrisy, flattering ways with the most beautiful words of love and devotion which are difficult to describe. He is in constant touch with him by wireless with or without reason. He spends generously to spread bad propaganda in the southern parts of Yemen and western Tohama, both of which ere Shafi'ite. When some men from Yemen calling themselves free Yemenites and they are the ones who are apposed to their Imam and (who are) the country's dissidents - approach him for help he completely rejects them for he thinks that the government of his brother, His Majesty the Great Imam, is the surest means for domination over Yemen. Those people who call themselves the free men of Yemen say that the Saudi King would be enraged if a youthful state should rise in Yemen which would check his ambitions in the south of the Arabian peninsula.
2. Yemen and the British. The British undertake an economic siege against Yemen and spread their well-known methods among the various classes of people and encourage the free men of Aden and employ them for destruction only and for spreading vile rumours against the government of His Great Majesty the Imam. Thus Britain did not cooperate with the free men to form a democratic government as they said they did, nor did she make true and permanent peace with the government of His Majesty the Imam.

3. Yemen end U.S.A. The American-Yemeni Treaty has become mere ink on paper. Nothing in it was implemented, especially after the arrival of a letter from the American Consul in Jedda in which he makes an excuse regarding the stoppage of trade between the two countries for the lack of American dollars in Yemen and in which he says that Yemen could procure some dollars from Britain after Britain’s borrowing from America. Thus we find that the United States has shelved the Treaty with Yemen until the time of need for it.

4. There is a Lebanese delegation here now which is encouraging His Majesty the Great Imam to make a treaty with France. Saif ul-Islam 'Abdullah is still in Paris and he exchanges telegrams with H.M the Great Imam (encouraging him) to enter this treaty which they think will save them from all the external and internal complications. Thus the messengers of Arabism from Beirut exert effort that France may set foot in Yemen while the Arabs try to dismiss her from Syria end Lebanon.

5. You are faced with the religious, national, family, political and military duty to save this homeland from external and internal chaos and to extend the hand of help to it by sending a delegation for guidance to His Majesty our Lord the Great Imam, even though this may cause some material or moral loss to your country, especially if the delegation proves a failure in its function of guidance. But, by this you would be performing your duty and getting prepared for the unexpected and getting ready for what the near future may bring. I suggest that the guidance delegation should be composed of either H.E. Taha Pasha al-Hashimi or H.E. Jamil Bey al-Madfa'i, and include one of the learned men of Najaf from the family of Kashif al-Ghita (provided it shall not be Sheikh 'Abdul Rassoul) and Sayid Mohammed Habib al-'Obaidi who has a wonderful position in Yemen and also Staff Brigadier Isma'il Safwat Beg. The delegation shall offer the following advice:
        a. Mediating through the Iraqi government and the Hashemite Jordanian government to bring about understanding between Yemen and Britain and putting an end to British ambitions in Yemen and establishing permanent peace between the two neighbouring countries.
        b. Entering a Yemeni-Iraqi military treaty which will check Saudi ambitions in the south of the peninsula.
        c. Introducing reforms in the machinery of the state, raising salaries and preventing bribery.

d. Establishing e consultative council.

e. Forming a responsible cabinet.
f. Pardoning the culprits who are in Yemeni prisons or outside Yemen and mediating for their return to Yemen, especially His Highness Saif ul-Islam Ibrahim, the son of the Great Imam of Yemen.
g. Exempting the people from payment of their unpaid taxes from the year 1340-1360 Hejira.

h. Letting trade be free and forbidding government men from practising trade.

Majesty, Highness, Excellencies, if you carry out this policy and succeed in it, by God you will be rendering the greatest service known in history to Yemen, to the Arabs and to Islam. You will rescue a homeland which is on the verge of (being subjected to) imperialism and you will prevent the acting out the drama of the slaughtered Palestine on the stage of Yemen. You will make out of Yemen a strong pillar of security in the Arab world and you will be realizing the dreams of those resting in Paradise and you will be building a structure of glory for the Hashemites which will last forever, God willing.My servitude to the pure descendents of the Holy House in the north and in the south and my love for Iraq and Yemen. My devotion to H.M. the Great Imam Yahia and to your Great Majesty and to your Great Highness is the real motive for all that I have said, whether you be convinced or not, for I know I am that humble, guilty man who has no right to encroach on your high and great positions. But so God has wished and I wrote to your Majesty and your Highness seeking the help of God and the Prophet and your help. May God support you in whatever includes the good for the Arabs and Islam! Amen. Your servant Captain Jamal Jamil, employed in Yemen. Copy to H. E. the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri Pasha as-Sa’id Copy to H. E. the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Mohammed Fadhel Jamali Not long after the arrival of this letter the old Imam, Yahia Hameed ud-Deen was assassinated and the throne was taken over by his son, Imam Ahmad, who had the Iraqi officer, Jamal Jamil, beheaded as one of those responsible for the assassination of his father. I am told that modern Yemen has a square and a memorial for Jamal Jamil in the capital, San'a. It seems that Imam Ahmad followed the footsteps of his father, for Yemen remained under the archaic form of government. A plot seems to have been prepared to overthrow Imam Ahmad in his turn. As a result, he beheaded his enlightened, modernized brother, Saif ul-Islam 'Abdullah. I thought that was a real loss for the Kingdom of Yemen.

Saif ul-Islam al-Hasan was appointed as Prime Minister. I met him for the first time in Cairo at the meeting of the Arab Prime Ministers celled by President Nasir. Saif ul-Islam al-Hasawas a charming level-headed man who would not yield to Nasir's pressure to condemn Iraq for joining the Turco-Iraqi Pact of Mutual Cooperation, later to be called the Baghdad Pact. He could see that Iraq was entitled to decide her own policy and that there was nothing in the Pact to do harm to the Arab cause. Later in the same year, 1955, I saw Saif ul-Islam al-Hasan at the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, and still later at the United Nations General Assembly. He seems to have been enchanted by the world outside Yemen and it pleased his brother that he should stay away from the country. Prince al-Hasan became another Saif ul-Islam 'Abdullah in his hope for building a new Yemen. Imam Ahmad, however, continued to run the affairs of Yemen in the traditional ways while his son, Saif ul-Islam al-Badr, was attracted by the personality and policies of President Nasir. The Prince accepted an invitation to Moscow thinking that Moscow and President Nasir might show Yemen the way to move in the modern world. He influenced his father to be as close to President Nasir as possible.

Although enjoying the personal attention and public approval of President Nasir, Imam Ahmad wrote a poem jibing at 'Arab socialism’. But, when Syria and Egypt united early in 1958, Imam Ahmed acceded to the Union.

A Yemeni diplomat who was residing abroad sent me the following letter:

Praise be to Allah.

His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq,

Dr Fadhel Jamali, May Allah preserve you.

Allah's salaams unto you and His mercy and His blessings.

Surely your Excellency knows the real catastrophe which has befallen Yemen and the Yemenites at the hands of the erratic Imam Ahmad and his Badr. While we were awaiting relief and a solution which would guarantee the independence of our virgin land and stability in our homes, we found ourselves caught in the snares of a new Pharaonic colonialism whose pillars are made of plots, assassinations, crimes and big noise. Your Excellency, we realize today that Yemen's joining the wicked clique of 'Abdul Nasir will be a source of danger to all Arab states and that the Yemenites will yield to despondency and will be forced to surrender if they do not find someone to help them, for the Imam and his Badr have handed them over to criminal hands and tied their destiny and all they possess to that clique. Your Excellency realizes that the cause for the development of this clique and the spread of evil is due to the tolerance of the Arab States and their leniency facts which encouraged them (the clique) to achieve this great expansion so that they begin to think today of imposing their will on all the Arab states. The means for achieving this development are aggression, plots, demagogy and yielding of the Arab states which have been and still are on-lookers at events which some of them even applaud. Here we are today. We shall be their first victims and we shall be a laboratory for experiments to be applied in other lands than Yemen in the future.

The Yemenis, Excellency, possess a great readiness to achieve fruitful deeds for the sake of their land and their independence if you help them and guide them, and it may be that this people, which is considered as lost, may prove to have a hand stronger than all other hands in overcoming this clique and breaking their power. We are in need for someone to guide us temporarily. Are there any of our brethren end cousins in the Rafidain (two rivers) who will help us in these dark circumstances?

We have great hopes in your Excellency's calling the attention of your responsible brethren to this situation, for you are best acquainted with the evil of 'Abdul Nasir's clique. It is possible to resist with all effective means in a manner which 'Abdul Nasir has not known from any other Arab people. Those who can work are numerous inside and outside. Before the disease becomes acute we seek help in your Arabism in facing this catastrophe and we request moral and material help. Our destiny will be more critical than that of the Algerians if we let things take their natural course and if we do not find someone who will come to our help. Be sure that the Yemenis are your brethren. They are of you and unto you. We await with impatience your answer.

May God greet you and preserve you as a hope.

In 1958 both Iraq and Saudi Arabia had tried to influence Saif ul-Islam el-Badr to follow a policy independent of President Nasir's. An Iraqi delegation which was in Saudi Arabia met Prince Badr, discussed Arab affairs with him and invited him to visit Iraq. He did not come to Iraq until after the downfall of the royal regime in 1958. During his visit to Iraq he was taken to see the modest house where King Faisal II had lived with his uncle, Prince 'Abdul Ilah, and to the house of Nuri as-Sa'id. Reportedly he said, "These are the homes of the oppressors.” Not many years elapsed before he got a taste of what happens to 'oppressors'.On the death of Imam Ahmed in 1962, Saif ul-Islam al-Badr became the Imam of Yemen. But in the same week a coup d'etat inspired by Egypt and led by 'Abdullah as-Sallal took place. Imam Badr who was et first thought to have died in the coup was able to escape alive and to start a resistance movement. Egypt immediately recognized the government of ‘Abdullah as-Sallal and sent a force to support him. A sanguine civil war ensued which continued for several years and put an end to the royal regime in Yemen. 'Abdullah os-Sallal was one of the young Yemenis who had gone to Iraq in 1936 to get their officer's training in the Military College of Baghdad. Later he was implicated in a plot and imprisoned by Imam Ahmed. It was Saif ul-Islam al-Badr who intervened on his behalf and got him out of prison. Thus Badr was completely deceived and betrayed when he followed President Nasir's policy which was based on undermining the archaic regime by revolution and not by evolution

Although I have never visited Yemen, I have formed a personal sentiment and affection for Yemen and the Yemenis. I know several Yemenis and I know a little about Yemen's past and present. I think Yemen occupies a very special place in the history of Arabism and Islam. The Yemenis are courageous, faithful, intelligent people. With modern means of education and communication, and granted international peace and Cooperation, Yemenis might become a great pillar for Islam, Arabism and world peace.

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IRAQ and the NILE VALLEY

IRAQ, EGYPT AND SUDAN

The first Egyptian I ever met was my teacher, Mohammed 'Abdul 'Aziz Sa’id, director of the Teacher's Training College of Baghdad from 1918 to 1921. He was brought by the British Occupation Authorities of Iraq to head the Teacher's Training College of Baghdad. He was an excellent teacher, a model of honest and good character, as well as a strict disciplinarian whose discipline was based on understanding and appreciation. He was a master of the art of teaching according to the five steps of Herbart. I owe much of my educational career to him, for he helped me continue my education which later enabled me to get out of the mediaeval society in which I lived in Kadhimain. When Mohammed ‘Abdul ‘Aziz came to Iraq I was only fifteen years old, so I was not admitted to the Teacher's Training College until I had signed a paper stating that I would not claim the right to become a teacher upon finishing the course. I graduated from the six-month course as one of the outstanding students and ranked second in the class of over forty students.

Mohammed ‘Abdul ‘Aziz helped me to get work in his office and later to become an assistant elementary school teacher. When the college course was extended to two years, Mohammed 'Abdul 'Aziz advised me to enroll in the second year which I did. ON graduating in 1920 I came out as the top student in the college, which entitled me to become a full-fledged elementary school teacher and later on to be sent on and educational mission to the American University of Beirut. In the beginning of 1922 I was one of the six students sent on educational mission to the American University of Beirut. We traveled from Baghdad to Basrah by rail, from Basrah by see to Karachi, Bombay,, Aden and Port Sa'id.. We made an excursion to Cairo before going from Port Sa’id to Haifa where we took a train to Damascus and Beirut.

It was on this trip that I first saw Port Sa'id and Cairo, where we were welcomed and helped by cur former educator, Mohammed ‘Abdul ‘Aziz. I was greatly impressed by the cultural and historical riches of Cairo. For the first time in my life I attended a theatrical production in Arabic and saw an Arabic operetta. I called on the well-known Iraqi poet, Sheikh 'Abdul Muhsin al-Kadhimi, who was a close friend of my father's. The poet had emigrated from Iraq and settled in Cairo where he put his talents at the disposal of the Egyptian movement for freedom end independence.

As a student in the American University of Beirut I developed friendly relations with a number of Egyptian and Sudanese students including Mrs Ihsan al-Quossi , an Egyptian educator, 'Obaid 'Abdun Nour, a student educator, and Isma’il al-Azhari, who later became the President of the Sudanese Republic.

As a student in the United States some years later I developed close friendship with the Egyptian educator, Dr. Ameer Buqtor, professor of Education at the American University of Cairo, and editor of the magazine, Modern Education. We continued to have very pleasant professional contracts over the years . On attaining my Ph.D. degree from Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, I was asked by the Iraqi government to join the Monroe Commission which was to survey and make a report on education in Iraq. On our from the United States to Baghdad we stopped in Cairo and visited the American University of Cairo where I was asked to address an assembly of students on the topic, Modern Educational Trends. I spoke on the educational situation in Iraq and the need for education to serve the rural and tribal sections of the population which were the majority in the country .Education should prepare them for a richer and more productive life. My words had an enthusiastic reception at that time. In the course of my work in the Ministry of Education in Baghdad from 1932 to 1942 I had many contacts with men of learning and education in Egypt. In 1935 Iraq invited some prominent men in the legal field to come and work in Iraq. Dr 'Abdur Razzaq as-Sanhouri with a team of well-known professors of Law came to teach at the Law College. Dr Hameed Zaki, Dr 'Abdul Hameed al-Wishahi, Dr Mahmoud 'Azmi, Dr Othman Khalil Othman, Dr Mustapha Kamil and Professor Hasan Abu es-Su'ud all taught at the Law College of Baghdad.

In the field of Arabic literature we had men like Drs. 'Abdul Wahab 'Azzam, Zaki Mubarak, 'Ali 'Abdul Wahid, Ahmad Hasan Zayat and others. In the field of Education and Philosophy we had Mrs Nazla al-Hakeem, Miss Farajallah, Professor Mazhar Sa'id, Dr Kamil Nahas and Dr Ahmad 'Izzet Rajeh.

All these acted as cultural ambassadors from Egypt to Iraq, but they also acted as Iraq's ambassadors of Arab nationalism to Egypt. In those days Egypt was not thinking in terms of Arab nationalism. Leading Egyptians spoke of an Egyptian nationalism having its roots in PharaoniC civilization. Some writers even turned their backs on the East and claimed a Western or Mediterranean culture. This was evidenced by the book, the future of the Culture in Egypt written, by the leader of thought and literature, Dr Taha Hussein.

Through Iraqis cultural contact with Egypt a contribution was made to the growth of the idea of Arab nationalism in Egypt. The credit for this should first and foremost go to H.M. King Fasiel I of Iraq. For it was in his day that he invited the Egyptian singer, Mohammed ‘Abdul Waheb to come to Baghdad and sing his famous song ” O Sail moved by the wind of the Tigris “ Umm Kulthum, the best-known singer in the Arab world, was also invited to come and sing in Baghdad. It was also King Faisal I who encouraged the idea of a pan-Arab Conference for medical men which met in Cairo and Baghdad. It was at one of these conferences that the famous Egyptian poet, 'Ali al-Jarim, recited his poem, which was later set to music, "O Baghdad, the city of Haroun er-Rasheed, and the minaret of eternal glory."

In July 1941, after the anti-British Rasheed ‘Asli al-Gailani movement was crushed, the Ministry of Education delegated me to go to Egypt to engage Egyptian teachers of both sexes for Iraqi schools and colleges. I engaged over 400 teachers and professors. During the two months I spent in Cairo I visited Egyptian schools of various types. I also delivered a lecture in the College of Arts of the University of Cairo entitles:” Abab University youth and their National Message". I delivered another lecture to the Teachers Association about, "Education in Iraq, its Goals and Problems".I had an instructive visit to Al-Azhar, the great bastion of Islamic learning, where I met with His EminenceSheikh Mustapha al-Maraghi, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar. We discussed the conditions of Islamic education and the need for achieving Islamic revival end Islamic unity through Muslim education. Sheikh Mustapha was an enlightened and progressive religious leader. He told me about his plan to introduce the Shi’ite school of theology into Al-Azhar, in addition to the four schools of Sunni theology, so that Islamic unity might be served end the separation between Shi’i and Sunni Muslims could be overcome This I felt might prove to be a great progressive step in Islamic learning..

That visit to Egypt provided me with an excellent opportunity to develop personal friendships with men of thought and letters I used to meet frequently with professors 'Abdul Razzaq as-Sanhouri, Ahmad Zaki, Ahmad 'Abdul Salam al-Kirdani, Isma'il al-Mohan and others. I also came to know distinguished ladies in the Egyptian feminist liberation movement like Hude Shelerawi, Kareeme as-Salid, Ameene as-Sefid, Mme Mensour Fahmi, Nazla al-Hakeem, I used to visit the Egyptian Ministry of Education and sometimes I attended the technical and administrative meetings, taking part in the discussions as a member of the Educational family in Egypt.

In 1942 I was delegated to Egypt again to engage more professors and teachers. This time I dealt with Dr Taha Husein who had been appointed as Cultural Counsellor in the Ministry of Education. He should get the credit for the success of our negotiations and for drafting the first Educational and Cultural Treaty between Egypt and Iraq. We also prepared a project for an Arab educational conference and another for establishing a cultural centre for Egypto-Iraqi cooperation and exchange in cultural affairs. This centre was to undertake the implementation of the provisions of the Cultural treaty

It was by the kind advice and arrangement of Dr Taha Husein that I enjoyed an excellent visit to Luxor and Aswan dam. I really became convinced that no one could have a complete appreciation of ancient Egyptian glory and achievement in art and civilization without visiting Luxor. I came to know Egypt's greatness in its true perspectives. In fact, these visits developed my love for Egypt and Egyptians and I began to feel that Egypt was my homeland and that Cairo might well become a centre of Arabic unity and Islamic revival.

In 1943 I was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Iraq's policies with regard to Egypt were always inspired by a spirit of sincere brotherhood, cooperation and unity of purpose. Sometimes differences between the two countries arose, however, concerning: (1) the method of dealing with the Palestine problem, (2) prestige, (3) Syrio-Iraqi federation, (4) alignment with the West, and (5) Nasir's inflated ambitions for pan-Arab leadership. Throughout the period under discussion Iraq did its best to be positive and realistic in its relations with Egypt.

The San Francisco Conference

I had no direct contact with my Egyptian brethren until I went to the San Francisco conference which drafted the United Nations Charter in 1945. That Conference provided me with a precious opportunity to cooperate with our brethren in the Egyptian delegation headed by ‘Abdul Hameed Badawi Pasha., Egypt's Foreign Minister. Two persons with whom I developed close ties of brotherhood and cooperation were Mohan ‘Abdul Hadi Pasha who later became prime Minister of Egypt, and Professor 'Awadh Mohammed 'Awadh of the University of Cairo. Arab delegations worked together and consulted each other about the draft of the Charter, especially those Articles that touched upon Arab interests and the liberation of the Asian and African colonies.

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Iraq-Egyptian Cooperation on Palestine

1n 1946, while I was Foreign Minister, I attended the Arab League meeting at Bluden near Damascus which was held to decide the attitude of the Arab states toward the Western powers approach to the Palestine problem and to decide what help could be rendered to the Palestinians. : In that meeting sharp contrasts appeared between the views of the Iraqi delegations and those of the Egyptian, especially with regard to spending for the defence of Palestine. The Iraqi delegation was enthusiastic and ready for sacrifices including the rupture of the oil flow if need be. This enthusiasm was not shared by sister Arab states especially Egypt.

After the Bluden conference, Ernest Bevin, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs called for a London Conference on Palestine. (See Palestine, pp). I must state that all the Arab delegations, including the Egyptian, worked in complete harmony at that Conference in London. I must also add that the Arab states, including Egypt, showed complete solidarity and unity in their stand when the problem of Palestine was referred to the United Nations Organization. When the armies of the Arab states entered Palestine in 1946 to defend the rights of their Palestinian brethren, new and bitter difficulties arose between Iraq and Egypt. I was not in the government at that time. In fact, I was on a visit to Iran and I did not know the inside story of what was going on between the Arab governments.

On my return to Iraq I agreed to accept the post of Minister Plenipotentiary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A section of the Egyptian army was besieged by the Israelis at Falouja. The Egyptians expected Iraq to help in raising the siege, but Iraq was not able to move or render any help. Prime Minister al-Pachachi asked me to go to Cairo, meet my friend, Egyptian Prime Minister Naqrashi Pasha, and put all the military potential of Iraq at his disposal.

As soon as I got to Cairo I had a meeting with Naqrashi Pasha. No protocol or formalities between us. I found him complaining and in despair. He was not convinced of the ability of the Egyptian army to undertake any serious war, for Britain had not permitted Egypt in the past to build up a fighting army. The Egyptian army was formed merely for demonstrations and parades and not for fighting. This is why the Palestine war came as a serious predicament so far as the Egyptian army was concerned. I explained the mission for which I had come and said that Prime Minister Muzahim al-Pachachi was very much concerned about rendering help to the Egyptian army. (See Palestine, pp). I stated Iraq’s proposals for mutual military assistance, but Naqrashi Pasha would agree to none of them.

After that meeting I wired to Muzahim al-Pachachi suggesting that he himself should come to Cairo because of the seriousness of the situation. He came with his Minister of Defence, Shakir al-Wadi. An agreement was reached with Naqrashi Pasha that Iraq would offer three of its Fury planes to Egypt. This decision was carried out.

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Iraq and the Egyptian Problem

In those days ‘the Egyptian problem’ meant the relations between Egypt and Britain. Egypt was persistently working to liberate her territory from British Occupation, including the British garrison base at Suez. Besides, Egypt maintained that Sudan belonged to Egypt and that King Farouq was the King of Egypt and Sudan.

My knowledge of the Egyptian problem began in my youth when I was a student in Baghdad and Beirut. I had read a novel in Arabic called, The Beloved of Mustapha Kamil.. In that book Mustapha Kamil, the Egyptian nationalist poured out sentiment and emotion for Egypt, the beloved one. I also read his letters in French and Arabic in a bilingual edition. Mustapha Kamil was a great patriot who aroused the reader's emotions for Egypt's liberation end independence.